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ICLR, ICON plc
ICON is a global provider of outsourced development and commercialization services to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical device, and government and public health organizations.
We offer a full range of clinical, consulting and commercial services that range from clinical development strategy, planning and trial design, to full study execution, and post-market commercialization.
ICON provides its services across a range of clinical outsourcing operating models including strategic partnerships, preferred provider, full-service delivery to functional service provision and stand-alone services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.4% to 19% — on a steadier 29% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Ireland at 38%.
- Ireland38%$3.2B
- United States31%$2.5B
- Rest of Europe19%$1.6B
- Rest of World12%$952M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $5.5B | $7.7B | $8.1B | $8.2B | $8.3B | $8.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 42% | 42% | 30% | 30% | 29% | 28% | 29% | 29% | 29% | — | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $312M | $338M | $373M | $433M | $392M | $379M | $795M | $905M | $1.0B | $443M | $390M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 18.7% | 19.2% | 14.4% | 15.4% | 14.0% | 6.9% | 10.3% | 11.2% | 12.6% | 5.4% | 4.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $262M | $281M | $323M | $376M | $333M | $153M | $505M | $554M | $739M | $229M | $173M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | 14% | 12% | 12% | 13% | 21% | 11% | 3% | 8% | 9% | 13% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $259M | $383M | $269M | $413M | $568M | $829M | $563M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $935M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $60M | $61M | $66M | $62M | $66M | $315M | $570M | $586M | $489M | $383M | $377M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($63M) | $40M | ($120M) | ($25M) | $169M | $361M | ($512M) | $21M | $59M | $424M | $384M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $43M | $45M | $48M | $39M | $41M | $94M | $142M | $141M | $168M | $174M | $176M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $217M | $338M | $220M | $374M | $527M | $735M | $421M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $862M | $759M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.0% | 19.2% | 8.5% | 13.3% | 18.8% | 13.4% | 5.4% | 12.7% | 13.7% | 10.4% | 9.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $217M | $338M | $220M | $374M | $527M | $735M | $421M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $862M | $759M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 13.0% | 19.2% | 8.5% | 13.3% | 18.8% | 13.4% | 5.4% | 12.7% | 13.7% | 10.4% | 9.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $110M | $133M | $129M | $147M | $175M | $0 | $100M | $0 | $500M | $750M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 36% | 32% | 34% | 35% | 25% | 2% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 4% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| 28% | 24% | 24% | 23% | 18% | 2% | 6% | 6% | 8% | 2% | 2% | Return on equityROE |
| 28% | 24% | 24% | 23% | 18% | 2% | 6% | 6% | 8% | 2% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $193M | $283M | $396M | $520M | $840M | $752M | $289M | $378M | $539M | $647M | $765M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $416M | $380M | $415M | $528M | $715M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $5M | $6M | — | — | — | — | $6M | InventoryInvent. |
| $9M | $19M | $13M | $24M | $51M | $91M | $81M | $132M | $173M | $192M | $100M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $410M | $363M | $404M | $507M | $669M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $958M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $494M | $566M | $611M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.9× | 2.2× | 1.4× | 1.9× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $616M | $769M | $756M | $883M | $936M | $9.0B | $9.0B | $9.0B | $9.1B | $8.7B | $8.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $17.4B | $17.2B | $16.9B | $16.6B | $16.3B | $16.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | $348M | $5.4B | $4.6B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $2.9B | $2.9B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | ($492M) | $4.7B | $4.3B | $3.3B | $2.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | 32.6× | 30.1× | 2.1× | 3.5× | 2.7× | 4.4× | 2.2× | 1.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $945M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $8.1B | $8.5B | $9.2B | $9.4B | $9.2B | $9.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 56.4M | 54.8M | 54.8M | 54.3M | 53.3M | 68.1M | 82.5M | 82.7M | 83.0M | 79.0M | 76.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $29.54 | $32.06 | $47.38 | $51.64 | $52.50 | $80.52 | $93.87 | $97.38 | $98.62 | $104.49 | $107.96 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.65 | $5.13 | $5.89 | $6.92 | $6.25 | $2.25 | $6.13 | $6.70 | $8.90 | $2.90 | $2.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.84 | $6.17 | $4.02 | $6.88 | $9.89 | $10.80 | $5.11 | $12.34 | $13.47 | $10.92 | $9.91 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.84 | $6.17 | $4.02 | $6.88 | $9.89 | $10.80 | $5.11 | $12.34 | $13.47 | $10.92 | $9.91 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.76 | $0.82 | $0.88 | $0.72 | $0.77 | $1.38 | $1.72 | $1.70 | $2.02 | $2.21 | $2.30 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $16.76 | $21.71 | $24.72 | $29.78 | $34.72 | $118.51 | $103.39 | $111.36 | $113.71 | $116.42 | $121.41 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.1%/yr | +14.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +12.3%/yr | +2.0%/yr |
