Owner Scorecard


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MSEX, Middlesex Water

Water Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

Middlesex also operates water and wastewater systems under contract on behalf of municipal and private clients primarily in New Jersey and Delaware.

The Company's other subsidiaries are Pinelands Water Company (Pinelands Water) and Pinelands Wastewater Company (Pinelands Wastewater) (collectively, Pinelands), Utility Service Affiliates, Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MSEX · Middlesex Water
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$195M
+1.5% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $199M 5-yr avg $172M
Operating margin 28.1% 5-yr avg 26.3%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin −7% 5-yr avg −20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 27% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (23%–30% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Capital spending runs about 54% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$133M$131M$138M$135M$142M$143M$162M$166M$192M$195M$199MRevenueRevenue
$40M$38M$37M$36M$37M$33M$47M$39M$53M$54M$56MOperating incomeOp. inc.
30.3%28.9%26.9%26.4%26.4%23.2%29.1%23.6%27.7%27.9%28.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M$23M$32M$34M$38M$37M$42M$32M$44M$43M$44MNet incomeNet inc.
34%33%3%7%3%13%10%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$47M$43M$46M$36M$53M$33M$61M$53M$59M$63M$61MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$14M$15M$16M$17M$21M$27M$27M$29M$28M$32M$33MDepreciationDeprec.
$10M$4M($3M)($16M)($7M)($32M)($10M)($10M)($15M)($14M)($17M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$47M$50M$72M$89M$106M$79M$91M$90M$75M$75MCapexCapex
35.6%38.5%52.2%66.2%74.6%55.5%56.2%54.2%38.9%37.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$34M$28M$30M$19M$33M$6M$34M$23M$31M$28MOwner earningsOwner earn.
25.2%21.4%21.8%14.0%23.0%4.4%20.9%14.0%16.0%14.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($304K)($7M)($26M)($53M)($52M)($46M)($30M)($37M)($16M)($14M)Free cash flowFCF
−0.2%−5.7%−19.0%−39.4%−36.9%−32.4%−18.5%−22.5%−8.3%−7.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M$14M$15M$16M$18M$19M$21M$22M$23M$25M$26MDividends paidDiv. paid
6%5%6%3%6%6%6%ROICROIC
11%10%11%7%10%9%9%Return on equityROE
6%5%5%2%5%4%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4M$5M$4M$2M$4M$4M$4M$2M$4M$3M$2MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$10M$11M$12M$12M$15M$15M$16M$18M$19M$19M$19MReceivablesReceiv.
$12M$14M$19M$23M$30M$21M$25M$28M$28M$31M$29MAccounts payablePayables
($2M)($3M)($8M)($11M)($16M)($6M)($9M)($9M)($9M)($12M)($11M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$27M$29M$31M$29M$34M$34M$37M$109M$43M$42M$47MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$47M$65M$94M$65M$57M$57M$118M$104M$83M$94M$120MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.5×0.3×0.4×0.6×0.6×0.3×1.0×0.5×0.4×0.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$620M$661M$768M$910M$976M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$141M$146M$160M$238M$280M$313M$308M$723M$361M$387M$379MTotal debtDebt
$137M$141M$156M$236M$276M$310M$304M$720M$356M$384M$377MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.6×6.9×5.5×4.9×5.0×4.1×5.1×3.0×3.8×3.8×3.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$346M$368M$400M$423M$445M$494M$501MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.6%0.8%0.5%0.8%0.9%1.0%1.3%0.8%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
16.4M16.5M16.5M16.8M17.6M17.6M17.7M17.8M17.9M18.1M18.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.09$7.93$8.35$8.00$8.06$8.13$9.17$9.32$10.69$10.73$10.72Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.38$1.38$1.96$2.01$2.19$2.08$2.40$1.77$2.47$2.36$2.37EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.04$1.70$1.82$1.12$1.85$0.35$1.91$1.31$1.71$1.50Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.02$-0.45$-1.59$-3.15$-2.97$-2.63$-1.69$-2.10$-0.89$-0.76Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.80$0.85$0.90$0.96$1.03$1.10$1.17$1.26$1.30$1.37$1.37Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.88$3.05$4.36$5.30$6.01$4.51$5.16$5.05$4.16$4.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.70$20.89$22.60$23.70$24.81$27.24$26.97Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr+5.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.2%/yr (8-yr)+8.9%/yr
EPS+6.1%/yr+1.5%/yr
Dividends / share+6.2%/yr+5.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.7%/yr (8-yr)−4.7%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr (5-yr)+6.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
18Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
11.6×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$31Mowner earningsvs.$44Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned $31M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $28M it takes just to hold its position. It put $47M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($16M).

