Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← GYRE Manual HAE → ← GXO Hotels & Resorts HAFN →

H, Hyatt Hotels Corporation

Hotels & Resorts diversified Serial acquirer

Hyatt Hotels Corporation is a global hospitality company with widely recognized, industry-leading brands and a tradition of innovation developed over our almost 70-year history.

Hyatt's portfolio of properties consists of full service hotels and resorts, select service hotels, all-inclusive resorts, and other properties, including timeshare, fractional, and other forms of residential and vacation units.

Our offering includes brands across five distinct portfolios.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
H · Hyatt Hotels Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.1B
+6.8% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $7.1B 5-yr avg $5.9B
Operating margin 5.6% 5-yr avg 10.8%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 8 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 8.4% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −40% to 26% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

30% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States70%$5.0B
  • International30%$2.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$4.3B$4.5B$4.5B$5.0B$2.1B$3.0B$5.9B$6.7B$6.6B$7.1B$7.1BRevenueRevenue
7%8%7%8%16%12%8%9%8%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$358M$801M$1.0B$1.1B($832M)$207M$513M$455M$1.7B$395M$400MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.4%18.0%23.1%21.5%−40.3%6.8%8.7%6.8%26.2%5.6%5.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$206M$389M$769M$766M($703M)($222M)$455M$220M$1.3B($52M)($34M)Net incomeNet inc.
27%46%19%24%29%17%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$462M$587M$341M$396M($611M)$315M$674M$800M$633M$379M$326MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$326M$348M$327M$329M$310M$310M$426M$397M$333M$325M$321MDepreciationDeprec.
($96M)($182M)($783M)($734M)($246M)$168M($268M)$108M($1.1B)$32M($32M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$211M$298M$297M$369M$122M$111M$201M$198M$170M$220M$213MCapexCapex
4.9%6.7%6.7%7.4%5.9%3.7%3.4%3.0%2.6%3.1%3.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$251M$289M$44M$27M($733M)$204M$473M$602M$463M$159M$113MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.9%6.5%1.0%0.5%−35.5%6.7%8.0%9.0%7.0%2.2%1.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$251M$289M$44M$27M($733M)$204M$473M$602M$463M$159M$113MFree cash flowFCF
5.9%6.5%1.0%0.5%−35.5%6.7%8.0%9.0%7.0%2.2%1.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$492M$259M$678M$18M$0$2.9B$174M$175M$609M$1.3B$1.3BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$68M$80M$20M$0$0$47M$60M$57M$57MDividends paidDiv. paid
$272M$743M$946M$421M$69M$0$369M$453M$1.2B$293MBuybacksBuybacks
5%9%17%17%-12%2%9%6%23%3%2%ROICROIC
5%10%21%19%-22%-6%12%6%37%-2%-1%Return on equityROE
5%10%19%17%−23%−6%12%5%35%−3%−3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$538M$552M$686M$961M$1.9B$1.2B$1.1B$896M$1.4B$813M$1.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$304M$350M$427M$421M$316M$633M$834M$883M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$28M$14M$14M$12M$9M$10M$9M$9M$8M$8M$8MInventoryInvent.
$162M$136M$151M$150M$102M$523M$500M$493M$475M$451M$612MAccounts payablePayables
$170M$228M$290M$283M$223M$120M$343M$399M$654M$680M$513MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.7B$2.6B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1B$2.7B$2.2B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$924M$992M$1.1B$1.1B$984M$2.2B$3.3B$3.6B$3.3B$2.9B$3.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.3×1.3×1.6×2.6×0.9×0.7×0.6×0.8×0.8×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$125M$150M$283M$326M$288M$3.0B$3.1B$3.2B$2.5B$3.5B$3.5BGoodwillGoodwill
$7.7B$7.6B$7.6B$8.4B$9.1B$12.6B$12.3B$12.8B$13.3B$14.0B$13.9BTotal assetsAssets
$1.6B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$3.3B$4.0B$3.1B$3.1B$3.8B$4.3B$6.0BTotal debtDebt
$1.0B$913M$964M$677M$1.4B$2.8B$2.0B$2.2B$2.4B$3.5B$4.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.7×10.0×13.5×14.4×-6.5×1.3×3.4×3.1×9.7×1.2×1.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.9B$3.8B$3.7B$4.0B$3.2B$3.6B$3.7B$3.6B$3.5B$3.3B$3.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.7%0.6%0.7%1.4%1.9%1.0%1.1%1.0%1.0%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$25M$38M$38M$7M$163M$163MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
134M126M115M106M101M104M111M108M102M95.5M96.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$31.84$35.32$38.69$47.23$20.39$29.12$52.95$61.89$64.91$74.35$73.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.54$3.08$6.68$7.21$-6.94$-2.14$4.09$2.04$12.65$-0.54$-0.35EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.87$2.29$0.38$0.25$-7.23$1.96$4.25$5.59$4.52$1.66$1.17Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.87$2.29$0.38$0.25$-7.23$1.96$4.25$5.59$4.52$1.66$1.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.59$0.75$0.20$0.00$0.00$0.44$0.59$0.60$0.59Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.58$2.36$2.58$3.47$1.20$1.07$1.81$1.84$1.66$2.30$2.20Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$29.14$30.37$31.88$37.27$31.69$34.27$33.24$33.08$34.63$34.91$33.32Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.9%/yr+29.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.3%/yr
Dividends / share+24.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.3%/yr+13.9%/yr
Book value / share+2.0%/yr+2.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
96Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
3%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
21.8×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$159Mowner earningsvs.($52M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $52M loss into $159M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($52M)$1.3B$220M$455M($222M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$325M+$333M+$397M+$426M+$310M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$74M+$64M+$75M+$61M+$59M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$32M−$1.1B+$108M−$268M+$168M
Cash from operations$379M$633M$800M$674M$315M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$220M−$170M−$198M−$201M−$111M
Owner earnings$159M$463M$602M$473M$204M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%7%9%8%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $74M), owner earnings is nearer $85M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $395M ÷ interest expense $317M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.5B · 8.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $787M + ST investments $26M − debt $4.3B
    What this means