| EPS | −5.1%/yr | −14.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.6%/yr | +23.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +24.0%/yr | +27.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $229M of profit into $862M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $229M | $739M | $554M | $505M | $153M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$383M | +$489M | +$586M | +$570M | +$315M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$424M | +$59M | +$21M | −$512M | +$361M |
| Cash from operations | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $563M | $829M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$174M | −$168M | −$141M | −$142M | −$94M |
| Owner earnings | $862M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $421M | $735M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 14% | 13% | 5% | 13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“Controls and Procedures of this Form 20-F, we have identified material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting.”
“Restatement of Previously Issued Consolidated Financial Statements As described in the Explanatory Note to this Form 20-F, the Company has restated its consolidated financial statements for the Restated Periods.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $390M ÷ interest expense $322M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B · 5.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $765M − debt $2.9B
What this means
Netting $765M of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, about 5.5× a year's operating profit (7.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 65 + DIO 0 − DPO 6 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–36%; 3% latest = NOPAT $339M ÷ invested capital $11.5BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 5%–19%; latest $759M = operating cash $935M − maintenance capex $176MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $935M ÷ net income $173M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $750M ÷ Owner Earnings $759M
What this means
Of $759M Owner Earnings, $750M (99%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $750M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $176M ÷ depreciation $377M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $438M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +76%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.63/share (latest year $2.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $121.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 17% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 17% early to 10% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 5.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +3.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Failure to keep pace with rapid developments in AI technologies could adversely affect our competitive position and results of operation.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$765M
- Receivables$1.5B
- Inventory$6M
- Other current assets$1.4B
- Debt due within a year$55M
- Accounts payable$100M
- Other current liabilities$3.0B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $6.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$934M · 14%
- Buybacks$2.0B · 30%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.8B · 56%
- Returned to owners$2.0B
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count35.8%
The diluted count rose from 56M to 77M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained43%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $742M, so each retained $1 added about 0.43 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why ICON plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?35.8%
Diluted shares grew 35.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2.0B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$579M · 7% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Our largest customer represented a strategic partnership with a large global pharmaceutical company and contributed 7.0% of revenue for the year.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IQVIQVIA Holdings Inc. | $16.3B | — | 9.2% | 5% | 11% |
| ACMAECOM | $16.1B | 6% | 3.6% | 9% | 4% |
| ICLRICON plc | $8.3B | 29% | 13.3% | 16% | 13% |
| GGenpact | $5.1B | 36% | 12.4% | 15% | 11% |
| VVXV2X Inc. | $4.5B | 9% | 3.6% | 11% | 3% |
| FCNFTI Consulting | $3.8B | 32% | 10.5% | 16% | 9% |
| ULSUL Solutions Inc. | $3.1B | 48% | 16.2% | 27% | 10% |
| MEDPMedpace Holdings | $2.5B | — | 17.6% | 27% | 22% |
| Group median | — | 31% | 11.5% | 16% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. ICON plc's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ICON plc has delivered.
Through the cycle, ICON plc earns about $1.1B on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $759M on 77M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $2.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ICL its page in the Manual IFRX →
Industry order: ← GRAL the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter ILMN →