Owner Scorecard


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FLG, Flagstar Bank N.A.

Banks financial

Flagstar Bank, National Association, is a national banking association headquartered in Hicksville, New York which had $87.5 billion of assets, $61.0 billion of loans, deposits of $66.0 billion, and total stockholders' equity of $8.1 billion as of December 31, 2025.

Online Information about the Bank We serve our customers through our website: www.flagstar.com.

The Bank currently operates approximately 340 locations across nine states, including strong footholds in the greater New York/New Jersey metropolitan region and in the upper Midwest, along with a significant presence in fast-growing markets in Florida and the West Coast.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FLG · Flagstar Bank N.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.1B
−19.2% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $2.7B
Return on equity −2% 5-yr avg −0%
Return on tangible equity −2% 5-yr avg 1%
Efficiency ratio 101% 5-yr avg 67%
Equity / assets 9.3% 5-yr avg 9.3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 101% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$5.8B$2.6B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$957M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$3.1B$2.2B$1.7BNet interest incomeNet int.
$146M$217M$92M$84M$61M$61M$247M$2.7B$400M$341MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$495M$466M$422M$395M$511M$596M$650M($79M)($1.1B)($177M)Net incomeNet inc.
36%30%24%24%13%26%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.0%0.9%0.8%0.7%0.9%1.0%0.7%-0.1%-1.1%-0.2%Return on assetsROA
8%7%6%6%7%8%7%-1%-14%-2%Return on equityROE
3%2%1%1%3%4%4%−7%−14%−2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
13%11%10%9%12%13%11%-1%-15%-2%Return on tangible equityROTCE
45%48%49%49%44%40%42%86%101%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$48.9B$49.1B$51.9B$53.6B$56.3B$59.5B$90.1B$114.1B$100.2B$87.5BTotal assetsAssets
$28.9B$29.1B$30.8B$31.7B$32.4B$35.1B$58.7B$81.5B$75.9B$66.0BDepositsDeposits
$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$6.1B$6.8B$6.7B$6.7B$6.8B$7.0B$8.8B$8.4B$8.2B$8.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
162M162M162M155M154M155M162M238M331M415MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.06$2.87$2.60$2.54$3.31$3.85$4.02$-0.33$-3.38$-0.43EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.05$2.05$2.05$2.04$2.05$2.04$1.96$2.04$0.16$0.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$37.87$41.85$40.97$43.24$44.31$45.48$54.57$35.17$24.70$19.61Book value / shareBVPS
$22.80$26.85$25.97$27.61$28.60$29.82$37.79$32.55$23.22$18.69Tangible book / shareTBVPS

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−6.2%/yr−8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−14.5%/yr (2-yr)−14.5%/yr (2-yr)
Dividends / share−36.1%/yr−55.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−65.9%/yr (2-yr)−65.9%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share−7.1%/yr−15.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
415Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$2.1Blow FY2019
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Loss on equity
    Net income ($177M) ÷ equity $8.1B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Loss
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $0 − intangibles $381M)
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • High cost ratio (>75%)
    Noninterest expense $2.1B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 59%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 9.3%
    Adequate
    Equity $8.1B ÷ assets $87.5B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $66.0B ÷ assets $87.5B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 6%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $100M ÷ net interest income $1.7B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$381M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $122M of capital spent building

$2.4B written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership21.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio87:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$61M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
COLBColumbia Banking System$2.3B8%13%60%3.4%
FLGFlagstar Bank N.A.$2.1B7%10%48%2.1%
PNFPPinnacle Financial Partners$2.1B9%10%57%2.7%
VLYValley National Bancorp$2.0B8%11%58%2.7%
SNVSynovus Financial$2.0B10%11%59%3.0%
AXAxos Financial Inc.$1.3B16%17%47%3.7%
BKUBankUnited$1.1B10%10%60%2.5%
BBTBeacon Financial Corporation$553M6%8%68%2.6%
Group median9%11%59%2.7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Flagstar Bank N.A.’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered18%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity10%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $7.8B on 417M shares, a 10% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Flagstar Bank N.A. (FLG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FLG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FLEX its page in the Manual FLGT →

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