Share count
156Mpeak FY2024
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ILMN, Illumina Inc.
Our focus on innovation has established us as a global leader in DNA sequencing and array-based technologies, serving customers in the research, clinical and applied markets.
Our products are used for applications in the life sciences, oncology, reproductive health, agriculture and other emerging segments.
Our comprehensive line of products addresses the scale of experimentation and breadth of functional analysis to advance disease research, drug development, and the development of molecular tests.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
−0.7% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.4B 5-yr avg $4.2B
Revenue $1.1B +4.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 19.2% yr-ago 15.8%
Net income $134M yr-ago $131M
Net margin 12.3% yr-ago 12.6%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Sequencing (92%) and Microarray (8%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 66% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −24% to 28% — on a steadier 66% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 6.0% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Sequencing is 92% of revenue, with Microarray the other meaningful segment at 8%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Sequencing92%$4.0B
- Microarray8%$358M
By geographyAmericas55%Europe29%Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa10%China6%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 66% | 69% | 70% | 68% | 70% | 61% | 65% | 66% | 66% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 24% | 24% | 24% | 29% | 46% | 36% | 25% | 25% | 25% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 20% | 19% | 18% | 21% | 26% | 30% | 27% | 22% | 22% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $606M | $883M | $985M | $580M | ($123M) | ($1.1B) | ($833M) | $807M | $852M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 22.0% | 26.5% | 27.8% | 17.9% | −2.7% | −23.7% | −19.1% | 18.6% | 19.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $726M | $826M | $1.0B | $656M | $762M | ($1.2B) | ($1.2B) | $850M | $853M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 33% | 12% | 11% | 23% | 14% | — | — | 22% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $875M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $545M | $478M | $837M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $156M | $179M | $188M | $187M | $251M | $432M | $354M | $270M | $269M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($171M) | ($56M) | ($333M) | $43M | ($1.2B) | $827M | $1.3B | ($316M) | ($256M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $310M | $296M | $209M | $189M | $208M | $195M | $128M | $148M | $154M | CapexCapex |
| 11.3% | 8.9% | 5.9% | 5.8% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 2.9% | 3.4% | 3.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $719M | $963M | $842M | $891M | $337M | $283M | $709M | $931M | $974M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 26.1% | 28.9% | 23.8% | 27.5% | 7.4% | 6.3% | 16.2% | 21.4% | 22.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $565M | $846M | $842M | $891M | $337M | $283M | $709M | $931M | $974M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 20.5% | 25.4% | 23.8% | 27.5% | 7.4% | 6.3% | 16.2% | 21.4% | 22.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $100M | $0 | $98M | $2.4B | $30M | $81M | $10M | $418M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $251M | $201M | $324M | $736M | $0 | $0 | $116M | $742M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 13% | 17% | 19% | 11% | -1% | -14% | -24% | 23% | 22% | ROICROIC |
| 26% | 22% | 22% | 14% | 7% | -18% | -52% | 31% | 32% | Return on equityROE |
| 26% | 22% | 22% | 14% | 7% | −18% | −52% | 31% | 32% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $1.7B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $411M | $514M | $573M | $487M | $648M | $734M | $735M | $854M | $738M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $333M | $386M | $359M | $372M | $431M | $587M | $547M | $564M | $611M | InventoryInvent. |
| $160M | $184M | $149M | $192M | $332M | $245M | $221M | $240M | $218M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $584M | $716M | $783M | $667M | $747M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.0B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $2.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $746M | $1.8B | $665M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.0× | 2.5× | 6.7× | 3.6× | 2.5× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 2.1× | 1.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $771M | $831M | $897M | $897M | $7.1B | $2.5B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $5.3B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $7.6B | $15.2B | $10.1B | $6.3B | $6.6B | $6.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.2B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.2B | $993M | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Total debtDebt |
| ($463M) | ($1.5B) | ($1.4B) | ($2.3B) | ($346M) | ($528M) | $270M | ($143M) | $335M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 16.4× | 15.5× | 18.9× | 11.8× | -2.0× | -41.1× | -8.3× | 8.0× | 8.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.7B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $4.7B | $10.7B | $6.6B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 6.0% | 5.8% | 5.5% | 6.0% | 16.7% | 8.4% | 8.5% | 6.3% | 6.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 148M | 149M | 149M | 148M | 151M | 158M | 159M | 156M | 154M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $18.59 | $22.37 | $23.78 | $21.89 | $29.97 | $28.51 | $27.50 | $27.84 | $28.53 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.91 | $5.54 | $6.72 | $4.43 | $5.05 | $-7.35 | $-7.69 | $5.45 | $5.54 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.86 | $6.46 | $5.65 | $6.02 | $2.23 | $1.79 | $4.46 | $5.97 | $6.32 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.82 | $5.68 | $5.65 | $6.02 | $2.23 | $1.79 | $4.46 | $5.97 | $6.32 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.09 | $1.99 | $1.40 | $1.28 | $1.38 | $1.23 | $0.81 | $0.95 | $1.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $18.57 | $25.22 | $30.96 | $31.72 | $71.13 | $41.77 | $14.92 | $17.46 | $17.38 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.2%/yr | +6.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +2.6%/yr | −0.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +1.3%/yr | +5.3%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −9.4%/yr | −7.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −0.8%/yr | −13.9%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
