Owner Scorecard


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GL, Globe Life Inc.

American Income Life Division American Income Life Insurance Company Waco, Texas Individual life and supplemental health limited-benefit insurance marketed to working families. 11,920 average producing agents in the U.S., Canada, and New Zealand.

Globe Life's insurance subsidiaries write a variety of nonparticipating ordinary life insurance products.

Does not currently sell interest-sensitive whole life products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GL · Globe Life Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.0B
+3.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.1B 5-yr avg $5.5B
Return on equity 19% 5-yr avg 27%
Return on assets 3.8% 5-yr avg 3.5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The spread on the float and the growth in book value. What decides it: the gap between what the invested reserves earn and what is credited to policyholders, the mortality and fee margins on top, and the scale of the float against equity. Benefits exceed premiums by design, so a P&C combined ratio is the wrong lens; the risks are interest rates and reserve adequacy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
A life insurer is read on the spread it earns on a large float and the growth in book value, not a combined ratio: benefits exceed premiums by design, since claims fall due decades after the premium and are funded by the investment income on accumulated reserves. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 8% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.1× equity, the leverage that magnifies the spread. Whether the spread holds as rates move, and whether the reserves prove adequate, are what the 10-K decides, not an earnings multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.9B$4.2B$4.3B$4.5B$4.7B$5.1B$5.3B$5.5B$5.8B$6.0B$6.1BRevenueRevenue
$3.1B$3.3B$3.4B$3.6B$3.8B$4.1B$4.3B$4.5B$4.7B$4.9B$5.0BPremiums earnedPremiums
$807M$848M$883M$910M$927M$957M$992M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$550M$1.5B$701M$761M$732M$1.0B$894M$971M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BNet incomeNet inc.
30%19%18%18%19%19%19%19%19%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
12%23%13%10%8%51%23%22%20%19%19%Return on equityROE
11%22%12%9%7%47%21%20%19%18%18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$300M$333M$351M$365M$403M$477M$509M$515M$533M$541M$549MFloat (reserves)Float
$21.4B$23.5B$23.1B$26.0B$29.0B$29.8B$28.2B$28.1B$29.1B$30.8B$31.0BTotal assetsAssets
$148M$246M$184M$114M$203M$161M$207M$185M$250M$459M$439MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4.6B$6.2B$5.4B$7.3B$8.8B$2.0B$3.9B$4.5B$5.3B$6.0B$6.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
122M119M115M111M107M103M99.0M96.4M89.7M82.5M79.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.49$12.22$6.09$6.83$6.82$9.99$9.04$10.07$11.94$14.07$14.76EPS (diluted)EPS
$11.35$11.92$10.97$12.10$13.61$13.74$14.16$15.17$15.34$16.56$17.00Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.55$0.58$0.62$0.67$0.73$0.78$0.81$0.87$0.95$1.04$1.09Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$37.32$52.37$46.99$65.49$81.80$19.42$39.90$46.56$59.17$72.40$76.30Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.5%/yr+10.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.3%/yr+4.0%/yr
EPS+13.5%/yr+15.6%/yr
Dividends / share+7.4%/yr+7.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+26.7%/yr+34.7%/yr
Book value / share+7.6%/yr−2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
83Mpeak FY2016
Revenue
$6.0Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Strong
    Net income $1.2B ÷ equity $6.0B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

  • earned on investments
    Net investment income $1.1B
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

The float and book value

  • 0.1× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $541M, 0.1× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • the compounding scoreboard
    Equity $6.0B ÷ 83M shares
    What this means

    A life insurer is judged the way Berkshire is, by the growth in book value per share over the years as the spread on the float and the mortality and fee margins compound into equity. This is the level today; the record below shows whether it has grown. Note that reported book value swings with interest rates, which mark the bond portfolio up and down through other comprehensive income.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Gary L. Coleman$8.9M$19.2M$1.4B
2022Larry M. Hutchinson$8.9M$19.2M$1.4B
2023Frank M. Svoboda$7.2M$6.0M$1.5B
2023J. Matthew Darden$6.9M$6.0M$1.5B
2024Frank M. Svoboda$8.7M$8.3M$1.4B
2024J. Matthew Darden$8.5M$8.1M$1.4B
2025Frank M. Svoboda$9.5M$16.0M$1.4B
2025J. Matthew Darden$9.1M$16.0M$1.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$53M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Credit & receivables, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Insurance — Life & Health

The same industry, side by side on the spread-and-book-value lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEReturn on assets
VOYAVoya Financial Inc.$8.2B11%0.4%
GNWGenworth Financial Inc$7.3B2%0.3%
BHFBrighthouse Financial Inc.$6.8B2%-0.0%
JXNJackson Financial Inc.$6.7B9%0.3%
GLGlobe Life Inc.$6.0B20%3.3%
MCYMercury General$6.0B10%3.3%
FGF&G Annuities & Life Inc.$5.7B16%0.8%
PRIPrimerica$3.3B23%2.9%
Group median11%0.6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Globe Life Inc.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered10%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity22%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $5.6B on 78M shares, a 22% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Globe Life Inc. (GL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GL, data as of 2026-07-09.

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