← All companies ← MSBIP Manual MSEX → ← MNY Commercial Services & Supplies NUTX →
MSCI, MSCI Inc.
We use advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, to improve how we collect and validate data and enhance the capabilities and insights we deliver to clients.
Investors all over the world use our tools and solutions to gain insights and improve transparency throughout their investment processes.
We are focused on supporting investors' total portfolio needs across asset classes through our integrated solutions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Index (57%) and Analytics (23%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 80% and operating margin about 52% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (42%–55% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 38%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 46% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Index at 57%.
- Index57%$1.8B
- Analytics23%$714M
- Sustainability and Climate11%$354M
- Other Operating9%$279M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 78% | 79% | 80% | 81% | 83% | — | — | — | — | — | 91% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 8% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $488M | $580M | $687M | $756M | $885M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 42.4% | 45.5% | 47.9% | 48.5% | 52.2% | 52.5% | 53.7% | 54.8% | 53.5% | 54.7% | 55.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $261M | $304M | $508M | $564M | $602M | $726M | $871M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | 35% | 19% | 7% | 12% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 18% | 20% | 15% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $442M | $404M | $613M | $710M | $811M | $936M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $34M | $35M | $31M | $30M | $30M | $29M | $27M | $21M | $17M | $23M | $25M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $115M | $28M | $35M | $75M | $128M | $126M | $140M | ($5M) | $280M | $251M | $130M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $32M | $33M | $30M | $29M | $22M | $14M | $14M | $23M | $34M | $39M | $31M | CapexCapex |
| 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.1% | 1.9% | 1.3% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 0.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $410M | $371M | $583M | $680M | $789M | $923M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 35.6% | 29.1% | 40.6% | 43.7% | 46.6% | 45.1% | 48.1% | 48.0% | 52.0% | 49.9% | 48.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $410M | $371M | $583M | $680M | $789M | $923M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 35.6% | 29.1% | 40.6% | 43.7% | 46.6% | 45.1% | 48.1% | 48.0% | 51.4% | 49.4% | 48.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $60K | — | — | $18M | $0 | $949M | $0 | $727M | $27M | $0 | $42M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $96M | $120M | $171M | $223M | $246M | $302M | $373M | $441M | $509M | $557M | $563M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $775M | $150M | $950M | $292M | $779M | $198M | $1.4B | $504M | $885M | $2.5B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 21% | 24% | 37% | 47% | 48% | 35% | 40% | 35% | 40% | 45% | 47% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $792M | $890M | $904M | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $994M | $462M | $409M | $515M | $385M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $222M | $328M | $473M | $499M | $559M | $665M | $663M | $840M | $821M | $987M | $883M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $568K | $2M | $4M | $6M | $14M | $13M | $15M | $10M | $15M | $15M | $10M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $221M | $326M | $470M | $493M | $544M | $651M | $648M | $830M | $806M | $971M | $873M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $537M | $608M | $809M | $901M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.0× | 2.1× | 1.8× | 2.3× | 1.9× | 1.7× | 1.4× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $5.4B | $5.7B | $5.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $6.2B | $6.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $3.5B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $5.7B | $6.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.8× | 5.0× | 5.2× | 5.1× | 5.7× | 6.7× | 7.0× | 7.4× | 8.2× | 8.2× | 7.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $318M | $401M | ($166M) | ($77M) | ($443M) | ($163M) | ($1.0B) | ($740M) | ($940M) | ($2.7B) | ($2.8B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.8% | 2.9% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.3% | 3.6% | 3.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 96.5M | 91.9M | 89.7M | 85.5M | 84.5M | 83.5M | 81.2M | 79.8M | 79.0M | 76.6M | 73.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.92 | $13.86 | $15.99 | $18.21 | $20.06 | $24.48 | $27.69 | $31.67 | $36.17 | $40.90 | $44.13 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.70 | $3.31 | $5.66 | $6.59 | $7.12 | $8.70 | $10.72 | $14.39 | $14.05 | $15.69 | $17.98 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.25 | $4.04 | $6.49 | $7.95 | $9.34 | $11.05 | $13.32 | $15.20 | $18.80 | $20.42 | $21.29 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.25 | $4.04 | $6.49 | $7.95 | $9.34 | $11.05 | $13.32 | $15.20 | $18.59 | $20.21 | $21.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.00 | $1.30 | $1.91 | $2.61 | $2.92 | $3.62 | $4.59 | $5.52 | $6.45 | $7.26 | $7.67 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.33 | $0.36 | $0.34 | $0.34 | $0.26 | $0.16 | $0.17 | $0.29 | $0.43 | $0.51 | $0.42 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.29 | $4.36 | $-1.86 | $-0.90 | $-5.24 | $-1.96 | $-12.41 | $-9.27 | $-11.90 | $-34.64 | $-37.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +14.7%/yr | +15.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +19.1%/yr | +16.9%/yr |
