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MFC, Manulife Financial Corporation
We announced new milestones to strengthen our presence in the world's largest economies and augment our capabilities to deliver differentiated products and solutions for our customers.
Has a multi-channel distribution network in all the segments in which it operates, with different emphasis depending on the product line and geography.
We are a leading provider of insurance and insurance-based wealth accumulation products, driven by a customer-centric strategy, and we leverage the asset management expertise and products managed by our Global Wealth and Asset Management segment.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- The spread on the float and the growth in book value. What decides it: the gap between what the invested reserves earn and what is credited to policyholders, the mortality and fee margins on top, and the scale of the float against equity. Benefits exceed premiums by design, so a P&C combined ratio is the wrong lens; the risks are interest rates and reserve adequacy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- A life insurer is read on the spread it earns on a large float and the growth in book value, not a combined ratio: benefits exceed premiums by design, since claims fall due decades after the premium and are funded by the investment income on accumulated reserves. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 4% a year across the record. Whether the spread holds as rates move, and whether the reserves prove adequate, are what the 10-K decides, not an earnings multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| C$53.3B | C$58.3B | C$39.0B | C$79.6B | C$78.9B | C$61.8B | C$38.3B | C$40.2B | C$44.8B | C$47.9B | C$47.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | C$23.1B | C$24.0B | C$26.6B | C$28.9B | C$28.9B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| C$13.4B | C$13.6B | C$13.6B | C$15.4B | C$16.4B | C$15.6B | C$15.2B | C$16.2B | C$18.2B | C$19.0B | C$19.0B | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| C$2.9B | C$2.1B | C$4.8B | C$5.6B | C$5.9B | C$7.1B | (C$1.9B) | C$5.1B | C$5.4B | C$5.6B | C$5.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 6% | 10% | 12% | 11% | 17% | 15% | — | 14% | 18% | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| C$17.0B | C$17.8B | C$19.2B | C$20.5B | C$20.0B | C$23.2B | C$16.6B | C$20.4B | C$26.5B | C$32.1B | C$32.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| 7% | 5% | 10% | 11% | 11% | 12% | -4% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 1% | 7% | 9% | 7% | 8% | −10% | 11% | 4% | 5% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| C$720.7B | C$729.5B | C$750.3B | C$809.1B | C$880.3B | C$917.6B | C$928.2B | C$875.6B | C$978.8B | C$1.03T | C$1.03T | Total assetsAssets |
| C$15.2B | C$16.0B | C$16.2B | C$20.3B | C$26.2B | C$22.6B | C$19.2B | C$20.3B | C$25.8B | C$26.7B | C$26.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$41.8B | C$41.0B | C$46.0B | C$49.1B | C$52.3B | C$58.4B | C$45.4B | C$47.0B | C$51.0B | C$50.1B | C$50.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.97B | 1.98B | 1.98B | 1.96B | 1.94B | 1.94B | 1.91B | 1.83B | 1.78B | 1.70B | 1.70B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$1.48 | C$1.06 | C$2.42 | C$2.86 | C$3.02 | C$3.66 | C$-1.01 | C$2.78 | C$3.03 | C$3.27 | C$3.27 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$0.81 | C$0.90 | C$0.90 | C$0.71 | C$1.21 | C$1.29 | C$1.46 | C$0.00 | C$1.78 | C$1.94 | C$0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| C$21.20 | C$20.73 | C$23.18 | C$25.10 | C$26.96 | C$30.08 | C$23.75 | C$25.65 | C$28.65 | C$29.43 | C$29.43 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.4%/yr | −7.1%/yr |
| EPS | +9.2%/yr | +1.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.2%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.7%/yr | +1.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 11%SolidNet income C$5.6B ÷ equity C$50.1BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
- Investment income C$19.0Bearned on investmentsNet investment income C$19.0B
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
The float and book value
- Float —Not enough data
What this means
Loss reserves weren't found.
- Book value per share C$29the compounding scoreboardEquity C$50.1B ÷ 1703M shares
What this means
A life insurer is judged the way Berkshire is, by the growth in book value per share over the years as the spread on the float and the mortality and fee margins compound into equity. This is the level today; the record below shows whether it has grown. Note that reported book value swings with interest rates, which mark the bond portfolio up and down through other comprehensive income.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Insurance — Life & Health
The same industry, side by side on the spread-and-book-value lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | Return on assets |
|---|---|---|---|
| METMetLife Inc. | $77.1B | 9% | 0.7% |
| PFHPrudential Financial Inc | $60.8B | 9% | 0.5% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 12% | 2.4% |
| ATHSAthene Holding Ltd | $25.7B | 14% | 0.9% |
| RGAReinsurance Group of America | $23.7B | 9% | 1.0% |
| CRBGCorebridge Financial Inc. | $19.0B | 14% | 0.6% |
| LNCLincoln National | $18.2B | 11% | 0.4% |
| MFCManulife Financial Corporation | C$47.9B | 11% | 0.6% |
| Group median | — | 11% | 0.6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Manulife Financial Corporation reports in CAD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that CAD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in CAD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Manulife Financial Corporation’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered−0%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book C$37.8B on 1703M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← MESO its page in the Manual MFG →
Industry order: ← MET the Insurance — Life & Health chapter PFG →