Reported net income$44M
Owner earnings$31M · 16% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$44M$32M$42M$37M$38M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$28M+$29M+$27M+$27M+$21M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$2M+$2M+$2M+$1M+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$15M−$10M−$10M−$32M−$7M
Cash from operations$59M$53M$61M$33M$53M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$28M−$29M−$27M−$27M−$21M
Owner earnings$31M$23M$34M$6M$33M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$47M−$61M−$64M−$53M−$85M
Free cash flow($16M)($37M)($30M)($46M)($52M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%14%21%4%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $28M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $47M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $29M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $54M ÷ interest expense $14M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $384M · 7.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $3M + ST investments $200K − debt $387M
    What this means

    Netting $3M of cash and short-term investments against $387M of debt leaves $384M owed, about 7.1× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 3%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $49M ÷ invested capital $878M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 4%–25%; latest $30M = operating cash $63M − maintenance capex $32M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 9 years. It chose to put $42M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($12M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1M of SBC) leaves $29M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $63M ÷ net income $43M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $26M ÷ Owner Earnings $30M
    What this means

    Of $30M Owner Earnings, $26M (88%) went back to shareholders, $25M dividends, $1M buybacks. Net of $1M stock comp, the real buyback was about $231K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.30×
    Expanding
    Capex $75M ÷ depreciation $32M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $195M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.45×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $387M vs ($52M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +52%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.12/share (latest year $2.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 29% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (26%) sits below the early years (29%), but the latest year (28%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 27% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 23.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$47M
  • Cash & short-term investments$2M
  • Receivables$19M
  • Other current assets$26M
Current liabilities$120M
  • Debt due within a year$8M
  • Accounts payable$29M
  • Other current liabilities$82M
Current ratio0.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.39×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($73M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $2M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$501Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$382M$2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$467Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$8M
'27$8M
'28$7M
'29$7M
'30$6M
later$351M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$8Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$15Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$8Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$386Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$30M
Together, against $8M due next year4.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $32M against the $8M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $431M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$700M · 162%
  • Dividends$162M · 38%
  • Buybacks$2M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$165M

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $162M as dividends and $2M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$433M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $433M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $141M to $379M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count13.1%

    The diluted count rose from 16M to 19M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.30/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($141M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $1M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$1.3M$3.2M$6M
2022$1.2M$39k$34M
2023Mr. Dennis Doll,$1.8M$1.4M$23M
2024$1.8M$1.6M$31M
2025Ms. Leslie$1.9M$1.6M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio78:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$1M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Middlesex Water is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?17.0% vs 22.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 22.8% early in the record and 17.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?13.1%

    Diluted shares grew 13.1% over 2016–2024, even as the company spent $2M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$141M → $379M

    Debt rose from $141M to $379M while owner earnings went from about $31M to $29M — about 4.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 13 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Water Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CWTCalifornia Water Service$964M16.5%5%15%
HTOH2O America$806M22.0%5%
AWRAmerican States Water$658M89%28.3%10%17%
OPALOPAL Fuels Inc.$327M3.3%5%
MSEXMiddlesex Water$195M27.3%6%21%
CWCOConsolidated Water Co. Ltd.$132M36%11.8%9%16%
ARTNAArtesian Resources Corporation$113M24.0%5%21%
YORWYork Water$77M42.9%7%28%
Group median23.0%6%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Middlesex Water has delivered.

Middlesex Water’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Middlesex Water earns about $36M on its 18.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($14M) on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $377M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($75M) runs well above depreciation ($33M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $28M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Middlesex Water (MSEX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MSEX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MSCI its page in the Manual MSFT →

Industry order: ← HTO the Water Utilities chapter SBS →