23%low FY2024
Gross margin
66%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.2×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$931Mowner earningsvs.$850Mnet incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2017FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $850M of profit into $931M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $850M | ($1.2B) | ($1.2B) | $762M | $656M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$270M | +$354M | +$432M | +$251M | +$187M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$275M | +$370M | +$380M | +$754M | +$194M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$316M | +$1.3B | +$827M | −$1.2B | +$43M |
| Cash from operations | $1.1B | $837M | $478M | $545M | $1.1B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$148M | −$128M | −$195M | −$208M | −$189M |
| Owner earnings | $931M | $709M | $283M | $337M | $891M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 21% | 16% | 6% | 7% | 28% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $275M), owner earnings is nearer $656M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $807M ÷ interest expense $101M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $1.4B + ST investments $215M − debt $1.5B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $143M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 72 + DIO 140 − DPO 59 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -24%–23%; 23% latest = NOPAT $632M ÷ invested capital $2.8BIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 6%–29%; latest $931M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $148MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $275M of SBC) leaves $656M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $850M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $742M ÷ Owner Earnings $931M
What this means
Of $931M Owner Earnings, $742M (80%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $742M buybacks. Net of $275M stock comp, the real buyback was about $467M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.55×HarvestingCapex $148M ÷ depreciation $270M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.08×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs $1.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −160%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.38/share (latest year $5.62), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 25% → −8% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to −8% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −0%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −23.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.7%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“In addition, any disruption or failure in the AI functionality we incorporate into our business activities, products or services could adversely impact our business or result in delays or errors in our offerings.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
- Receivables$738M
- Inventory$611M
- Other current assets$234M
Current liabilities$1.6B
- Debt due within a year$499M
- Accounts payable$218M
- Other current liabilities$849M
Current ratio1.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$499M due · $1.2B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$962Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$555M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.1B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$269Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$101Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$661Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$564Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$1.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$564M
Total fixed claims on the business$2.1B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.1B, of which the leases are 27%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $7.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.7B · 24%
- Buybacks$2.4B · 33%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.0B · 43%
- Returned to owners$2.4B
42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.4B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$98.69
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $858M, about $98.69 each.
- Net change in share count4.1%
The diluted count rose from 148M to 154M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$1.3B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity41%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.8Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $1.7B of capital spent building
$2.2B written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 79% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- CEO pay ratio97:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$275M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 34% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Illumina Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?14.6% vs 26.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 26.3% early in the record and 14.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.1%
Diluted shares grew 4.1% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $2.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AAgilent Technologies Inc. | $6.9B | 54% | 19.1% | 17% | 18% |
| KEYSKeysight Technologies Inc. | $5.4B | 61% | 16.6% | 19% | 20% |
| ILMNIllumina Inc. | $4.3B | 67% | 18.2% | 12% | 23% |
| FTVFortive Corp. | $4.2B | 57% | 17.0% | 6% | 25% |
| MTDMettler-Toledo International Inc. | $4.0B | 79% | 26.1% | 43% | 21% |
| TRMBTrimble Inc. | $3.6B | 55% | 11.7% | 7% | 15% |
| WATWaters Corporation | $3.2B | 59% | 28.8% | 28% | 18% |
| BIOBio-Rad | $2.6B | 55% | 10.2% | 3% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 58% | 17.6% | 14% | 19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Illumina Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Illumina Inc. earns about $982M on its 22.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $974M on 151M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $335M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Illumina Inc. (ILMN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ILMN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← IIPR its page in the Manual ILPT →
Industry order: ← ICLR the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter INCY →