← All companies ← ILPT Manual IMCR → ← FUN Entertainment & Studios IQ →
IMAX, Imax Corporation
IMAX Corporation is a Canadian corporation that was formed in March 1994 as a result of an amalgamation between WGIM Acquisition Corp. and the former IMAX Corporation.
IMAX is a premier global technology platform for entertainment and events.
Through its proprietary software, auditorium architecture, patented intellectual property, and specialized equipment, IMAX offers a unique end-to-end solution to create superior, awe-inspiring immersive content experiences for which the IMAX brand is globally renowned.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Technology Products and Services (62%), Content Solutions (37%) and All Other (2%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 54% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −89% and 21% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Stock-based pay runs about 6.5% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Technology Products and Services is 62% of revenue, with Content Solutions the other meaningful segment at 37%.
- Technology Products and Services62%$251M
- Content Solutions37%$151M
- All Other2%$8M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $377M | $381M | $374M | $396M | $137M | $255M | $301M | $375M | $352M | $410M | $405M | RevenueRevenue |
| 54% | 49% | 56% | 54% | 16% | 53% | 52% | 57% | 54% | 60% | 59% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | — | 79% | 46% | 46% | 39% | 38% | 34% | 34% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 5% | 4% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 1% | 1% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $59M | $31M | $45M | $77M | ($122M) | $11M | ($5M) | $50M | $44M | $84M | $77M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 15.5% | 8.3% | 12.1% | 19.5% | −88.9% | 4.3% | −1.6% | 13.4% | 12.5% | 20.5% | 19.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $29M | $2M | $23M | $47M | ($144M) | ($22M) | ($23M) | $25M | $26M | $35M | $37M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 36% | — | 29% | 26% | — | — | — | 34% | 16% | 34% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $78M | $85M | $110M | $90M | ($23M) | $6M | $17M | $59M | $71M | $127M | $124M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $46M | $67M | $57M | $63M | $54M | $56M | $57M | $60M | $66M | $62M | $63M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($28M) | ($7M) | $7M | ($43M) | $46M | ($53M) | ($44M) | ($50M) | ($44M) | $3M | ($2M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $15M | $24M | $13M | $7M | $697K | $4M | $8M | $6M | $8M | $8M | $9M | CapexCapex |
| 4.0% | 6.3% | 3.6% | 1.9% | 0.5% | 1.4% | 2.8% | 1.7% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $63M | $61M | $97M | $83M | ($24M) | $2M | $9M | $52M | $62M | $119M | $115M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 16.6% | 16.1% | 25.8% | 21.0% | −17.3% | 1.0% | 3.0% | 13.9% | 17.7% | 29.0% | 28.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $63M | $61M | $97M | $83M | ($24M) | $2M | $9M | $52M | $62M | $119M | $115M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 16.6% | 16.1% | 25.8% | 21.0% | −17.3% | 1.0% | 3.0% | 13.9% | 17.7% | 29.0% | 28.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $16M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $46M | $71M | $3M | $37M | $14M | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | — | 8% | 12% | -25% | — | -2% | 17% | 19% | 30% | 30% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | 0% | 4% | 9% | -36% | -6% | -9% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 0% | 4% | 9% | −36% | −6% | −9% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $205M | $159M | $142M | $109M | $317M | $190M | $97M | $76M | $101M | $151M | $146M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $96M | $131M | $93M | $100M | $56M | $110M | $136M | $136M | $108M | $108M | $109M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $42M | $31M | $45M | $43M | $40M | $27M | $32M | $32M | $33M | $33M | $36M | InventoryInvent. |
| $138M | $161M | $138M | $143M | $96M | $137M | $168M | $168M | $141M | $141M | $144M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $39M | $39M | $39M | $39M | $39M | $39M | $53M | $53M | $53M | $46M | $46M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $857M | $867M | $874M | $889M | $998M | $883M | $821M | $815M | $830M | $894M | $893M | Total assetsAssets |
| $27M | $25M | $38M | $18M | $306M | $2M | — | — | — | — | $1M | Total debtDebt |
| ($177M) | ($133M) | ($104M) | ($91M) | ($12M) | ($187M) | — | — | — | — | ($145M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 32.5× | 16.2× | 15.5× | 27.7× | -17.4× | 1.5× | -0.8× | 7.4× | 5.4× | 11.4× | 10.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $562M | $528M | $512M | $548M | $394M | $356M | $263M | $273M | $299M | $338M | $335M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 8.1% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 5.8% | 15.7% | 10.0% | 9.0% | 6.3% | 6.5% | 6.5% | 6.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 68.3M | 65.5M | 63.2M | 61.5M | 59.2M | 59.1M | 56.7M | 55.1M | 53.9M | 55.5M | 56.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.53 | $5.81 | $5.92 | $6.43 | $2.31 | $4.31 | $5.31 | $6.80 | $6.54 | $7.39 | $7.18 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.42 | $0.04 | $0.36 | $0.76 | $-2.43 | $-0.38 | $-0.40 | $0.46 | $0.48 | $0.63 | $0.65 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.92 | $0.93 | $1.53 | $1.35 | $-0.40 | $0.04 | $0.16 | $0.95 | $1.16 | $2.14 | $2.05 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.92 | $0.93 | $1.53 | $1.35 | $-0.40 | $0.04 | $0.16 | $0.95 | $1.16 | $2.14 | $2.05 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.22 | $0.37 | $0.21 | $0.12 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $0.15 | $0.12 | $0.16 | $0.15 | $0.15 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $8.23 | $8.05 | $8.10 | $8.91 | $6.65 | $6.02 | $4.65 | $4.95 | $5.56 | $6.08 | $5.95 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.3%/yr | +26.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +9.9%/yr | — |
