Share count
45Mpeak FY2025
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HPP, Hudson Pacific Properties
The purchase of properties with a value-add component, typically sourced through off-market transactions, also facilitates our long-term 7 growth.
We are a vertically integrated real estate investment trust ("REIT") offering end-to-end real estate solutions for dynamic tenants in the synergistic, converging and secular growth industries of tech and media.
Our primary investment markets include Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, New York and Vancouver, British Columbia.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$831M
−1.3% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $182M −8.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income ($51M) yr-ago ($80M)
Net margin −28.0% yr-ago −40.5%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share do not form a clean trend in the record. Debt is 37% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $640M | $728M | $728M | $818M | $805M | $897M | $1.0B | $952M | $842M | $831M | $814M | RevenueRevenue |
| $27M | $68M | $98M | $43M | $383K | $6M | ($56M) | ($192M) | ($364M) | ($572M) | ($551M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $266M | $306M | $306M | $278M | $300M | $350M | $319M | $102M | ($7M) | ($203M) | ($184M) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 44% | 52% | 51% | 57% | 52% | 44% | 46% | 54% | — | — | — | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $5.9B | $6.2B | $7.1B | $7.3B | $8.2B | $8.4B | $8.7B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $7.8B | $7.8B | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $6.7B | $6.6B | $7.1B | $7.5B | $8.4B | $9.0B | $9.3B | $8.3B | $8.1B | $7.3B | $7.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| 40% | 37% | 37% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 37% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.6B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.6B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.2× | 1.5× | 2.2× | 1.4× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.6× | 0.1× | -1.0× | -2.3× | 0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.1B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $2.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 15.8M | 22.0M | 22.2M | 22.4M | 21.9M | 21.7M | 20.5M | 20.1M | 20.2M | 44.7M | 64.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $16.87 | $13.90 | $13.75 | $12.41 | $13.71 | $16.11 | $15.53 | $5.09 | $-0.36 | $-4.54 | $-2.85 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $7.47 | $7.21 | $7.06 | $7.05 | $7.08 | $7.12 | $7.08 | $2.73 | $0.76 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $196.82 | $165.48 | $159.32 | $152.73 | $158.27 | $172.38 | $160.96 | $152.86 | $141.57 | $66.52 | $45.25 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/7 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×2.22 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −8.3%/yr | −12.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −53.3%/yr | −74.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.9%/yr (2-yr) | −1.9%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | −11.4%/yr | −15.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Revenue
$831Mlow FY2016
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations (FFO) ($203M)about $-4.54 per shareNet income ($572M) + depreciation $375M − gains on sale $6M
What this means
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not enough data
What this means
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 37%ConservativeTotal debt $2.7B ÷ assets $7.3BIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Adequate(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $172MIndustry peers: median 4.2×
What this means
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$36Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$632Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$344Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$2.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$344M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.0B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.0B, of which the leases are 11%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$316M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$409Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $912M of capital spent building
$255M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 62% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Victor J. Coleman | $10.5M | $9.5M | $6M |
| 2022 | Victor J. Coleman | $6.8M | −$5.7M | ($56M) |
| 2023 | Victor J. Coleman | $8.4M | $9.1M | ($192M) |
| 2024 | Victor J. Coleman | $24.8M | $3.6M | ($364M) |
| 2025 | Victor J. Coleman | $2.8M | −$2.1M | ($572M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 22% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Office REITs
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DEIDouglas Emmett | $1.0B | 47% | 4.6% | 40% | 53% |
| SLGSL Green Realty | $1.0B | 37% | 3.4% | 69% | 27% |
| CUZCousins Properties | $994M | 52% | 5.7% | 45% | 31% |
| HPPHudson Pacific Properties | $831M | 36% | 3.7% | 52% | 37% |
| HIWHighwoods Properties | $806M | 55% | 8.1% | 47% | — |
| ESRTEmpire State Realty Trust Inc. | $768M | 30% | 5.1% | 17% | 20% |
| CDPCopt Defense Properties | $764M | 36% | 5.6% | 55% | 52% |
| PDMPiedmont Realty Trust Inc. | $565M | 29% | 3.9% | 65% | 47% |
| Group median | — | 37% | 4.9% | 49% | 37% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hudson Pacific Properties (HPP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HPP, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← HPK its page in the Manual HPQ →
Industry order: ← GTY the Real Estate Development & Services chapter IIPR →