Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← MMED Manual MMM → ← MLP Real Estate Development & Services MRP →

MMI, Marcus & Millichap Inc.

Marcus & Millichap Inc. is a leading national real estate services firm specializing in commercial real estate investment sales, financing services, research and advisory services.

We are the leading national investment brokerage company in the $1 million to $10 million private client market.

As of December 31, 2025, we had 1,808 investment sales and financing professionals who are primarily commission-based independent contractors who provide real estate investment brokerage and financing services to sellers and buyers of commercial real estate in over 80 offices in the United States and Canada.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MMI · Marcus & Millichap Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$755M
+8.5% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $782M 5-yr avg $939M
Operating margin −0.2% 5-yr avg 1.9%
ROIC −0% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Real estate brokerage commissions (84%), Financing fees (14%) and Other revenue (2%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −9.2% to 15% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 24%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Real estate brokerage commissions is 84% of revenue, with Financing fees the other meaningful line at 14%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Real estate brokerage commissions84%$633M
  • Financing fees14%$104M
  • Other revenue2%$19M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$717M$720M$815M$806M$717M$1.3B$1.3B$646M$696M$755M$782MRevenueRevenue
$65M$52M$87M$77M$43M$142M$104M($34M)($12M)($2M)($587K)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$69M$57M$94M$85M$54M$154M$118M($20M)$4M$10M$11MFunds from operationsFFO
Balance sheet
0%0%51%478%202%187%Dividend payout (FFO)Payout
$394M$460M$566M$709M$779M$1.0B$1.0B$878M$870M$827M$755MTotal assetsAssets
($187M)($221M)($215M)($233M)($243M)($382M)($236M)($171M)($153M)($162M)($137M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
69.5×64.3×80.2×69.5×59.6×326.5×194.1×-66.9×-40.5×-17.7×-2.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$259M$315M$410M$495M$547M$696M$714M$645M$631M$603M$569MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
39.0M39.1M39.4M39.5M39.7M40.2M40.2M38.7M38.7M38.9M38.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.77$1.45$2.38$2.15$1.35$3.84$2.93$-0.53$0.11$0.26$0.29FFO / shareFFO/sh
$0.00$0.00$1.50$0.52$0.52$0.53$0.54Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.63$8.05$10.40$12.51$13.76$17.33$17.76$16.69$16.31$15.49$14.90Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.6%/yr+1.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.1%/yr+14.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.0%/yr+3.0%/yr
Book value / share+9.9%/yr+2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
39Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
−2%low FY2023
Gross margin
38%low FY2017
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($14M) ÷ interest expense $773K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $162M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $162M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -13%–19%; latest $59M = operating cash $67M − maintenance capex $8M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $35M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($2M) · cash from operations $67M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $46M ÷ Owner Earnings $59M
    What this means

    Of $59M Owner Earnings, $46M (78%) went back to shareholders, $21M dividends, $25M buybacks. Net of $24M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.65×
    Harvesting
    Capex $8M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $755M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −124%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.43/share (latest year $-0.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 14% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to −5% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth −6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −9.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$245M
  • Cash & short-term investments$137M
  • Other current assets$109M
Current liabilities$93M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$81M
Current ratio2.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.65×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$153Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.7× → 2.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$528Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$59MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$75M$75M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Nadji$8.2M$11.0M$249M
2022Mr. Nadji$7.5M$3.5M$2M
2023Mr. Nadji$10.4M$13.9M($82M)
2024Mr. Nadji$4.6M$2.3M$14M
2025Mr. Nadji$6.3M$2.0M$59M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership41.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio66:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Real Estate Development & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation$5.0B68%10.4%6%6%
AGNTAGNT Inc.$4.8B11%-0.4%-14%5%
OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc$4.4B8%-6.4%-20%-1%
NMRKNewmark Group Inc.$3.3B10.4%14%-2%
MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc.$755M38%11.3%24%6%
MRPMillrose Properties Inc.$600M80.9%6%
JOESt. Joe Company (The)$513M43%24.5%6%25%
TRNOTerreno Realty$476M37.6%3%37%
Group median38%10.8%6%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marcus & Millichap Inc. has delivered.

Marcus & Millichap Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Marcus & Millichap Inc. earns about $46M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−27%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $83M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net cash $137M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($9M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $84M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Marcus & Millichap Inc. (MMI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MMI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MMED its page in the Manual MMM →

Industry order: ← MLP the Real Estate Development & Services chapter MRP →