Owner Scorecard


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KRNT, Kornit Digital Ltd.

Industrial Machinery capital-intensive UnprofitableNet current asset value

We are a leading global developer and provider of innovative digital solutions for the printed textile industry.

Our solutions are designed to enable our customers to remain relevant, reduce waste, and adapt to shifting supply chain dynamics.

We focus on the rapidly growing high throughput DTG (direct to garment) and Direct to Fabric segments of the printed textile industry.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
KRNT · Kornit Digital Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$208M
+2.1% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $208M 5-yr avg $167M
Operating margin −16.6% 5-yr avg −25.9%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −4%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg −12%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 13% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.7%) on a 85% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 30% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 5 regions, the largest United States at 59%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States59%$122M
  • EMEA25%$52M
  • Asia Pacific11%$22M
  • Other6%$12M
  • Israel0%$363K

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$109M$114M$142M$180M$77M$101M$103M$220M$204M$208M$208MRevenueRevenue
30%45%44%Gross marginGross mgn
$1M($2M)$6M$8M($7M)$13M($70M)($88M)($37M)($35M)($35M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.3%−1.8%3.9%4.2%−8.7%12.6%−67.6%−39.8%−18.3%−16.6%−16.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$828K($2M)$12M$10M($5M)$16M($79M)($64M)($17M)($14M)($79M)Net incomeNet inc.
44%7%-1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$956K$6M$33M$11M$32M$54M($99M)($35M)$49M$25M$25MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$5M$5M$4M$5M$7M$14M$15M$13M$12M$12MDepreciationDeprec.
($3M)$3M$16M($4M)$32M$31M($34M)$15M$52M$26M$92MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$5M$6M$7M$5M$13M$14M$18M$7M$15M$21M$21MCapexCapex
5.0%5.0%5.1%3.0%17.5%14.3%17.4%3.2%7.4%10.2%10.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($2M)$330K$28M$6M$28M$47M($113M)($42M)$34M$13M$13MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−1.8%0.3%19.9%3.1%35.9%46.0%−109.2%−19.0%16.5%6.1%6.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($5M)$330K$26M$6M$19M$39M($117M)($42M)$34M$3M$3MFree cash flowFCF
−4.1%0.3%18.3%3.1%24.5%38.7%−113.5%−19.0%16.5%1.6%1.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$56M$84M$26MBuybacksBuybacks
1%-1%5%2%-1%4%-7%-9%-4%-4%-4%ROICROIC
1%-1%7%3%-1%2%-9%-8%-2%-2%-11%Return on equityROE
1%−1%7%3%−1%2%−9%−8%−2%−2%−11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$39M$23M$79M$136M$139M$640M$380M$275M$241M$89M$241MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$32M$23M$22M$41M$52M$286K$67M$94M$65M$61M$61MReceivablesReceiv.
$24M$35M$30M$37M$52M$63M$89M$68M$60M$47M$47MInventoryInvent.
$56M$58M$52M$78M$104M$63M$157M$161M$126M$108M$108MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$99M$89M$141M$253M$478M$775M$579M$522M$615M$596M$596MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$30M$26M$33M$46M$90M$97M$65M$50M$44M$42M$42MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×3.5×4.2×5.6×5.3×8.0×8.9×10.4×13.9×14.2×14.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5M$5M$5M$6M$16M$25M$29M$29M$29M$29M$29MGoodwillGoodwill
$140M$178M$215M$405M$629M$1.0B$958M$866M$787M$771M$771MTotal assetsAssets
($39M)($23M)($79M)($136M)($139M)($640M)($380M)($275M)($241M)($89M)($241M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$107M$151M$179M$338M$519M$920M$869M$796M$727M$713M$713MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
31.7M33.6M35.4M39.3M42.3M48.6M49.8M49.2M47.5M45.2M45.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.43$3.40$4.03$4.58$1.82$2.08$2.08$4.47$4.29$4.60$4.62Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.03$-0.06$0.35$0.26$-0.11$0.32$-1.59$-1.31$-0.35$-0.30$-1.75EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.06$0.01$0.80$0.14$0.66$0.96$-2.27$-0.85$0.71$0.28$0.28Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.14$0.01$0.74$0.14$0.45$0.81$-2.36$-0.85$0.71$0.07$0.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.17$0.17$0.21$0.14$0.32$0.30$0.36$0.14$0.32$0.47$0.47Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.38$4.49$5.07$8.61$12.27$18.92$17.45$16.19$15.31$15.75$15.81Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.3%/yr+20.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share−15.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.8%/yr+8.1%/yr
Book value / share+18.7%/yr+5.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
45Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−4%low FY2023
Gross margin
44%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$13Mowner earningsvs.($14M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $13M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $9M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($14M)($17M)($64M)($79M)$16M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12M+$13M+$15M+$14M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$26M+$52M+$15M−$34M+$31M
Cash from operations$25M$49M($35M)($99M)$54M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$12M−$15M−$7M−$14M−$7M
Owner earnings$13M$34M($42M)($113M)$47M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$9M−$4M−$7M
Free cash flow$3M$34M($42M)($117M)$39M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%16%-19%-109%46%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $9M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $35M + ST investments $206M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $241M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -109%–46%; latest $13M = operating cash $25M − maintenance capex $12M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put $9M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $3M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($79M) · cash from operations $25M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $26M ÷ Owner Earnings $13M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $13M of Owner Earnings, $26M (205%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $26M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.79×
    Expanding
    Capex $21M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $208M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 14.18×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −942%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-1.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 1% → −25% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −25% lately, median −9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Worst year 2022 · −67.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Advanced technologies like virtual reality, 3D modeling, and artificial intelligence are being increasingly integrated to enhance online shopping.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$596M
  • Cash & short-term investments$241M
  • Receivables$61M
  • Inventory$47M
  • Other current assets$246M
Current liabilities$42M
  • Other current liabilities$42M
Current ratio14.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio13.06×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio5.75×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$554Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$674Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$538MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4M$4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $77M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$113M · 148%
  • Buybacks$166M · 216%
  • Returned to owners$166M

    $0 as dividends and $166M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$202M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $202M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $166M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count42.0%

    The diluted count rose from 32M to 45M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kornit Digital Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?42.0%

    Diluted shares grew 42.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $166M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$125M · 60% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “During the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, our ten largest customers accounted for approximately 60% of our revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Machinery

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VECOVeeco Instruments Inc.$664M40%5.2%-1%6%
AZTAAzenta Inc.$594M44%-6.1%-3%6%
TWINTwin Disc Incorporated$341M28%3.4%5%0%
GHMGraham Corporation$245M22%1.9%3%6%
KRNTKornit Digital Ltd.$208M44%-5.3%-1%5%
OUSTOuster Inc.$169M27%-297.0%-101%-224%
ERIIEnergy Recovery Inc.$135M69%13.5%13%8%
ASYSAmtech Systems Inc.$79M37%1.8%1%-4%
Group median39%1.9%-0%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kornit Digital Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kornit Digital Ltd. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kornit Digital Ltd. earns about $13M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−90%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $3M on 46M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $241M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($21M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $13M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kornit Digital Ltd. (KRNT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KRNT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KRKR its page in the Manual KSPI →

Industry order: ← KMT the Industrial Machinery chapter LECO →