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VAC, Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation
We are a leading global vacation company that offers vacation ownership, exchange, rental and resort and property management, along with related businesses, products and services.
As the first major hospitality-branded vacation ownership company, Marriott Vacations Worldwide helped establish the industry and was the first major pure-play independent, public company in the field.
We are a global leader in vacation ownership with some of the most iconic brands in the industry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Cost Reimbursement (34%) and Time Share (29%), with 5 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 10% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.5% to 17% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Cost Reimbursement at 34%.
- Cost Reimbursement34%$1.7B
- Time Share29%$1.5B
- Management and exchange17%$860M
- Rental13%$650M
- Service, Other7%$358M
- Ancillary revenues5%$276M
- Management Service4%$226M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.0B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $4.3B | $2.9B | $3.9B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| $122M | $235M | $55M | $138M | ($275M) | $49M | $391M | $254M | $218M | ($308M) | ($342M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $143M | $256M | $117M | $279M | ($152M) | $195M | $523M | $389M | $364M | ($159M) | ($197M) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 24% | 15% | 44% | 29% | — | 12% | 19% | 27% | 29% | — | — | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $2.4B | $2.8B | $9.0B | $9.2B | $8.9B | $9.6B | $9.6B | $9.7B | $9.8B | $9.8B | $9.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | 29% | 19% | 20% | 30% | 27% | 32% | 31% | 31% | 36% | 34% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| — | $835M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $426M | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $976M | $1.0B | $3.5B | $3.0B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 28.4M | 27.7M | 34.0M | 44.5M | 41.3M | 43.3M | 45.2M | 43.5M | 42.1M | 34.9M | 34.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.04 | $9.24 | $3.44 | $6.27 | $-3.68 | $4.50 | $11.57 | $8.94 | $8.65 | $-4.56 | $-5.66 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $1.20 | $1.37 | $1.50 | $1.82 | $1.09 | $0.53 | $2.19 | $2.44 | $2.54 | $3.15 | $3.16 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $34.38 | $37.58 | $101.79 | $67.84 | $64.19 | $68.73 | $55.22 | $54.76 | $58.00 | $57.11 | $57.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.3%/yr | +15.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +11.4%/yr | +23.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.2%/yr | +10.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.8%/yr | −2.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -3.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($177M) ÷ interest expense $58M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $406M − debt $3.5B
What this means
Netting $406M of cash and short-term investments against $3.5B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -3%–16%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($140M) ÷ invested capital $5.1BIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -1%–10%; latest ($29M) = operating cash $28M − maintenance capex $57MIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves ($67M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($308M) · cash from operations $28M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.38×HarvestingCapex $57M ÷ depreciation $149M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −60%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.59/share (latest year $-8.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $58.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to 6% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −3.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“If we fail to keep pace with rapidly evolving AI technological developments, our competitive position and business results may be negatively impacted.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$232M written down across 2 years (2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Stephen P. Weisz | $13.2M | $17.5M | $296M |
| 2022 | Mr. Stephen P. Weisz | $9.8M | $6.2M | $457M |
| 2023 | Mr. Geller | $5.4M | $1.1M | $114M |
| 2024 | Mr. Geller | $7.4M | $5.8M | $148M |
| 2025 | Mr. Avril | $4.0M | $5.3M | ($29M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Geller | $14.3M | $7.0M | ($29M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership13.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio99:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWKCushman & Wakefield Ltd. | $10.3B | — | 2.2% | 4% | 1% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| INVHInvitation Homes Inc. | $2.7B | — | 11.2% | 1% | 37% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38% | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 24% | 6.3% | 3% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation has delivered.
Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Marriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation earns about $285M on its 5.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($35M) on 34M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $3.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← V its page in the Manual VALU →
Industry order: ← UE the Real Estate Development & Services chapter VTMX →