| EPS | +21.6%/yr | +17.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +24.7%/yr | +20.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.9%/yr | +14.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $23M it takes just to hold its position. It put $16M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.5B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $871M | $726M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$23M | +$17M | +$21M | +$27M | +$29M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$111M | +$95M | +$72M | +$58M | +$55M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$251M | +$280M | −$5M | +$140M | +$126M |
| Cash from operations | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $936M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$23M | −$17M | −$23M | −$14M | −$14M |
| Owner earnings | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $923M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$16M | −$17M | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $923M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 50% | 52% | 48% | 48% | 45% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $23M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $16M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $111M), owner earnings is nearer $1.5B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $1.7B ÷ interest expense $210M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.6B · 3.3× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $515M + ST investments $71M − debt $6.2B
What this means
Netting $586M of cash and short-term investments against $6.2B of debt leaves $5.6B owed, about 3.3× a year's operating profit (3.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 115 + DIO 0 − DPO 19 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range 21%–48%; 45% latest = NOPAT $1.4B ÷ invested capital $3.0BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 45% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 29%–52%; latest $1.6B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 50% of revenue this year, a 45% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $111M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.6B ÷ net income $1.2B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.6B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.6B of Owner Earnings, $3.0B (194%) went back to shareholders, $557M dividends, $2.5B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $111M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.4B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.68×ExpandingCapex $39M ÷ depreciation $23M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.90×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $6.2B vs ($185M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +223%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $15.84/share (latest year $16.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-36.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 45% → 54% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 45% early to 54% lately, median 52% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 53%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 42.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Advances in AI and cloud platforms have also lowered the barriers for clients to build capabilities internally.”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$385M
- Receivables$883M
- Other current assets$126M
- Accounts payable$10M
- Other current liabilities$1.6B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $9.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$270M · 3%
- Dividends$3.0B · 33%
- Buybacks$8.4B · 90%
- Returned to owners$11.5B
126% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.0B as dividends and $8.4B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$2.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.1B to $6.4B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $407M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$78.00
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 12M shares were bought for $925M, about $78.00 each.
- Net change in share count−24.0%
The diluted count fell from 97M to 73M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$7.26/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 25% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Henry A. Fernandez | $10.3M | $81.2M | $923M |
| 2022 | Henry A. Fernandez | $13.0M | −$39.0M | $1.1B |
| 2023 | Henry A. Fernandez | $13.8M | $42.4M | $1.2B |
| 2024 | Henry A. Fernandez | $15.7M | $17.9M | $1.5B |
| 2025 | Henry A. Fernandez | $33.3M | $19.8M | $1.6B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$111M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why MSCI Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 27% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $222M to $883M while revenue grew 182%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPAYCorpay Inc. | $4.5B | 98% | 43.9% | 11% | 37% |
| FOURShift4 Payments | $4.2B | 23% | 1.9% | -1% | 9% |
| CARTMaplebear Inc. | $3.7B | 74% | 2.4% | 21% | 18% |
| MSCIMSCI Inc. | $3.1B | 80% | 52.3% | 38% | 46% |
| ETSYEtsy Inc. | $2.9B | 70% | 10.5% | 24% | 26% |
| ZZillow Group Inc. Class C Capital Stock | $2.6B | 78% | -8.9% | -3% | 10% |
| EXLSExlService | $2.1B | 86% | 12.5% | 14% | 12% |
| FICOFair Isaac | $2.0B | 73% | 30.6% | 35% | 29% |
| Group median | — | 76% | 11.5% | 18% | 22% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MSCI Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, MSCI Inc. earns about $1.4B on its 45.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 49.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $1.6B on 73M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-14; net debt $6.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($31M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MSBIP its page in the Manual MSEX →
Industry order: ← MNY the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter NUTX →