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LBTYB, Liberty Global Ltd. Class B

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LBTYB · Liberty Global Ltd. Class B

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.9B

+12.4% YoY · −16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $5.5B

Gross margin 66% 5-yr avg 69%

Operating margin −1.2% 5-yr avg 1.2%

ROIC −0% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin −6% 5-yr avg 25%

Free cash flow margin −6% 5-yr avg 25%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 28% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 71% and operating margin about 5.9% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −7.6% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −63 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 30% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$13.7B	$11.3B	$12.0B	$11.1B	$11.5B	$10.3B	$4.0B	$4.1B	$4.3B	$4.9B	$5.0B	RevenueRevenue
75%	74%	73%	72%	71%	71%	73%	69%	67%	66%	66%	Gross marginGross mgn
18%	18%	17%	18%	19%	21%	25%	27%	26%	25%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.6B	$792M	$839M	$660M	$2.0B	$1.3B	$110M	($314M)	($60M)	($23M)	($60M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.4%	7.0%	7.0%	5.9%	17.6%	12.8%	2.7%	−7.6%	−1.4%	−0.5%	−1.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.7B	($2.8B)	$725M	$11.5B	($1.6B)	$13.4B	$1.5B	($4.1B)	$1.6B	($7.1B)	($5.5B)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	2%	—	3%	22%	—	-2%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$5.9B	$5.7B	$6.0B	$4.6B	$4.2B	$3.5B	$2.8B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4.1B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$3.5B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	DepreciationDeprec.
($150M)	$4.5B	$1.2B	($10.8B)	$3.2B	($12.5B)	$108M	$4.8B	($725M)	$7.1B	$5.4B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$891M	$922M	$909M	$1.3B	$1.5B	CapexCapex
11.2%	11.1%	12.2%	10.5%	11.2%	13.7%	22.2%	22.4%	20.9%	27.5%	30.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$4.4B	$4.5B	$4.5B	$3.4B	$2.9B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$1.1B	($132M)	($308M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
32.1%	39.5%	37.7%	30.7%	25.1%	20.8%	48.5%	30.2%	25.9%	−2.7%	−6.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.4B	$4.5B	$4.5B	$3.4B	$2.9B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$1.1B	($132M)	($308M)	Free cash flowFCF
32.1%	39.5%	37.7%	30.7%	25.1%	20.8%	48.5%	30.2%	25.9%	−2.7%	−6.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.4B	$414M	$83M	$23M	$5.3B	$71M	$0	$0	$199M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.0B	$3.0B	$2.0B	$3.2B	$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$690M	$192M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
3%	—	1%	2%	—	3%	0%	-1%	-0%	-0%	-0%	ROICROIC
12%	-41%	15%	85%	-12%	52%	7%	-21%	13%	-73%	-57%	Return on equityROE
12%	−41%	15%	85%	−12%	52%	7%	−21%	13%	−73%	−57%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.1B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$8.1B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$4.3B	$3.4B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$1.9B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$907M	$831M	$404M	$450M	$558M	$523M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$955M	$926M	$874M	$964M	$579M	$613M	$610M	$408M	$371M	$479M	$442M	Accounts payablePayables
$420M	$479M	$530M	$441M	$499M	$294M	$221M	($3M)	$79M	$80M	$82M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$7.1B	$4.3B	$4.1B	$10.6B	$5.8B	$5.9B	$6.3B	$5.6B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$9.7B	$10.0B	$10.3B	$8.7B	$4.5B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$4.3B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$2.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	0.4×	0.4×	1.2×	1.3×	1.5×	1.6×	1.3×	1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12.8B	$14.4B	$13.7B	$13.6B	$10.0B	$9.5B	$2.8B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$3.5B	$3.4B	GoodwillGoodwill
$68.7B	$57.6B	$53.2B	$49.0B	$59.1B	$46.9B	$42.9B	$42.1B	$25.4B	$22.6B	$21.9B	Total assetsAssets
$42.3B	$40.8B	$29.8B	$28.2B	$14.9B	$14.8B	$13.8B	$15.7B	$9.1B	$8.6B	$44.1B	Total debtDebt
$41.2B	$39.1B	$28.3B	$20.0B	$12.0B	$11.6B	$9.4B	$12.3B	$6.9B	$6.4B	$42.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.8×	0.6×	0.6×	0.5×	1.7×	1.5×	0.2×	-0.3×	-0.1×	-0.0×	-0.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13.8B	$6.8B	$4.7B	$13.6B	$13.7B	$25.9B	$22.4B	$19.1B	$12.4B	$9.7B	$9.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%	1.4%	1.7%	2.8%	3.0%	3.0%	4.1%	5.0%	3.9%	3.5%	3.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
900M	848M	779M	706M	602M	569M	497M	426M	375M	342M	351M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$15.26	$13.30	$15.36	$15.75	$19.18	$18.12	$8.08	$9.67	$11.57	$14.25	$14.19	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.89	$-3.28	$0.93	$16.32	$-2.70	$23.59	$2.96	$-9.52	$4.23	$-20.86	$-15.56	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.89	$5.26	$5.79	$4.84	$4.80	$3.76	$3.92	$2.92	$3.00	$-0.39	$-0.88	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.89	$5.26	$5.79	$4.84	$4.80	$3.76	$3.92	$2.92	$3.00	$-0.39	$-0.88	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.71	$1.47	$1.87	$1.66	$2.15	$2.47	$1.79	$2.17	$2.42	$3.92	$4.26	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.29	$8.03	$6.01	$19.28	$22.69	$45.57	$45.14	$44.78	$32.96	$28.44	$27.07	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.8%/yr	−5.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.7%/yr	+12.8%/yr
Book value / share	+7.1%/yr	+4.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

342Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

−0%low FY2023

Gross margin

66%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($132M)owner earningsvs.($7.1B)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $7.1B loss into ($132M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($7.1B)	$1.6B	($4.1B)	$1.5B	$13.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.0B	+$1.0B	+$1.2B	+$1.1B	+$2.4B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$169M	+$168M	+$205M	+$163M	+$308M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$7.1B	−$725M	+$4.8B	+$108M	−$12.5B
Cash from operations	$1.2B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.8B	$3.5B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1.3B	−$909M	−$922M	−$891M	−$1.4B
Owner earnings	($132M)	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.9B	$2.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-3%	26%	30%	48%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $169M), owner earnings is nearer ($301M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($23M) ÷ interest expense $498M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $44.0B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $2.1B + ST investments $76M − debt $46.2B

What this means
Netting $2.2B of cash and short-term investments against $46.2B of debt leaves $44.0B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -63d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 42 + DIO 0 − DPO 105 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 0%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -1%–3%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($18M) ÷ invested capital $53.8B

Industry peers: median 0%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 30%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–48%; latest ($132M) = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $1.3B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $169M of SBC) leaves ($301M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.2B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($7.1B) · cash from operations $1.2B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.29×

Expanding

Capex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $1.0B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.08×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $46.2B vs $237M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-9.55/share (latest year $-21.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $29.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 8% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to −3% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −22%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 22% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −7.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B

Cash & short-term investments$1.9B
Receivables$523M
Other current assets$716M

Current liabilities$2.8B

Debt due within a year$698M
Accounts payable$442M
Other current liabilities$1.7B

Current ratio1.11×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.11×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.67×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$304Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$698M due · $1.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$4.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($9.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$9.2B$818M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$256Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $38.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$12.2B · 32%
Buybacks$16.9B · 44%
Retained (debt / cash)$9.1B · 24%

Returned to owners$16.9B
65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $16.9B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $16.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−61.0%
The diluted count fell from 900M to 351M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.9B21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity36%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$7.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $12.2B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mike Fries	$62.0M	$70.3M	$2.1B
2022	Mike Fries	$19.0M	−$22.7M	$1.9B
2023	Mike Fries	$44.7M	$35.2M	$1.2B
2024	Mike Fries	$45.7M	$48.6M	$1.1B
2025	Mike Fries	$37.7M	$22.6M	($132M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$169M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Liberty Global Ltd. Class B is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?17.8% vs 36.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 36.4% early in the record and 17.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“We expect to incur further restructuring charges during 2026 as certain elements of the restructuring plan did not meet the criteria for recognition in 2025.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OPTUOptimum Communications Inc.	$8.6B	67%	18.6%	5%	10%
LBTYBLiberty Global Ltd. Class B	$4.9B	72%	6.5%	1%	30%
ROKURoku Inc.	$4.7B	44%	-4.6%	-15%	5%
VSATViaSat Inc.	$4.6B	88%	-2.7%	-2%	7%
LILALiberty Latin America Ltd.	$4.4B	77%	2.0%	0%	2%
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.	$2.3B	51%	15.8%	13%	12%
CABOCable One	$1.5B	—	27.3%	10%	19%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.	$1.0B	—	-33.2%	-12%	12%
Group median	—	69%	4.3%	0%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Liberty Global Ltd. Class B has delivered.

Liberty Global Ltd. Class B’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($745M) Net of stock comp (−$173M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($154M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−30%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−22%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($308M) on 335M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $42.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 351M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.5B) runs well above depreciation ($1.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($154M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LBTYB against another business →

The owners of LBTYB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Liberty Global Ltd. Class B (LBTYB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LBTYB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LBTYA its page in the Manual LBTYK →

Industry order: ← LBTYA the Media & Broadcasting chapter LBTYK →