    Netting $813M of cash and short-term investments against $4.3B of debt leaves $3.5B owed, about 8.8× a year's operating profit (10.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $678M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $2.8B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -12%–23%; 3% latest = NOPAT $198M ÷ invested capital $6.8B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -35%–9%; latest $159M = operating cash $379M − maintenance capex $220M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $74M of SBC) leaves $85M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($52M) · cash from operations $379M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $350M ÷ Owner Earnings $159M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $159M of Owner Earnings, $350M (220%) went back to shareholders, $57M dividends, $293M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $74M stock comp, the real buyback was about $219M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.68×
    Harvesting
    Capex $220M ÷ depreciation $325M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.75×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.3B vs ($717M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +7%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.16/share (latest year $-0.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 13% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −40.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −3.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 6 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The success of our business depends on complex internal and third-party information technology, cloud, and AI systems, and any failures, security incidents, data issues, regulatory challenges, integration difficulties, or inability to effectively develop, govern, or access these technologies could disrupt operations, r…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$671M
  • Receivables$1.1B
  • Inventory$8M
  • Other current assets$287M
Current liabilities$3.4B
  • Debt due within a year$9M
  • Accounts payable$612M
  • Other current liabilities$2.8B
Current ratio0.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $671M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.4B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($8.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.0B$269M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.6Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$4M
'27$604M
'28$903M
'29$654M
'30$444M
later$1.7B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$4Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$608Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$903Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$4.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$671M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$159M
Together, against $4M due next year207.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $830M against the $4M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 208 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$2.2B · 55%
  • Dividends$332M · 8%
  • Buybacks$4.8B · 120%
  • Returned to owners$5.1B

    286% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $332M as dividends and $4.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$3.3B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.6B to $6.0B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$85.86

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 55M shares were bought for $4.8B, about $85.86 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $48.30 (2016) to $148.89 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($1.2B).

  • Net change in share count−27.7%

    The diluted count fell from 134M to 97M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.60/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.7B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$6.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.2B of capital spent building

$271M written down across 5 years (2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mark S. Hoplamazian$24.1M$36.9M$204M
2022Mark S. Hoplamazian$16.7M$16.6M$473M
2023Mark S. Hoplamazian$20.8M$56.4M$602M
2024Mark S. Hoplamazian$16.6M$20.4M$463M
2025Mark S. Hoplamazian$26.7M$36.2M$159M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$74M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hyatt Hotels Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.6B → $6.0B

    Debt rose from $1.6B to $6.0B while owner earnings went from about $195M to $408M — about 8.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 15 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 16% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $332M to $1.1B while revenue grew 67%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 16% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $705M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MARMarriott International$26.2B12.4%17%10%
HLTHilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.$12.0B17.5%20%15%
HHyatt Hotels Corporation$7.1B8.6%7%6%
HGVHilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock$4.5B12.8%5%7%
BALYBally's Corporation$2.5B5.7%5%2%
CHHChoice Hotels International$1.6B28.9%30%20%
WHWyndham Hotels & Resorts$1.4B25.7%12%18%
Group median12.8%12%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hyatt Hotels Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Hyatt Hotels Corporation earns about $439M on its 6.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $113M on 94M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $4.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hyatt Hotels Corporation (H), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/H, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GYRE its page in the Manual HAE →

Industry order: ← GXO the Hotels & Resorts chapter HAFN →