Share count
48Mpeak FY2020
← All companies ← JKHY Manual JNJ → ← IRS Real Estate Development & Services JOE →
JLL, Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated
Our global platform and diverse service and product offerings position us to take advantage of the opportunities in a consolidating industry and to successfully navigate the dynamic and challenging markets in which we compete worldwide.
Powered by rich global datasets and leading technology capabilities, we provide coordinated, end-to-end delivery of real estate services for a broad range of global clients who represent a wide variety of industries.
Through LaSalle Investment Management (also referred to as "LaSalle" or our "Investment Management" segment), we invest for clients on a global basis in both private assets and publicly traded real estate securities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$26.1B
+11.4% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $26.8B 5-yr avg $22.1B
Revenue $6.4B +11.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 3.2% yr-ago 2.1%
Net income $159M yr-ago $58M
Net margin 2.5% yr-ago 1.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Real Estate Management Services (77%) and Leasing Advisory (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 11%, above 12% in 2 of 10 years). A mortgage REIT lives on the spread between what its mortgages earn and what its borrowing costs, levered many times over; weigh the worst rate and credit years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Real Estate Management Services is 77% of revenue, with Leasing Advisory the other meaningful segment at 12%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Real Estate Management Services77%$20.0B
- Leasing Advisory12%$3.0B
- Capital Markets Services9%$2.4B
- Investment Management2%$450M
- Proptech Investments1%$232M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $13.0B | $14.5B | $16.3B | $18.0B | $16.6B | $19.4B | $20.9B | $20.8B | $23.4B | $26.1B | $26.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($45M) | ($56M) | ($51M) | ($56M) | ($53M) | ($40M) | ($75M) | ($135M) | ($137M) | ($107M) | ($100M) | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $330M | $276M | $485M | $535M | $403M | $962M | $655M | $225M | $547M | $792M | $896M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 26% | 48% | 31% | 23% | 21% | 22% | 23% | 10% | 20% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 4.3% | 3.0% | 4.8% | 3.9% | 2.8% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 1.4% | 3.3% | 4.4% | 5.0% | Return on assetsROA |
| 12% | 8% | 13% | 10% | 7% | 16% | 11% | 4% | 8% | 11% | 12% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 7% | 12% | 10% | 7% | 16% | — | — | — | — | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| — | 85% | 74% | 200% | 65% | 140% | 103% | 24% | 38% | 37% | 46% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $7.6B | $9.3B | $10.0B | $13.7B | $14.3B | $15.5B | $15.6B | $16.1B | $16.8B | $17.8B | $17.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $4.6B | $4.7B | $4.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.7B | $5.1B | $5.5B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.8B | $7.5B | $7.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 45.5M | 45.8M | 45.9M | 49.2M | 52.3M | 52.1M | 49.3M | 48.3M | 48.4M | 48.3M | 47.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $7.24 | $6.04 | $10.55 | $10.89 | $7.70 | $18.47 | $13.26 | $4.67 | $11.30 | $16.40 | $18.74 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.65 | $0.72 | $0.82 | $0.87 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $61.27 | $72.99 | $80.37 | $104.12 | $105.60 | $118.78 | $122.03 | $130.34 | $139.99 | $155.30 | $152.86 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $-1.86 | $7.12 | $14.30 | $5.44 | $11.79 | $13.18 | $12.86 | $19.08 | $29.69 | $44.06 | $41.12 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.4%/yr | +11.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +112.0%/yr (2-yr) | +112.0%/yr (2-yr) |
| EPS | +9.5%/yr | +16.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −31.6%/yr (2-yr) | −31.6%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | +10.9%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$26.1Blow FY2016
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 11%AdequateNet income $792M ÷ equity $7.5BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $4.7B − intangibles $667M)Industry peers: median 18%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 63%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 42.1%Well capitalizedEquity $7.5B ÷ assets $17.8B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Borrowed against bookAssets $17.8B ÷ equity $7.5B
What this means
A mortgage REIT finances a pool of mortgages with borrowed money — mostly short-term repo, which sits in liabilities rather than as tagged debt — so its true leverage is the whole balance sheet against the owners' equity, not just labeled debt. That leverage magnifies both the spread it earns and the loss when rates or credit move against it; read it beside the book value, the question being whether the spread compensated for the leverage through a cycle.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“A failure to optimally deploy and integrate AI could result in the write-off of significant investments and a failure to realize expected productivity and efficiency gains, negatively impacting our profit margins and competitive position.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$8.3B
- Cash & short-term investments$436M
- Receivables$2.2B
- Other current assets$5.7B
Current liabilities$7.4B
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$6.2B
Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.12×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$918Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$899M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.8B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$229Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$198Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$941Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$905M
Lease obligations (present value)$941M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.8B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.8B, of which the leases are 51%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$5.4B30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $149M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $12.9M | $33.1M | $962M |
| 2022 | $12.1M | −$7.8M | $655M |
| 2023 | $12.0M | $10.6M | $225M |
| 2024 | $17.0M | $32.4M | $547M |
| 2025 | $14.7M | $40.3M | $792M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio243:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (reit / real estate), compared on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USBU.S. Bancorp | $28.7B | 12% | 17% | 59% | 2.5% |
| JLLJones Lang LaSalle Incorporated | $26.1B | 11% | 74% | — | -0.6% |
| SCHWCharles Schwab Corporation (The) | $23.9B | 13% | 18% | — | 1.9% |
| PNCPNC Financial Services Group Inc. (The) | $23.1B | 10% | 12% | 63% | 2.4% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corporation | $20.3B | 8% | 11% | 63% | 2.7% |
| BKTHE Bank of NEW York Mellon Corporation | $20.1B | 10% | 20% | 69% | 0.9% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc. | $15.9B | 16% | 18% | 82% | 2.1% |
| DFSDiscover Financial Services | $17.9B | 25% | 26% | 39% | 8.6% |
| Group median | — | 11% | 18% | — | 2.2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA mortgage REIT is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered31%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A mortgage REIT earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a mortgage REIT.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity74%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $2.0B on 46M shares, a 74% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the mortgage REIT keeps earning that return; a rate shock, a spread that compresses or a credit cycle changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated (JLL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JLL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← JKHY its page in the Manual JNJ →
Industry order: ← IRS the Real Estate Development & Services chapter JOE →