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KRNT, Kornit Digital Ltd.
We are a leading global developer and provider of innovative digital solutions for the printed textile industry.
Our solutions are designed to enable our customers to remain relevant, reduce waste, and adapt to shifting supply chain dynamics.
We focus on the rapidly growing high throughput DTG (direct to garment) and Direct to Fabric segments of the printed textile industry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 13% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.7%) on a 85% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 30% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 regions, the largest United States at 59%.
- United States59%$122M
- EMEA25%$52M
- Asia Pacific11%$22M
- Other6%$12M
- Israel0%$363K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $109M | $114M | $142M | $180M | $77M | $101M | $103M | $220M | $204M | $208M | $208M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 30% | 45% | 44% | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $1M | ($2M) | $6M | $8M | ($7M) | $13M | ($70M) | ($88M) | ($37M) | ($35M) | ($35M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.3% | −1.8% | 3.9% | 4.2% | −8.7% | 12.6% | −67.6% | −39.8% | −18.3% | −16.6% | −16.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $828K | ($2M) | $12M | $10M | ($5M) | $16M | ($79M) | ($64M) | ($17M) | ($14M) | ($79M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 44% | — | — | 7% | — | -1% | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $956K | $6M | $33M | $11M | $32M | $54M | ($99M) | ($35M) | $49M | $25M | $25M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $5M | $5M | $4M | $5M | $7M | $14M | $15M | $13M | $12M | $12M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($3M) | $3M | $16M | ($4M) | $32M | $31M | ($34M) | $15M | $52M | $26M | $92M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $5M | $6M | $7M | $5M | $13M | $14M | $18M | $7M | $15M | $21M | $21M | CapexCapex |
| 5.0% | 5.0% | 5.1% | 3.0% | 17.5% | 14.3% | 17.4% | 3.2% | 7.4% | 10.2% | 10.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($2M) | $330K | $28M | $6M | $28M | $47M | ($113M) | ($42M) | $34M | $13M | $13M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −1.8% | 0.3% | 19.9% | 3.1% | 35.9% | 46.0% | −109.2% | −19.0% | 16.5% | 6.1% | 6.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($5M) | $330K | $26M | $6M | $19M | $39M | ($117M) | ($42M) | $34M | $3M | $3M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −4.1% | 0.3% | 18.3% | 3.1% | 24.5% | 38.7% | −113.5% | −19.0% | 16.5% | 1.6% | 1.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $56M | $84M | $26M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 1% | -1% | 5% | 2% | -1% | 4% | -7% | -9% | -4% | -4% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 1% | -1% | 7% | 3% | -1% | 2% | -9% | -8% | -2% | -2% | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| 1% | −1% | 7% | 3% | −1% | 2% | −9% | −8% | −2% | −2% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $39M | $23M | $79M | $136M | $139M | $640M | $380M | $275M | $241M | $89M | $241M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $32M | $23M | $22M | $41M | $52M | $286K | $67M | $94M | $65M | $61M | $61M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $24M | $35M | $30M | $37M | $52M | $63M | $89M | $68M | $60M | $47M | $47M | InventoryInvent. |
| $56M | $58M | $52M | $78M | $104M | $63M | $157M | $161M | $126M | $108M | $108M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $99M | $89M | $141M | $253M | $478M | $775M | $579M | $522M | $615M | $596M | $596M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $30M | $26M | $33M | $46M | $90M | $97M | $65M | $50M | $44M | $42M | $42M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.3× | 3.5× | 4.2× | 5.6× | 5.3× | 8.0× | 8.9× | 10.4× | 13.9× | 14.2× | 14.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5M | $5M | $5M | $6M | $16M | $25M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $29M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $140M | $178M | $215M | $405M | $629M | $1.0B | $958M | $866M | $787M | $771M | $771M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($39M) | ($23M) | ($79M) | ($136M) | ($139M) | ($640M) | ($380M) | ($275M) | ($241M) | ($89M) | ($241M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $107M | $151M | $179M | $338M | $519M | $920M | $869M | $796M | $727M | $713M | $713M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 31.7M | 33.6M | 35.4M | 39.3M | 42.3M | 48.6M | 49.8M | 49.2M | 47.5M | 45.2M | 45.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.43 | $3.40 | $4.03 | $4.58 | $1.82 | $2.08 | $2.08 | $4.47 | $4.29 | $4.60 | $4.62 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.03 | $-0.06 | $0.35 | $0.26 | $-0.11 | $0.32 | $-1.59 | $-1.31 | $-0.35 | $-0.30 | $-1.75 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.06 | $0.01 | $0.80 | $0.14 | $0.66 | $0.96 | $-2.27 | $-0.85 | $0.71 | $0.28 | $0.28 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.14 | $0.01 | $0.74 | $0.14 | $0.45 | $0.81 | $-2.36 | $-0.85 | $0.71 | $0.07 | $0.