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GXO, GXO Logistics

GXO Logistics, Inc. is the largest pure-play contract logistics provider in the world and a foremost innovator in the industry.

Our revenue is diversified among over one thousand customers, including many multinational corporations, across numerous verticals.

We design and operate the most advanced warehouse solutions in the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GXO · GXO Logistics

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$13.2B

+12.5% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $13.5B 5-yr avg $10.3B

Operating margin 2.5% 5-yr avg 2.3%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Omnichannel retail (49%) and Technology and consumer electronics (12%), with 4 more lines behind.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 1.9% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.3% to 3.3% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Omnichannel retail at 49%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Omnichannel retail49%$6.4B
Technology and consumer electronics12%$1.6B
Industrial and manufacturing12%$1.5B
Food and beverage10%$1.4B
Consumer packaged goods10%$1.3B
Other7%$960M

By geographyUnited Kingdom48%United States24%Netherlands8%France6%Other6%Spain5%Italy3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$6.1B	$6.2B	$7.9B	$9.0B	$9.8B	$11.7B	$13.2B	$13.5B	RevenueRevenue
8%	10%	9%	10%	10%	9%	8%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$150M	$16M	$151M	$242M	$318M	$218M	$245M	$340M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.5%	0.3%	1.9%	2.7%	3.3%	1.9%	1.9%	2.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$60M	($31M)	$153M	$197M	$229M	$134M	$32M	$132M	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	—	-6%	25%	13%	6%	—	37%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$145M	$333M	$455M	$542M	$558M	$549M	$434M	$436M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$302M	$323M	$335M	$329M	$361M	$415M	$457M	$463M	DepreciationDeprec.
($240M)	$16M	($61M)	($17M)	($67M)	($39M)	($102M)	($204M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$222M	$222M	$250M	$342M	$274M	$359M	$324M	$311M	CapexCapex
3.6%	3.6%	3.1%	3.8%	2.8%	3.1%	2.5%	2.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($77M)	$111M	$205M	$200M	$284M	$190M	$110M	$125M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.3%	1.8%	2.6%	2.2%	2.9%	1.6%	0.8%	0.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($77M)	$111M	$205M	$200M	$284M	$190M	$110M	$125M	Free cash flowFCF
−1.3%	1.8%	2.6%	2.2%	2.9%	1.6%	0.8%	0.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$30M	$0	$876M	$149M	$863M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$200M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	—	5%	5%	7%	4%	2%	4%	ROICROIC
2%	-1%	7%	7%	8%	4%	1%	4%	Return on equityROE
2%	−1%	7%	7%	8%	4%	1%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$200M	$328M	$333M	$495M	$468M	$413M	$854M	$794M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.0B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$415M	$624M	$717M	$709M	$776M	$758M	$713M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$809M	$883M	$930M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$3.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$1.7B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$3.2B	$3.9B	$3.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.1×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	0.8×	0.8×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$3.5B	$3.8B	$3.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$6.5B	$7.3B	$9.2B	$9.5B	$11.3B	$12.3B	$12.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$673M	$961M	$1.8B	$1.6B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$3.1B	Total debtDebt
—	$345M	$628M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.3B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.5×	0.7×	7.2×	8.3×	6.0×	2.1×	1.8×	2.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.0B	$3.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
115M	115M	116M	118M	119M	120M	116M	116M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$53.16	$54.05	$68.69	$76.46	$81.83	$97.74	$113.31	$116.53	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.52	$-0.27	$1.32	$1.67	$1.92	$1.12	$0.28	$1.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.67	$0.97	$1.77	$1.70	$2.38	$1.59	$0.95	$1.08	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.67	$0.97	$1.77	$1.70	$2.38	$1.59	$0.95	$1.08	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.94	$1.94	$2.16	$2.91	$2.29	$3.00	$2.79	$2.68	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$23.53	$24.63	$20.34	$22.49	$24.37	$25.07	$25.65	$25.62	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.4%/yr	+16.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	−0.5%/yr
EPS	−10.2%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+6.2%/yr	+7.5%/yr
Book value / share	+1.4%/yr	+0.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

116Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

2%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

20.1×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$110Mowner earningsvs.$32Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $32M of profit into $110M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$32M

Owner earnings$110M · 1% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$32M	$134M	$229M	$197M	$153M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$457M	+$415M	+$361M	+$329M	+$335M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$47M	+$39M	+$35M	+$33M	+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$102M	−$39M	−$67M	−$17M	−$61M
Cash from operations	$434M	$549M	$558M	$542M	$455M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$324M	−$359M	−$274M	−$342M	−$250M
Owner earnings	$110M	$190M	$284M	$200M	$205M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	2%	3%	2%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $47M), owner earnings is nearer $63M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.8×

Thin

Operating income $245M ÷ interest expense $133M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B · 9.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $854M − debt $3.1B

What this means
Netting $854M of cash and short-term investments against $3.1B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, about 9.0× a year's operating profit (12.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range 2%–7%; 2% latest = NOPAT $123M ÷ invested capital $5.2B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $110M = operating cash $434M − maintenance capex $324M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 2%)

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $47M of SBC) leaves $63M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 13.56×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $434M ÷ net income $32M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 182%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $200M ÷ Owner Earnings $110M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $110M of Owner Earnings, $200M (182%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $200M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $47M stock comp, the real buyback was about $153M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.71×

Harvesting

Capex $324M ÷ depreciation $457M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.85×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.1B vs ($587M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +117%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.14/share (latest year $0.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.93/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 2% early, 2% lately, median 2%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +44%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 44% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 0.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +0.2%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Despite measures we have implemented to manage these risks, our systems may remain vulnerable, and a failure to prevent, detect, or mitigate issues arising from the use of AI could result in operational disruptions, unauthorized access to or disclosure of confidential or proprietary information, litigation, regulatory …”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.2B

Cash & short-term investments$794M
Receivables$2.0B
Other current assets$397M

Current liabilities$3.8B

Debt due within a year$35M
Accounts payable$713M
Other current liabilities$3.0B

Current ratio0.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.85×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($564M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$35M due · $794M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$4.5B$2.9B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $6.2B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$371Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$400M

'27$275M

'28$0

'29$600M

'30$587M

later$900M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$400Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$675Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$600Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$2.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$794M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$110M

Together, against $400M due next year2.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $904M against the $400M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$922M

'27$757M

'28$555M

'29$382M

'30$275M

later$859M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$922Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$3.8Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$3.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.1B

Lease obligations (present value)$3.1B

Total fixed claims on the business$6.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.2B, of which the leases are 50%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.0B · 66%
Buybacks$200M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$823M · 27%

Returned to owners$200M
20% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $200M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$37.04
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $200M, about $37.04 each.
Net change in share count1.1%
The diluted count rose from 115M to 116M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained20%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($574M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $115M, so each retained $1 added about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.7B38% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $2.0B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$10.2M	$19.6M	$205M
2022	$4.9M	−$9.4M	$200M
2023	$6.7M	$11.9M	$284M
2024	$5.5M	−$436k	$190M
2025	$4.9M	$2.0M	$110M
2025	$7.6M	$7.5M	$110M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$47M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why GXO Logistics is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GXOGXO Logistics	$13.2B	—	1.9%	4%	2%
EXPDExpeditors International of Washington, Inc.	$11.1B	—	10.0%	66%	7%
RXORXO Inc.	$5.7B	—	1.4%	4%	0%
BCOBrinks Company (The)	$5.3B	23%	8.1%	11%	6%
HUBGHub Group	$3.9B	12%	3.6%	9%	3%
GBTGGlobal Business Travel Group Inc.	$2.7B	—	-5.5%	-7%	-12%
RLGTRadiant Logistics Inc.	$903M	—	2.5%	10%	1%
Group median	—	—	2.5%	9%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GXO Logistics has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, GXO Logistics earns about $236M on its 1.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($236M) Net of stock comp (−$45M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+44%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $125M on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $2.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GXO against another business →

The owners of GXO: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GXO Logistics (GXO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GXO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GWW its page in the Manual GYRE →

Industry order: ← GBTG the Hotels & Resorts chapter H →