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GLOO, Gloo Holdings Inc.
Revenue is led by Platform Solutions (40%) and Advertising (28%), with 3 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −209% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 16% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Platform Solutions at 40%.
- Platform Solutions40%$37M
- Advertising28%$26M
- Subscription18%$17M
- Marketplace15%$14M
- Come And See3%$3M
- YouVision1%$700K
- Other1%$700K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2024–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $21M | $23M | $95M | $124M | RevenueRevenue |
| 62% | 65% | 63% | 53% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($45M) | ($83M) | ($108M) | ($105M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −209.1% | −358.7% | −114.3% | −84.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($48M) | ($86M) | ($157M) | ($148M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($41M) | ($46M) | ($80M) | ($76M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $5M | $8M | $11M | $12M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $378K | $28M | $50M | $42M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $450K | $425K | $1M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 1.8% | 1.3% | 1.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($42M) | ($47M) | ($82M) | ($78M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −196.5% | −200.5% | −86.3% | −63.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($42M) | ($47M) | ($82M) | ($78M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −196.5% | −200.5% | −86.3% | −63.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $19M | $2M | $10M | $10M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -76% | -67% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -116% | -121% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −116% | −121% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| — | $14M | $57M | $33M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $623K | $11M | $10M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $1M | $1M | $1M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $4M | $9M | $6M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($2M) | $3M | $6M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $18M | $76M | $51M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $21M | $49M | $54M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 1.6× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $43M | $28M | $107M | $107M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $121M | $264M | $239M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $70M | $35M | $34M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $57M | ($22M) | $848K | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -11.7× | -17.6× | -7.5× | -8.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($268M) | ($345M) | $135M | $122M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 8.8% | 16.3% | 16.3% | 13.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 7.6M | 7.8M | 22.7M | 80.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.81 | $2.99 | $4.17 | $1.53 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-6.37 | $-11.04 | $-6.92 | $-1.83 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-5.52 | $-6.00 | $-3.60 | $-0.97 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-5.52 | $-6.00 | $-3.60 | $-0.97 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.06 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-35.31 | $-44.40 | $5.96 | $1.51 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.92 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3.56 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Platform Solutions+11249.1%
“Platform solutions revenue increased by $37.1 million primarily due to the acquisitions of Gloo Capital Partners Midwestern, Masterworks, and Servant during the year ended January 31, 2026, none of which contributed to platform solutions revenue for the year ended January 31, 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Advertising+1463.3%
“Advertising revenue increased by $24.5 million as a result of the acquisition of Masterworks.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Subscription+138.7%
“Subscription revenue increased primarily as a result of an increased customer base driven by the broadening of our geographic and product footprint through strategic acquisitions, including Church Law & Tax, ChurchSalary and Visitor Reach.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2024–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $157M loss into ($82M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($157M) | ($86M) | ($48M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$11M | +$8M | +$5M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$15M | +$4M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$50M | +$28M | +$378K |
| Cash from operations | ($80M) | ($46M) | ($41M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1M | −$425K | −$450K |
| Owner earnings | ($82M) | ($47M) | ($42M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -86% | -201% | -196% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer ($97M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($108M) ÷ interest expense $14M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $57M − debt $35M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $22M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($85M) ÷ invested capital $113M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -1%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -196%Consumes cash through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -201%–-86%; latest ($82M) = operating cash ($80M) − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -86% of revenue this year, a -196% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves ($97M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($80M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($157M) · cash from operations ($80M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.11×HarvestingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $11M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $95M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $35M vs $27M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.20/share (latest year $-1.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$33M
- Receivables$10M
- Inventory$1M
- Other current assets$6M
- Debt due within a year$18M
- Accounts payable$6M
- Other current liabilities$30M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$28M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 88% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership9.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 16% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INODInnodata Inc. | $252M | — | -0.8% | -1% | 3% |
| BBAIBigBear.ai Inc. | $128M | 25% | -62.6% | -31% | -19% |
| CEVACeva, Inc. | $110M | 89% | -1.2% | -0% | 7% |
| RUMRumble Inc. | $101M | — | -125.9% | -322% | -86% |
| GLOOGloo Holdings Inc. | $95M | — | -209.1% | -76% | -196% |
| RDVTRed Violet Inc. Common Stock | $90M | — | -3.0% | -3% | 20% |
| ISSCInnovative Solutions and Support Inc. | $84M | 55% | 16.9% | 11% | 12% |
| SLPSimulations Plus Inc. | $79M | 74% | 27.8% | 9% | 29% |
| Group median | — | — | -2.1% | -2% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFGloo Holdings Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← GLIBK its page in the Manual GLP →
Industry order: ← GLOB the IT Services & Consulting chapter GMHS →