Owner Scorecard


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CUZ, Cousins Properties

Cousins, CPLP, CTRS, and their subsidiaries develop, acquire, lease, manage, and own primarily Class A office properties and opportunistic mixed-use developments in the Sun Belt markets of the United States with a focus on lifestyle office properties in Austin, Atlanta, Charlotte, Tampa, Phoenix, Dallas, and Nashville.

CPLP wholly owns Cousins TRS Services LLC ("CTRS"), a taxable entity that owns and manages its own real estate portfolio and performs certain real estate related services.

Our operations are conducted principally in the office real estate segment which we measure by geographical area.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CUZ · Cousins Properties
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$994M
+16.0% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $834M
FFO margin 23% 5-yr avg 56%
Dividend payout (FFO) 95% 5-yr avg 44%
Debt / assets 42% 5-yr avg 33%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Funds from operations per share have compounded about 24% a year across the record. The dividend takes 95% of FFO, leaving little cushion. Debt is 42% of assets, moderate for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$259M$466M$475M$658M$740M$755M$762M$803M$857M$994M$1.0BRevenueRevenue
$79M$216M$79M$150M$237M$279M$167M$83M$46M$41M($5M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$100M$280M$255M$297M$526M$567M$462M$398M$411M$456M$228MFunds from operationsFFO
Balance sheet
51%35%42%48%34%32%42%49%48%47%95%Dividend payout (FFO)Payout
$3.8B$3.9B$4.1B$7.2B$7.4B$7.7B$8.1B$8.4B$9.6B$10.0B$10.0BReal estate (gross)RE gross
$4.2B$4.2B$4.1B$7.2B$7.1B$7.3B$7.5B$7.6B$8.8B$8.9B$9.1BTotal assetsAssets
33%26%26%31%30%31%31%32%35%38%42%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$1.4B$1.1B$1.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$3.1B$3.3B$3.8BTotal debtDebt
$1.3B$944M$1.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$3.1B$3.3B$3.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
9.8×9.3×8.3×8.0×8.0×7.4×6.9×5.0×4.7×4.2×4.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$4.4B$4.5B$4.6B$4.6B$4.5B$4.8B$4.7B$4.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
256M106M107M130M149M149M150M152M154M169M166MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.39$2.65$2.39$2.29$3.54$3.81$3.07$2.62$2.67$2.70$1.37FFO / shareFFO/sh
$0.20$0.94$1.00$1.10$1.19$1.23$1.28$1.28$1.27$1.28$1.30Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$9.59$26.19$25.88$33.58$30.05$30.67$30.75$29.76$31.47$27.74$27.11Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/2.42 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+21.6%/yr+3.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+73.8%/yr (3-yr)+73.8%/yr (3-yr)
EPS−2.8%/yr−31.5%/yr
Dividends / share+23.1%/yr+1.5%/yr
Capital spending / share−11.4%/yr (3-yr)−11.4%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+12.5%/yr−1.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
169Mpeak FY2016
Revenue
$994Mlow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • about $2.05 per share
    Net income $41M + depreciation $415M − gains on sale $111M
    What this means

    GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.

  • Covered
    Dividends $216M ÷ FFO $345M
    Industry peers: median 47%
    What this means

    A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.

Is it sound?

  • Conservative
    Total debt $3.3B ÷ assets $8.9B
    Industry peers: median 39%
    What this means

    Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.

  • Strong
    (operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $159M
    Industry peers: median 4.2×
    What this means

    How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021M. Colin Connolly$4.8M$6.9M
2022M. Colin Connolly$5.6M$2.8M$23M
2023M. Colin Connolly$6.7M$7.1M$89M
2024M. Colin Connolly$8.0M$13.8M$148M
2025M. Colin Connolly$8.7M$7.3M$135M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio80:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$72K

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Office REITs

The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueFFO marginFFO / assetsPayout (FFO)Debt / assets
VNOVornado Realty Trust$1.8B37%3.9%51%
KRCKilroy Realty$1.1B56%5.6%42%39%
DEIDouglas Emmett$1.0B47%4.6%40%53%
SLGSL Green Realty$1.0B37%3.4%69%27%
CUZCousins Properties$994M52%5.7%45%31%
HIWHighwoods Properties$806M55%8.1%47%
ESRTEmpire State Realty Trust Inc.$768M30%5.1%17%20%
CDPCopt Defense Properties$764M36%5.6%55%52%
Group median42%5.4%46%35%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / FFO

A REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies.

$
The assumptions

FFO / share, delivered−7%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (required return − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% required return and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / FFO
Justified by growth
Dividend yield

FFO about $1.37 per share on 165M shares. The dials set the multiple they justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cousins Properties (CUZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CUZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CURB its page in the Manual CV →

Industry order: ← CUBE the REITs — Specialty & Diversified chapter CXW →