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GLP, Global Partners LP Common

We are one of the largest independent owners, suppliers and operators of gasoline stations and convenience stores, primarily in Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Maryland and Virginia.

We own, control or have access to a large terminal network of refined petroleum products and renewable fuels—with connectivity to strategic rail, pipeline and marine assets—spanning from Maine to Florida and into the U.S.

As of December 31, 2025, we had a portfolio of 1,524 owned, leased and/or supplied gasoline stations, including 290 directly operated convenience stores, primarily in the Northeast, as well as 67 gasoline stations located in Texas that are operated or supplied by our joint venture, Spring Partners Retail LLC ("SPR").

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GLP · Global Partners LP Common

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$18.6B

+8.1% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $8.9B 5-yr avg $16.9B

Operating margin 3.2% 5-yr avg 1.5%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 5.8% and operating margin about 1.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −1.8% to 2.4% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$8.2B	$8.9B	$12.7B	$13.1B	$8.3B	$13.2B	$18.9B	$16.5B	$17.2B	$18.6B	$8.9B	RevenueRevenue
7%	7%	5%	5%	9%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	—	Gross marginGross mgn
2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($152M)	$120M	$197M	$139M	$192M	$142M	$460M	$244M	$251M	$235M	$285M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.8%	1.3%	1.6%	1.1%	2.3%	1.1%	2.4%	1.5%	1.5%	1.3%	3.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($199M)	$59M	$104M	$36M	$102M	$61M	$362M	$153M	$110M	$98M	$149M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	5%	3%	-0%	2%	4%	5%	4%	1%	0%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($120M)	$348M	$169M	$94M	$313M	$50M	$480M	$512M	$32M	$285M	$232M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$75M	$287M	$62M	$57M	$209M	($11M)	$115M	$349M	($94M)	$173M	($30M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$71M	$50M	$69M	$83M	$76M	$102M	$107M	$89M	$103M	$91M	$105M	CapexCapex
0.9%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%	1.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($158M)	$299M	$100M	$34M	$274M	($11M)	$373M	$424M	($48M)	$193M	$126M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.9%	3.3%	0.8%	0.3%	3.3%	−0.1%	2.0%	2.6%	−0.3%	1.0%	1.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($191M)	$299M	$100M	$12M	$236M	($51M)	$373M	$424M	($72M)	$193M	$126M	Free cash flowFCF
−2.3%	3.3%	0.8%	0.1%	2.8%	−0.4%	2.0%	2.6%	−0.4%	1.0%	1.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$38M	$172M	—	—	$18M	$256M	$2M	—	—	$2M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$291K	$4M	$3M	$4M	$14M	$10M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
											Balance sheet
$10M	$15M	$8M	$12M	$10M	$11M	$4M	$20M	$8M	$12M	$18M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$421M	$417M	$335M	$413M	$227M	$411M	$479M	$552M	$473M	$530M	$773M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$522M	$351M	$386M	$450M	$384M	$510M	$567M	$397M	$594M	$549M	$736M	InventoryInvent.
$320M	$313M	$309M	$373M	$208M	$353M	$531M	$649M	$510M	$573M	$750M	Accounts payablePayables
$623M	$455M	$412M	$490M	$404M	$567M	$515M	$300M	$557M	$506M	$759M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$878M	$875M	$1.0B	$781M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$799M	$669M	$583M	$754M	$498M	$840M	$971M	$983M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.3×	1.5×	1.3×	1.6×	1.3×	1.2×	1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$295M	$312M	$327M	$324M	$324M	$328M	$428M	$429M	$422M	$422M	$422M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$4.3B	Total assetsAssets
$659M	$662M	$664M	$691M	$738M	$739M	$741M	$743M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Total debtDebt
$649M	$647M	$656M	$678M	$728M	$728M	$737M	$723M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
33.5M	33.6M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	33.8M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$245.78	$265.22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$263.84	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-5.95	$1.75	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$4.42	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-4.72	$8.88	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3.73	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.70	$8.88	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3.73	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.13	$1.48	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3.12	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.9%/yr (1-yr)	+7.9%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share	−30.3%/yr (1-yr)	−30.3%/yr (1-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Gross margin

6%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$193Mowner earningsvs.$98Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $98M of profit into $193M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$98M

Owner earnings$193M · 1% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$98M	$110M	$153M	$362M	$61M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$13M	+$15M	+$11M	+$3M	+$707K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$173M	−$94M	+$349M	+$115M	−$11M
Cash from operations	$285M	$32M	$512M	$480M	$50M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$91M	−$80M	−$89M	−$107M	−$62M
Owner earnings	$193M	($48M)	$424M	$373M	($11M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$23M	—	—	−$40M
Free cash flow	$193M	($72M)	$424M	$373M	($51M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	0%	3%	2%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $180M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.2×

Adequate

Operating income $235M ÷ interest expense $73M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 5.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $12M − debt $1.2B

What this means
Netting $12M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 5.2× a year's operating profit (5.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 10d

Tight

DSO 10 + DIO 11 − DPO 12 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -2%–3%; latest $193M = operating cash $285M − maintenance capex $91M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $180M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.91×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $285M ÷ net income $98M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 5%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $193M

What this means
Of $193M Owner Earnings, $10M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $10M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($13M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.06×

Maintaining

Capex $91M ÷ depreciation $86M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $18.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $151M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.56/share (latest year $2.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 0% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, 1% lately, median 1%.
Owner earnings growth +0%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −1.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.0%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B

Cash & short-term investments$18M
Receivables$773M
Inventory$736M
Other current assets$180M

Current liabilities$1.5B

Accounts payable$750M
Other current liabilities$774M

Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.64×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$184Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$373M$373M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.6B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$74M

'27$89M

'28$78M

'29$53M

'30$43M

later$148M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$74Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$485Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$385Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.2B

Lease obligations (present value)$385M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.6B, of which the leases are 24%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$842M · 39%
Buybacks$35M · 2%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 59%

Returned to owners$35M
2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $35M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $574M and cash and short-term investments rose $8M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $35M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count0.9%
The diluted count barely moved (34M to 34M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained13%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($850M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $110M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$435M11% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$486Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $842M of capital spent building

$122M written down across 1 year (2016): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 25% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership41.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2012 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Global Partners LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?11% → 17% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $943M to $1.5B while revenue grew 8%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (11% of revenue then, 17% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $278M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UNFIUnited Natural Foods	$31.8B	14%	0.4%	5%	1%
GLPGlobal Partners LP Common	$18.6B	6%	1.4%	—	1%
ANDEAndersons	$11.0B	6%	1.0%	4%	1%
SEBSeaboard Corporation	$9.7B	8%	3.5%	4%	2%
CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common	$3.7B	8%	1.8%	—	2%
CENTCentral Garden & Pet	$3.1B	30%	7.4%	10%	7%
ASHAshland	$1.8B	30%	3.0%	2%	4%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.	$536M	28%	13.3%	14%	8%
Group median	—	11%	2.4%	—	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Global Partners LP Common has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Global Partners LP Common earns about $170M on its 0.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($170M) Net of stock comp (−$17M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($140M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $126M on 34M diluted shares; net debt $1.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($105M) runs well above depreciation ($95M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $140M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GLP against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Global Partners LP Common (GLP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GLP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GLOO its page in the Manual GLPI →

Industry order: ← EQNR the Refining & Marketing chapter HES →