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ROKU, Roku Inc.

Roku Inc. is the leading TV streaming platform in the United States, Canada, and Mexico by hours streamed.

Nearly every major media company not only has a streaming service, but has also expanded beyond pure subscription streaming models to ad-supported streaming options.

Advertisers use TV streaming to reach viewers who are increasingly unreachable on traditional TV, while also benefiting from the digital advertising capabilities that TV streaming platforms can deliver.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ROKU · Roku Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.7B

+15.2% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $3.6B

Gross margin 44% 5-yr avg 46%

Operating margin 2.1% 5-yr avg −7.3%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg −56%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −5.3% through the cycle on a 44% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 7.5% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −15%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$399M	$513M	$743M	$1.1B	$1.8B	$2.8B	$3.1B	$3.5B	$4.1B	$4.7B	$5.0B	RevenueRevenue
30%	39%	45%	44%	45%	51%	46%	44%	44%	44%	44%	Gross marginGross mgn
9%	9%	10%	10%	10%	9%	11%	12%	9%	8%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
19%	21%	23%	23%	20%	17%	25%	25%	18%	15%	15%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($43M)	($20M)	($13M)	($65M)	($20M)	$235M	($531M)	($792M)	($218M)	($6M)	$104M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−10.9%	−3.8%	−1.8%	−5.8%	−1.1%	8.5%	−17.0%	−22.7%	−5.3%	−0.1%	2.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($43M)	($64M)	($9M)	($60M)	($18M)	$242M	($498M)	($710M)	($129M)	$88M	$201M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	-2%	—	—	—	6%	10%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($32M)	$37M	$14M	$14M	$148M	$228M	$12M	$256M	$218M	$484M	$544M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M	$5M	$8M	$13M	$22M	$25M	$31M	$53M	$49M	$46M	$48M	DepreciationDeprec.
($3M)	$85M	($23M)	($24M)	$10M	($227M)	$119M	$542M	($86M)	($4M)	($43M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$9M	$9M	$18M	$77M	$82M	$40M	$162M	$83M	$5M	$5M	$6M	CapexCapex
2.2%	1.8%	2.5%	6.8%	4.6%	1.4%	5.2%	2.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($38M)	$32M	$6M	$907K	$126M	$203M	($19M)	$203M	$213M	$478M	$538M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−9.5%	6.3%	0.8%	0.1%	7.1%	7.3%	−0.6%	5.8%	5.2%	10.1%	10.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($41M)	$28M	($4M)	($63M)	$66M	$188M	($150M)	$173M	$213M	$478M	$538M	Free cash flowFCF
−10.3%	5.5%	−0.6%	−5.6%	3.7%	6.8%	−4.8%	5.0%	5.2%	10.1%	10.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$3M	—	$68M	$0	$137M	$0	$0	$0	$95M	$95M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$150M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-12%	-18%	-5%	33%	-55%	-208%	-52%	-0%	8%	ROICROIC
—	-42%	-4%	-9%	-1%	9%	-19%	-31%	-5%	3%	8%	Return on equityROE
—	−42%	−4%	−9%	−1%	9%	−19%	−31%	−5%	3%	8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
—	$177M	$198M	$515M	$1.1B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$79M	$121M	$183M	$333M	$524M	$752M	$761M	$816M	$813M	$880M	$753M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$44M	$33M	$36M	$50M	$54M	$50M	$107M	$92M	$158M	$115M	$101M	InventoryInvent.
$31M	$56M	$57M	$115M	$112M	$125M	$165M	$385M	$274M	$159M	$123M	Accounts payablePayables
$92M	$97M	$162M	$267M	$465M	$678M	$703M	$523M	$697M	$836M	$731M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$165M	$345M	$433M	$926M	$1.7B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$117M	$163M	$194M	$358M	$520M	$730M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	2.1×	2.2×	2.6×	3.3×	4.2×	2.7×	2.4×	2.6×	2.7×	2.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$1M	$1M	$74M	$73M	$162M	$162M	$162M	$162M	$309M	$309M	GoodwillGoodwill
$179M	$372M	$465M	$1.5B	$2.3B	$4.1B	$4.4B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$4.4B	$4.4B	Total assetsAssets
$15M	$0	$0	$100M	$95M	$90M	$80M	$0	—	—	$100M	Total debtDebt
$15M	($177M)	($198M)	($416M)	($998M)	($2.1B)	($1.9B)	($2.0B)	—	—	($2.3B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	-102.9×	-1085.4×	-530.8×	-3.0×	49.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($194M)	$152M	$245M	$698M	$1.3B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%	2.1%	5.1%	7.5%	7.5%	6.8%	11.5%	10.6%	9.4%	7.5%	6.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
28.5M	28.3M	105M	115M	124M	142M	138M	142M	145M	151M	151M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$14.00	$18.11	$7.10	$9.80	$14.34	$19.51	$22.71	$24.61	$28.44	$31.39	$32.88	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.50	$-2.24	$-0.08	$-0.52	$-0.14	$1.71	$-3.62	$-5.01	$-0.89	$0.59	$1.33	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.33	$1.13	$0.06	$0.01	$1.02	$1.43	$-0.14	$1.43	$1.47	$3.17	$3.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.44	$0.99	$-0.04	$-0.55	$0.53	$1.33	$-1.09	$1.22	$1.47	$3.17	$3.56	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30	$0.33	$0.18	$0.67	$0.66	$0.28	$1.17	$0.58	$0.03	$0.03	$0.04	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-6.81	$5.38	$2.34	$6.06	$10.71	$19.53	$19.22	$16.43	$17.24	$17.61	$17.69	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×6 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×3.7 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.4%/yr	+17.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+25.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	−21.3%/yr	−44.5%/yr
Book value / share	—	+10.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

151Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−0%low FY2023

Gross margin

44%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$478Mowner earningsvs.$88Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $88M of profit into $478M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$88M

Owner earnings$478M · 10% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$88M	($129M)	($710M)	($498M)	$242M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$46M	+$49M	+$53M	+$31M	+$25M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$354M	+$385M	+$370M	+$360M	+$188M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$4M	−$86M	+$542M	+$119M	−$227M
Cash from operations	$484M	$218M	$256M	$12M	$228M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$5M	−$5M	−$53M	−$31M	−$25M
Owner earnings	$478M	$213M	$203M	($19M)	$203M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$29M	−$131M	−$15M
Free cash flow	$478M	$213M	$173M	($150M)	$188M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	5%	6%	-1%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $354M), owner earnings is nearer $124M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -3.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($6M) ÷ interest expense $2M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$2.2B

Net cash

Cash $1.6B + ST investments $730M − debt $100M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.2B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 62d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 68 + DIO 16 − DPO 22 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -18%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -208%–33%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($5M) ÷ invested capital $1.2B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -9%–10%; latest $478M = operating cash $484M − maintenance capex $5M

Industry peers: median 18%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $354M of SBC) leaves $124M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 5.47×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $484M ÷ net income $88M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 31%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $150M ÷ Owner Earnings $478M

What this means
Of $478M Owner Earnings, $150M (31%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $150M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($354M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.12×

Harvesting

Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $46M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.75×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $100M vs $2.2B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.69/share (latest year $0.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −5% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
The recent-years average (−9%) sits below the early years (−5%), but the latest year (−0%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −5% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2023 · −22.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If the recommendations, content, or analyses that AI applications produce are or are alleged to be deficient or inaccurate, we could be subjected to competitive harm, legal liability, regulatory action, or reputational harm.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.4B

Cash & short-term investments$2.4B
Receivables$753M
Inventory$101M
Other current assets$137M

Current liabilities$1.2B

Accounts payable$123M
Other current liabilities$1.0B

Current ratio2.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.82×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+22.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 2.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$1.7BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$501M$501M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $623M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$151Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$107M

'27$103M

'28$100M

'29$97M

'30$76M

later$110M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$107Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$594Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$523Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$100M

Lease obligations (present value)$523M

Total fixed claims on the business$623M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $623M, of which the leases are 84%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$490M · 36%
Buybacks$150M · 11%
Retained (debt / cash)$738M · 54%

Returned to owners$150M
12% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $150M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$97.21
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $150M, about $97.21 each.
Net change in share count430.4%
The diluted count rose from 28M to 151M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Anthony Wood	$18.1M	−$51.7M	$203M
2022	Anthony Wood	$21.0M	−$77.9M	($19M)
2023	Anthony Wood	$20.2M	$46.5M	$203M
2024	Anthony Wood	$27.7M	$57.8M	$213M
2025	Anthony Wood	$26.6M	$47.1M	$478M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio99:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$354M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Roku Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?430.4%
Diluted shares grew 430.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $150M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $310M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OPTUOptimum Communications Inc.	$8.6B	67%	18.6%	5%	10%
NXSTNexstar Media Group Inc.	$4.9B	—	24.3%	9%	22%
LBTYALiberty Global Ltd. Class A	$4.9B	72%	6.5%	1%	30%
ROKURoku Inc.	$4.7B	44%	-4.6%	-15%	5%
FWONALiberty Media Corporation	$4.5B	73%	13.6%	4%	18%
LILALiberty Latin America Ltd.	$4.4B	77%	2.0%	0%	2%
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.	$2.3B	51%	15.8%	13%	12%
CABOCable One	$1.5B	—	27.3%	10%	19%
Group median	—	69%	14.7%	4%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Roku Inc. has delivered.

Roku Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Roku Inc. earns about $260M on its 5.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($260M) Net of stock comp (−$337M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($539M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+39%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+66%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $538M on 148M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net cash $2.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation ($48M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $539M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ROKU against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Roku Inc. (ROKU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ROKU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ROK its page in the Manual ROL →

Industry order: ← RCI the Media & Broadcasting chapter SBGI →