Share count
891Mpeak FY2025
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KKR, KKR & Co. Inc.
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
KKR is an alternative-asset manager. It raises long-lived funds from institutions and invests that capital in private equity, credit, infrastructure and real estate, earning a recurring management fee on the money it oversees and a share of the profits, called carried interest, when the investments do well. It also invests its own balance-sheet capital alongside the funds, and it owns a life and annuity insurer, Global Atlantic, whose premiums give it permanent capital to manage and a spread to earn.
Since the inception of our firm, we have expanded our investment strategies and product offerings from traditional private equity to other alternative asset classes such as leveraged credit, alternative credit, infrastructure, real estate, energy, growth equity, and core private equity.
We have a pre-eminent global integrated platform for sourcing and originating investments, raising capital, and carrying out capital markets activities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$19.5B
−11.0% YoY · 58% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $20.7B 5-yr avg $15.6B
Net margin 14.3% 5-yr avg 14.4%
Revenue $4.3B +38.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $278M yr-ago $684M
Net margin 6.4% yr-ago 22.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Insurance (60%) and Asset Management and Strategic Holdings (40%).
- What moves the needle
- The durable part is fee-related earnings: whether a brand and a record keep pulling in capital that stays locked up for years, at fees that hold against a field the filing itself calls intensely competitive, where fee compression is the quiet way a manager decays. The lumpy part is carried interest and gains on its own balance sheet — both lean on the mood of the markets, and in a long drought the performance share does not arrive while the carrying values get marked down. The insurer adds a third lever and a different risk: a spread book that must earn more on its assets than it owes annuity holders, after credit losses and inside the capital rules its regulators impose, with the standing temptation to reach for yield. The bad case is markets that go quiet while a credit cycle marks down both the funds and the insurance assets. The record below carries the margins, the returns, and the assets it oversees.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating margin has run at the high end of fee-business margins across the record (median 76%, above 25% in 9 of 10 years), the economics of a business that takes a cut without carrying the risk. It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 14%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Insurance is 60% of revenue, with Asset Management and Strategic Holdings the other meaningful segment at 40%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Insurance60%$11.6B
- Asset Management and Strategic Holdings40%$7.8B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $16.2B | $5.7B | $14.5B | $21.9B | $19.5B | $20.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 101.7% | 133.1% | 98.5% | 199.8% | 178.5% | 44.4% | 20.2% | 53.1% | 32.3% | 31.3% | 32.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| 28.0% | 66.1% | 61.4% | 112.0% | 99.8% | 29.2% | −9.1% | 25.7% | 14.1% | 12.2% | 14.3% | Net marginNet mgn |
| $309M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $4.7B | ($522M) | $3.7B | $3.1B | $2.4B | $3.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 7% | 18% | — | 21% | 23% | 23% | — | 24% | 24% | 29% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($1.5B) | ($3.5B) | ($7.6B) | ($5.7B) | ($6.0B) | ($7.2B) | ($5.3B) | — | — | — | ($325M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 14% | 13% | 19% | 15% | 27% | -3% | 16% | 13% | 8% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 10% | 9% | 16% | 12% | 25% | −5% | 14% | 10% | 6% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $39.0B | $45.8B | $50.7B | $60.9B | $79.8B | — | $275.3B | $317.3B | $360.1B | $410.1B | $412.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.5B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $5.4B | $10.5B | $13.4B | $20.8B | $15.4B | $17.2B | $19.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $7.2B | $8.6B | $10.8B | $13.7B | $17.6B | $18.8B | $22.9B | $23.7B | $30.9B | $30.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 483M | 506M | — | 560M | 573M | 596M | 861M | 885M | 888M | 891M | 891M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.29 | $3.04 | — | $3.20 | $3.50 | $27.24 | $6.62 | $16.38 | $24.63 | $21.83 | $23.19 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.64 | $2.01 | — | $3.58 | $3.50 | $7.94 | $-0.61 | $4.22 | $3.46 | $2.66 | $3.32 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-3.01 | $-7.01 | — | $-10.18 | $-10.41 | $-12.05 | $-6.13 | — | — | — | $-0.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.59 | $0.62 | — | $0.48 | $0.52 | $0.56 | $0.52 | $0.64 | $0.69 | $0.73 | $0.74 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $14.19 | — | $19.30 | $23.94 | $29.52 | $21.84 | $25.83 | $26.63 | $34.67 | $34.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.45 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +28.5%/yr | +44.2%/yr |
| EPS | +17.1%/yr | −5.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +2.4%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +11.8%/yr (8-yr) | +7.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$19.5Blow FY2016
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Operating margin 31.3%Wide fee margin (≥30%)Operating income $6.1B ÷ revenue $19.5BIndustry peers: median 22%
What this means
The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.
- Net margin 12.2%SolidNet income $2.4B ÷ revenue $19.5B
What this means
What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.
- Below the cost of equityNet income $2.4B ÷ equity $30.9BIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership23.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$722M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Does management own its misses?1 plain admission in this year's filing
“As of December 31, 2025 , certain of our investment funds had met the first and second criteria, as described above, but did not meet the third criteria.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Op. margin | Net margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| APOApollo Global Management | $32.0B | 13.8% | 13.2% | 21% |
| KKRKKR & Co. Inc. | $19.5B | 75.8% | 28.6% | 14% |
| AMPAmeriprise Financial Inc. | $18.9B | 21.7% | 16.1% | 46% |
| BXBlackstone Inc. | $14.5B | 46.3% | 20.7% | 27% |
| BENFranklin Resources Inc. | $8.8B | 21.8% | 15.0% | 10% |
| TROWT. Rowe Price Group Inc. | $7.3B | 41.5% | 30.2% | 25% |
| IVZInvesco | $6.4B | 18.4% | 10.3% | 4% |
| ARESAres Management | $5.6B | 13.1% | 9.0% | 13% |
| Group median | — | 21.8% | 15.5% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFKKR & Co. Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered46%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−2%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "KKR & Co. Inc. (KKR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KKR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← KIM its page in the Manual KKRS →
Industry order: ← KEEL the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter KKRS →