Owner Scorecard


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GLOO, Gloo Holdings Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Revenue is led by Platform Solutions (40%) and Advertising (28%), with 3 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
GLOO · Gloo Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$95M
+307.7% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $124M 3-yr avg $46M
Operating margin −84.6% 3-yr avg −227.3%
ROIC −67% 3-yr avg −76%
Owner-earnings margin −63% 3-yr avg −161%
Free cash flow margin −63% 3-yr avg −161%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −209% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 16% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Platform Solutions at 40%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Platform Solutions40%$37M
  • Advertising28%$26M
  • Subscription18%$17M
  • Marketplace15%$14M
  • Come And See3%$3M
  • YouVision1%$700K
  • Other1%$700K

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2024–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$21M$23M$95M$124MRevenueRevenue
62%65%63%53%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($45M)($83M)($108M)($105M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−209.1%−358.7%−114.3%−84.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($48M)($86M)($157M)($148M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($41M)($46M)($80M)($76M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M$8M$11M$12MDepreciationDeprec.
$378K$28M$50M$42MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$450K$425K$1M$2MCapexCapex
2.1%1.8%1.3%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($42M)($47M)($82M)($78M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−196.5%−200.5%−86.3%−63.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($42M)($47M)($82M)($78M)Free cash flowFCF
−196.5%−200.5%−86.3%−63.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$19M$2M$10M$10MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-76%-67%ROICROIC
-116%-121%Return on equityROE
−116%−121%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$14M$57M$33MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$623K$11M$10MReceivablesReceiv.
$1M$1M$1MInventoryInvent.
$4M$9M$6MAccounts payablePayables
($2M)$3M$6MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$18M$76M$51MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$21M$49M$54MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.6×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$43M$28M$107M$107MGoodwillGoodwill
$121M$264M$239MTotal assetsAssets
$70M$35M$34MTotal debtDebt
$57M($22M)$848KNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-11.7×-17.6×-7.5×-8.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($268M)($345M)$135M$122MShareholders’ equityEquity
8.8%16.3%16.3%13.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
7.6M7.8M22.7M80.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.81$2.99$4.17$1.53Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-6.37$-11.04$-6.92$-1.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$-5.52$-6.00$-3.60$-0.97Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.52$-6.00$-3.60$-0.97Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.06$0.05$0.05$0.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-35.31$-44.40$5.96$1.51Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.92 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.56 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Platform Solutions+11249.1%
    “Platform solutions revenue increased by $37.1 million primarily due to the acquisitions of Gloo Capital Partners Midwestern, Masterworks, and Servant during the year ended January 31, 2026, none of which contributed to platform solutions revenue for the year ended January 31, 2025.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Advertising+1463.3%
    “Advertising revenue increased by $24.5 million as a result of the acquisition of Masterworks.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Subscription+138.7%
    “Subscription revenue increased primarily as a result of an increased customer base driven by the broadening of our geographic and product footprint through strategic acquisitions, including Church Law & Tax, ChurchSalary and Visitor Reach.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2024–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
23Mpeak FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($82M)owner earningsvs.($157M)net incomelow FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $157M loss into ($82M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024
Reported net income($157M)($86M)($48M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$11M+$8M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$15M+$4M+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$50M+$28M+$378K
Cash from operations($80M)($46M)($41M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1M−$425K−$450K
Owner earnings($82M)($47M)($42M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-86%-201%-196%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer ($97M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($108M) ÷ interest expense $14M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $57M − debt $35M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $22M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($85M) ÷ invested capital $113M (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    3-yr median margin, range -201%–-86%; latest ($82M) = operating cash ($80M) − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -86% of revenue this year, a -196% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves ($97M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($157M) · cash from operations ($80M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.11×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $11M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $95M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $35M vs $27M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.20/share (latest year $-1.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$51M
  • Cash & short-term investments$33M
  • Receivables$10M
  • Inventory$1M
  • Other current assets$6M
Current liabilities$54M
  • Debt due within a year$18M
  • Accounts payable$6M
  • Other current liabilities$30M
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.61×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($3M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$18M due · $33M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+237.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($21M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($44M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$42M$8M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$13Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$145M55% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity79%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$31Mover 3 years buying other businesses, against $2M of capital spent building

$28M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 88% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership9.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$15M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 16% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
INODInnodata Inc.$252M-0.8%-1%3%
BBAIBigBear.ai Inc.$128M25%-62.6%-31%-19%
CEVACeva, Inc.$110M89%-1.2%-0%7%
RUMRumble Inc.$101M-125.9%-322%-86%
GLOOGloo Holdings Inc.$95M-209.1%-76%-196%
RDVTRed Violet Inc. Common Stock$90M-3.0%-3%20%
ISSCInnovative Solutions and Support Inc.$84M55%16.9%11%12%
SLPSimulations Plus Inc.$79M74%27.8%9%29%
Group median-2.1%-2%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Gloo Holdings Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−63%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gloo Holdings Inc. (GLOO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GLOO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GLIBK its page in the Manual GLP →

Industry order: ← GLOB the IT Services & Consulting chapter GMHS →