Owner Scorecard


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PFG, Principal Financial

Principal Financial is a leader in global financial services offering businesses, individuals and institutional clients a wide range of financial products and services, including retirement, asset management and workplace benefits and protection solutions through our diverse family of financial services companies.

Our international asset management and accumulation businesses focus on the opportunities created as aging populations around the world drive increased demand for retirement accumulation, retirement asset management and retirement income management solutions.

In the U.S., we offer a broad array of retirement and employee benefit and insurance solutions to meet the needs of the business owner and their employees.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PFG · Principal Financial
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$15.6B
−3.1% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $15.5B 5-yr avg $15.5B
Return on equity 13% 5-yr avg 17%
Return on assets 0.5% 5-yr avg 0.6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The spread on the float and the growth in book value. What decides it: the gap between what the invested reserves earn and what is credited to policyholders, the mortality and fee margins on top, and the scale of the float against equity. Benefits exceed premiums by design, so a P&C combined ratio is the wrong lens; the risks are interest rates and reserve adequacy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
A life insurer is read on the spread it earns on a large float and the growth in book value, not a combined ratio: benefits exceed premiums by design, since claims fall due decades after the premium and are funded by the investment income on accumulated reserves. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 5% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.1× equity, the leverage that magnifies the spread. Whether the spread holds as rates move, and whether the reserves prove adequate, are what the 10-K decides, not an earnings multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$12.4B$14.1B$14.2B$16.2B$14.7B$14.4B$17.5B$13.7B$16.1B$15.6B$15.5BRevenueRevenue
$5.3B$6.2B$6.4B$7.9B$6.0B$4.8B$5.3B$6.5B$6.9B$6.8B$6.2BPremiums earnedPremiums
$3.3B$3.5B$3.6B$4.0B$3.9B$4.4B$3.8B$4.1B$4.4B$4.7B$4.8BInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$1.3B$2.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$4.8B$623M$1.6B$1.2B$1.6BNet incomeNet inc.
15%-3%13%15%16%15%20%10%16%12%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.9B$4.2B$5.2B$5.5B$3.7B$3.3B$3.2B$3.8B$4.6B$4.5B$3.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
13%18%14%10%8%10%48%6%14%10%13%Return on equityROE
8%14%8%5%5%6%41%−0%8%4%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2.0B$2.1B$2.3B$2.4B$1.7B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3BFloat (reserves)Float
$228.0B$253.9B$243.0B$276.1B$296.6B$304.7B$290.9B$305.0B$313.7B$341.4B$332.7BTotal assetsAssets
$2.7B$2.5B$3.0B$2.5B$2.8B$2.3B$4.8B$4.7B$4.2B$4.4B$4.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$10.2B$12.8B$11.4B$14.6B$16.6B$16.1B$10.0B$10.9B$11.1B$11.9B$11.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
293M293M289M281M277M273M255M245M235M226M220MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.50$7.88$5.35$4.96$5.05$5.79$18.63$2.55$6.68$5.25$7.09EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.59$1.84$2.07$2.16$2.22$2.40$2.52$2.56$2.80$3.03$3.13Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$34.94$43.84$39.44$52.02$59.87$58.88$39.08$44.63$47.12$52.65$53.63Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.6%/yr+5.4%/yr
EPS+1.7%/yr+0.8%/yr
Dividends / share+7.4%/yr+6.4%/yr
Book value / share+4.7%/yr−2.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
226Mpeak FY2017
Revenue
$15.6Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $1.2B ÷ equity $11.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

  • earned on investments
    Net investment income $4.7B
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

The float and book value

  • 0.1× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $1.3B, 0.1× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • the compounding scoreboard
    Equity $11.9B ÷ 226M shares
    What this means

    A life insurer is judged the way Berkshire is, by the growth in book value per share over the years as the spread on the float and the mortality and fee margins compound into equity. This is the level today; the record below shows whether it has grown. Note that reported book value swings with interest rates, which mark the bond portfolio up and down through other comprehensive income.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$350M
'27$100K
'28$393M
'29$498M
'30$598M
later$2.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$350Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$350Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$598Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$4.1B
Together, against $350M due next year11.6×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $4.1B against the $350M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 12 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021$17.6M$30.4M$1.6B
2022$13.8M$22.3M$4.8B
2023$15.1M$12.3M$623M
2024$16.4M$14.2M$1.6B
2025$11.3M$13.2M$1.2B
2025$13.8M$15.3M$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio155:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$110M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Insurance — Life & Health

The same industry, side by side on the spread-and-book-value lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEYield on floatReturn on assets
EGEverest Group$17.7B9%4.7%2.5%
AFLAFLAC Incorporated$17.6B16%5.8%3.0%
PFGPrincipal Financial$15.6B11%0.5%
MKLMarkel Group Inc.$15.5B9%3.1%2.5%
CNACNA Financial Corporation$15.0B8%9.4%1.6%
WRBW.R. Berkley$14.7B14%5.1%2.9%
UNMUnum Group$13.1B11%9.6%1.5%
CNOCNO Financial Group Inc.$4.5B9%1.0%
Group median10%2.0%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Principal Financial’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered−4%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity15%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $9.0B on 216M shares, a 15% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Principal Financial (PFG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PFG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PFE its page in the Manual PFGC →

Industry order: ← MFC the Insurance — Life & Health chapter PFH →