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HPAI, Helport AI Limited
Our partnership typically involves co-modeling and co-developing efforts based on our designs of the AI product and its expected application, and Youfei Shuke's provision of AI infrastructure.
The final and billable service fees will be invoiced to Baojiang every month, and the invoiced amount shall be confirmed by Baojiang within three business days.
If Baojiang decides to continue engaging Helport Singapore's service after the trial period ends, the fees generated during the trial will become payable.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 31% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 7.9% to 46% — on a steadier 55% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 78%, above 15% in 3 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $3M | $13M | $30M | $35M | $35M | RevenueRevenue |
| 53% | 62% | 63% | 55% | 55% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $981K | $6M | $9M | $3M | $3M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 36.8% | 45.5% | 31.1% | 7.9% | 7.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $822K | $5M | $7M | $2M | $2M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 16% | 17% | 18% | 22% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($84K) | ($454K) | $5M | $9M | $9M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ($906K) | ($5M) | ($2M) | $7M | $7M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| 95% | 85% | 72% | 12% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 95% | 85% | 56% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 95% | 85% | 56% | 11% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | — | $3M | $152K | $152K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $15M | $21M | $23M | $23M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $10M | $284K | $3M | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $4M | $21M | $20M | $20M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $15M | $25M | $24M | $24M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $13M | $14M | $19M | $19M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 1.8× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $19M | $27M | $37M | $37M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | ($3M) | ($152K) | ($152K) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $869K | $6M | $13M | $17M | $17M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 156K | 30.3M | 30.3M | 37.4M | 37.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $17.10 | $0.42 | $0.98 | $0.93 | $0.93 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $5.27 | $0.16 | $0.24 | $0.05 | $0.05 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $5.57 | $0.19 | $0.43 | $0.47 | $0.47 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×194.11 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −62.1%/yr | −62.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −78.9%/yr | −78.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −56.3%/yr | −56.3%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $152K − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $152K, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 246 + DIO 0 − DPO 81 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -40%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -34%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $9M ÷ net income $2M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 10% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $35M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.24×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.13/share (latest year $0.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 41% → 19% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 41% early to 19% lately, median 31% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Worst year 2025 · 7.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“The AI contact center service industry in China and globally is both highly fragmented and intensely competitive.”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$152K
- Receivables$23M
- Other current assets$148K
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$16M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RDVTRed Violet Inc. Common Stock | $90M | — | -3.0% | -3% | 20% |
| SVCOSilvaco Group Inc. | $63M | 80% | -67.5% | -40% | -34% |
| RCATRed Cat Holdings Inc. | $41M | 18% | -562.0% | -53% | -250% |
| HPAIHelport AI Limited | $35M | 58% | 33.9% | 78% | — |
| DUOTDuos Technologies Group Inc. | $27M | 29% | -64.1% | -240% | -57% |
| QXLQuantum X Labs Inc. | $27M | 95% | -9.4% | -2% | 3% |
| QBTSD-Wave Quantum Inc. | $25M | 68% | -724.6% | -1142% | -582% |
| GEGGLGreat Elm Group, Inc. | $16M | 93% | -46.5% | -12% | -3% |
| Group median | — | 68% | -55.3% | -26% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Helport AI Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Helport AI Limited is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← HMY its page in the Manual HSAI →
Industry order: ← GWRE the Software chapter HSTM →