| EPS | +4.5%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −4.6%/yr | +65.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | −3.3%/yr | −1.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $35M of profit into $119M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $35M | $26M | $25M | ($23M) | ($22M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$62M | +$66M | +$60M | +$57M | +$56M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$27M | +$23M | +$24M | +$27M | +$26M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$3M | −$44M | −$50M | −$44M | −$53M |
| Cash from operations | $127M | $71M | $59M | $17M | $6M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$8M | −$8M | −$6M | −$8M | −$4M |
| Owner earnings | $119M | $62M | $52M | $9M | $2M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 29% | 18% | 14% | 3% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer $92M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 11.4×ComfortableOperating income $84M ÷ interest expense $7M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $151M − debt $2M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $149M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -25%–30%; 29% latest = NOPAT $56M ÷ invested capital $189MIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 29% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -17%–29%; latest $119M = operating cash $127M − maintenance capex $8MIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves $92M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $127M ÷ net income $35M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $14M ÷ Owner Earnings $119M
What this means
Of $119M Owner Earnings, $14M (12%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $14M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($27M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.13×HarvestingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $62M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $410M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +60%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.52/share (latest year $0.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 15% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −88.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −2.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If the Company fails to enhance its current AI products and develop new products in response to changes in technology or industry standards, the Company fails to bring product enhancements or new product developments to market quickly enough, or the Company fails to respond to increasing competition from AI-generated c…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $620M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$96M · 15%
- Buybacks$171M · 28%
- Retained (debt / cash)$354M · 57%
- Returned to owners$171M
33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $171M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $171M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−17.4%
The diluted count fell from 68M to 56M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Richard L. Gelfond | $9.1M | $9.6M | $2M |
| 2022 | Richard L. Gelfond | $8.0M | $5.8M | $9M |
| 2023 | Richard L. Gelfond | $8.7M | $9.4M | $52M |
| 2024 | Richard L. Gelfond | $8.0M | $20.4M | $62M |
| 2025 | Richard L. Gelfond | $8.7M | $21.5M | $119M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$27M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 32% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Imax Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $13M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Entertainment & Studios
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TXG10x Genomics Inc. | $643M | 77% | -31.9% | -42% | -9% |
| BVSBioventus Inc. | $568M | 68% | 2.8% | -3% | 7% |
| ATRCAtriCure | $535M | 75% | -10.8% | -8% | -8% |
| GKOSGlaukos Corporation | $507M | 76% | -25.2% | -8% | -3% |
| MDXGMiMedx Group Inc | $419M | 84% | -0.3% | 34% | 8% |
| IMAXImax Corporation | $410M | 54% | 12.3% | 11% | 16% |
| ANGOAngioDynamics Inc. | $320M | 54% | -12.3% | -9% | -0% |
| PRCTPROCEPT BioRobotics Corporation | $308M | 51% | -93.9% | -115% | -96% |
| Group median | — | 72% | -11.5% | -8% | -2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Imax Corporation has delivered.
Imax Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Imax Corporation earns about $67M on its 16.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $115M on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $145M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ILPT its page in the Manual IMCR →
Industry order: ← FUN the Entertainment & Studios chapter IQ →