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.17 | $0.17 | $0.21 | $0.14 | $0.32 | $0.30 | $0.36 | $0.14 | $0.32 | $0.47 | $0.47 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.38 | $4.49 | $5.07 | $8.61 | $12.27 | $18.92 | $17.45 | $16.19 | $15.31 | $15.75 | $15.81 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.3%/yr | +20.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −15.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +11.8%/yr | +8.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +18.7%/yr | +5.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $13M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $9M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($14M) | ($17M) | ($64M) | ($79M) | $16M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$12M | +$13M | +$15M | +$14M | +$7M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$26M | +$52M | +$15M | −$34M | +$31M |
| Cash from operations | $25M | $49M | ($35M) | ($99M) | $54M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$12M | −$15M | −$7M | −$14M | −$7M |
| Owner earnings | $13M | $34M | ($42M) | ($113M) | $47M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$9M | — | — | −$4M | −$7M |
| Free cash flow | $3M | $34M | ($42M) | ($117M) | $39M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 16% | -19% | -109% | 46% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $9M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $35M + ST investments $206M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $241M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -109%–46%; latest $13M = operating cash $25M − maintenance capex $12MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put $9M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $3M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($79M) · cash from operations $25M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $26M ÷ Owner Earnings $13M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $13M of Owner Earnings, $26M (205%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $26M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.79×ExpandingCapex $21M ÷ depreciation $12M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $208M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 14.18×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −942%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-1.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 1% → −25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −25% lately, median −9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Worst year 2022 · −67.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +4.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Advanced technologies like virtual reality, 3D modeling, and artificial intelligence are being increasingly integrated to enhance online shopping.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$241M
- Receivables$61M
- Inventory$47M
- Other current assets$246M
- Other current liabilities$42M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $77M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$113M · 148%
- Buybacks$166M · 216%
- Returned to owners$166M
$0 as dividends and $166M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$202M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $202M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $166M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count42.0%
The diluted count rose from 32M to 45M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kornit Digital Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?42.0%
Diluted shares grew 42.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $166M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$125M · 60% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“During the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, our ten largest customers accounted for approximately 60% of our revenues.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Industrial Machinery
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VECOVeeco Instruments Inc. | $664M | 40% | 5.2% | -1% | 6% |
| AZTAAzenta Inc. | $594M | 44% | -6.1% | -3% | 6% |
| TWINTwin Disc Incorporated | $341M | 28% | 3.4% | 5% | 0% |
| GHMGraham Corporation | $245M | 22% | 1.9% | 3% | 6% |
| KRNTKornit Digital Ltd. | $208M | 44% | -5.3% | -1% | 5% |
| OUSTOuster Inc. | $169M | 27% | -297.0% | -101% | -224% |
| ERIIEnergy Recovery Inc. | $135M | 69% | 13.5% | 13% | 8% |
| ASYSAmtech Systems Inc. | $79M | 37% | 1.8% | 1% | -4% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 1.9% | -0% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kornit Digital Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kornit Digital Ltd. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Kornit Digital Ltd. earns about $13M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $3M on 46M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $241M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($21M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $13M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← KRKR its page in the Manual KSPI →
Industry order: ← KMT the Industrial Machinery chapter LECO →