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MMI, Marcus & Millichap Inc.
Marcus & Millichap Inc. is a leading national real estate services firm specializing in commercial real estate investment sales, financing services, research and advisory services.
We are the leading national investment brokerage company in the $1 million to $10 million private client market.
As of December 31, 2025, we had 1,808 investment sales and financing professionals who are primarily commission-based independent contractors who provide real estate investment brokerage and financing services to sellers and buyers of commercial real estate in over 80 offices in the United States and Canada.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Real estate brokerage commissions (84%), Financing fees (14%) and Other revenue (2%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −9.2% to 15% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 24%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Real estate brokerage commissions is 84% of revenue, with Financing fees the other meaningful line at 14%.
- Real estate brokerage commissions84%$633M
- Financing fees14%$104M
- Other revenue2%$19M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $717M | $720M | $815M | $806M | $717M | $1.3B | $1.3B | $646M | $696M | $755M | $782M | RevenueRevenue |
| $65M | $52M | $87M | $77M | $43M | $142M | $104M | ($34M) | ($12M) | ($2M) | ($587K) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $69M | $57M | $94M | $85M | $54M | $154M | $118M | ($20M) | $4M | $10M | $11M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | 51% | — | 478% | 202% | 187% | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $394M | $460M | $566M | $709M | $779M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $878M | $870M | $827M | $755M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($187M) | ($221M) | ($215M) | ($233M) | ($243M) | ($382M) | ($236M) | ($171M) | ($153M) | ($162M) | ($137M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 69.5× | 64.3× | 80.2× | 69.5× | 59.6× | 326.5× | 194.1× | -66.9× | -40.5× | -17.7× | -2.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $259M | $315M | $410M | $495M | $547M | $696M | $714M | $645M | $631M | $603M | $569M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 39.0M | 39.1M | 39.4M | 39.5M | 39.7M | 40.2M | 40.2M | 38.7M | 38.7M | 38.9M | 38.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.77 | $1.45 | $2.38 | $2.15 | $1.35 | $3.84 | $2.93 | $-0.53 | $0.11 | $0.26 | $0.29 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.50 | $0.52 | $0.52 | $0.53 | $0.54 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $6.63 | $8.05 | $10.40 | $12.51 | $13.76 | $17.33 | $17.76 | $16.69 | $16.31 | $15.49 | $14.90 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.6%/yr | +1.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −1.1%/yr | +14.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −2.0%/yr | +3.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.9%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -17.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($14M) ÷ interest expense $773K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $162M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $162M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -13%–19%; latest $59M = operating cash $67M − maintenance capex $8MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $35M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($2M) · cash from operations $67M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $46M ÷ Owner Earnings $59M
What this means
Of $59M Owner Earnings, $46M (78%) went back to shareholders, $21M dividends, $25M buybacks. Net of $24M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.65×HarvestingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $12M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $755M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.55×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −124%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.43/share (latest year $-0.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 14% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to −5% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth −6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −9.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$137M
- Other current assets$109M
- Accounts payable$11M
- Other current liabilities$81M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Nadji | $8.2M | $11.0M | $249M |
| 2022 | Mr. Nadji | $7.5M | $3.5M | $2M |
| 2023 | Mr. Nadji | $10.4M | $13.9M | ($82M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Nadji | $4.6M | $2.3M | $14M |
| 2025 | Mr. Nadji | $6.3M | $2.0M | $59M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership41.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio66:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38% | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| MRPMillrose Properties Inc. | $600M | — | 80.9% | 6% | — |
| JOESt. Joe Company (The) | $513M | 43% | 24.5% | 6% | 25% |
| TRNOTerreno Realty | $476M | — | 37.6% | 3% | 37% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 10.8% | 6% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marcus & Millichap Inc. has delivered.
Marcus & Millichap Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Marcus & Millichap Inc. earns about $46M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $83M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net cash $137M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($9M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $84M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MMED its page in the Manual MMM →
Industry order: ← MLP the Real Estate Development & Services chapter MRP →