Owner Scorecard


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IFS, Intercorp Financial Services Inc.

Banks financial

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · figures as filed, in PEN
IFS · Intercorp Financial Services Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
PEN 4.5B
+0.3% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue PEN 4.5B 5-yr avg PEN 4.0B
Return on equity 12% 5-yr avg 13%
Return on tangible equity 12% 5-yr avg 13%
Equity / assets 11.4% 5-yr avg 10.6%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has run high across the record (median 16%, above 12% in 5 of 8 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, charted

FY2017–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
114Mpeak FY2020
Revenue
PEN 4.5Blow FY2017
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Adequate
    Net income PEN 1.3B ÷ equity PEN 10.9B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill PEN 0 − intangibles PEN 0)
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 62%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 11.4%
    Well capitalized
    Equity PEN 10.9B ÷ assets PEN 95.5B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Mostly deposit-funded
    Deposits PEN 53.8B ÷ assets PEN 95.5B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
FHNFirst Horizon$3.4B10%14%63%2.9%
ZIONZions Bancorporation N.A.$3.4B12%14%62%2.9%
BPOPPopular Inc.$3.2B11%13%61%3.3%
EWBCEast West Bancorp$2.9B15%16%44%3.2%
WBSWebster Financial$2.9B10%14%59%3.0%
WTFCWintrust Financial$2.7B10%12%63%2.9%
SSBSouthState$2.7B9%14%63%3.1%
IFSIntercorp Financial Services Inc.PEN 4.5B16%16%25%4.7%
Group median11%14%62%3.0%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Intercorp Financial Services Inc. reports in PEN, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that PEN, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in PEN. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Intercorp Financial Services Inc.’s record justifies.

PEN 
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered4%/yr’19→’24

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity16%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book PEN 10.9B on 111M shares, a 16% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Intercorp Financial Services Inc. (IFS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IFS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IFRX its page in the Manual IGIC →

Industry order: ← IBOC the Banks chapter INDB →