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NGVT, Ingevity

Chemicals capital-intensive

Ingevity Corporation provides products and technologies that purify, protect, and enhance the world around us.

Through a diverse team of talented and experienced people, we develop, manufacture, and bring to market solutions that are largely renewably sourced and help customers solve complex problems while making the world more sustainable.

Our products are used in a variety of demanding applications, including automotive gasoline vapor emissions control systems, food, water and chemical filtration, asphalt paving, agrochemical dispersants, bioplastics, coatings, elastomers, and paint for road markings.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NGVT · Ingevity

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.2B

−2.7% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Gross margin 40% 5-yr avg 37%

Operating margin 35.6% 5-yr avg 32.7%

Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is PM (52%), PC (34%) and APT (14%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 22%, above 15% in 4 of 4 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, PM, is also where the profit is made: 52% of revenue and 78% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Operating profit same segments

PM52%$607M78% of profit
PC34%$401M14% of profit
APT14%$160M8% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$908M	$972M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	RevenueRevenue
30%	34%	37%	37%	38%	37%	34%	37%	39%	40%	40%	Gross marginGross mgn
11%	11%	12%	13%	12%	13%	12%	13%	13%	15%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$164M	$243M	$321M	$397M	$398M	$422M	$453M	$423M	$426M	$419M	$419M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
18.0%	25.0%	28.3%	30.7%	32.7%	30.3%	27.1%	34.8%	35.5%	35.9%	35.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$35M	$127M	$169M	$184M	$181M	$118M	$212M	($5M)	($430M)	($167M)	($128M)	Net incomeNet inc.
55%	19%	19%	19%	23%	27%	22%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$128M	$174M	$252M	$276M	$352M	$293M	$313M	$205M	$129M	$331M	$304M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$39M	$40M	$57M	$85M	$100M	$110M	$109M	$123M	$108M	$106M	$104M	DepreciationDeprec.
$54M	$7M	$13M	($5M)	$62M	$65M	($7M)	$88M	$451M	$392M	$319M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$57M	$53M	$94M	$115M	$82M	$104M	$143M	$110M	$78M	$58M	$58M	CapexCapex
6.2%	5.4%	8.3%	8.9%	6.8%	7.5%	8.5%	9.0%	6.5%	4.9%	4.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$89M	$134M	$195M	$191M	$270M	$190M	$205M	$95M	$51M	$274M	$246M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.8%	13.8%	17.2%	14.7%	22.2%	13.6%	12.3%	7.8%	4.2%	23.4%	20.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$71M	$122M	$158M	$161M	$270M	$190M	$171M	$95M	$51M	$274M	$246M	Free cash flowFCF
7.8%	12.5%	13.9%	12.4%	22.2%	13.6%	10.2%	7.8%	4.2%	23.4%	20.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$316M	$538M	$0	$0	$345M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$7M	$47M	$6M	$88M	$109M	$145M	$92M	$0	$56M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	31%	25%	—	18%	—	17%	—	—	—	—	ROICROIC
28%	48%	50%	35%	28%	18%	30%	-1%	-220%	-563%	-329%	Return on equityROE
28%	48%	50%	35%	28%	18%	30%	−1%	−220%	−563%	−329%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$31M	$88M	$78M	$57M	$258M	$275M	$77M	$96M	$68M	$78M	$95M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$90M	$100M	$119M	$150M	$148M	—	—	—	—	—	$148M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$151M	$160M	$191M	$213M	$189M	$241M	$335M	$309M	$196M	$186M	$204M	InventoryInvent.
$79M	$83M	$93M	$99M	$104M	$126M	$175M	$158M	$95M	$92M	$85M	Accounts payablePayables
$162M	$177M	$217M	$263M	$233M	$115M	$160M	$150M	$101M	$94M	$267M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$295M	$369M	$423M	$463M	$629M	$725M	$683M	$659M	$493M	$454M	$582M	Current assetsCur. assets
$137M	$153M	$183M	$216M	$223M	$269M	$304M	$363M	$264M	$341M	$409M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×	2.4×	2.3×	2.1×	2.8×	2.7×	2.3×	1.8×	1.9×	1.3×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M	$12M	$131M	$436M	$445M	$442M	$519M	$528M	$175M	$4M	$4M	GoodwillGoodwill
$833M	$930M	$1.3B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.7B	Total assetsAssets
$492M	$455M	$759M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Total debtDebt
$461M	$367M	$681M	$1.2B	$1.0B	$994M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
8.5×	13.4×	9.7×	7.3×	8.4×	8.2×	7.3×	4.5×	4.4×	5.3×	5.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$127M	$264M	$339M	$531M	$642M	$674M	$698M	$631M	$195M	$30M	$39M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	1.1%	1.0%	0.7%	—	—	—	—	—	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$307M	$184M	$184M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
42.3M	42.5M	42.6M	42.2M	41.5M	40.1M	38.5M	36.7M	36.3M	36.2M	36.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$21.49	$22.86	$26.61	$30.64	$29.27	$34.74	$43.37	$33.11	$33.04	$32.23	$32.70	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.83	$2.97	$3.97	$4.35	$4.37	$2.95	$5.50	$-0.15	$-11.85	$-4.61	$-3.55	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.11	$3.15	$4.58	$4.52	$6.51	$4.73	$5.32	$2.60	$1.40	$7.55	$6.82	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.68	$2.86	$3.71	$3.81	$6.51	$4.73	$4.44	$2.60	$1.40	$7.55	$6.82	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.34	$1.24	$2.20	$2.72	$1.98	$2.59	$3.70	$2.99	$2.14	$1.59	$1.61	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.00	$6.21	$7.95	$12.58	$15.45	$16.82	$18.15	$17.20	$5.37	$0.82	$1.08	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.6%/yr	+1.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+15.2%/yr	+3.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+1.9%/yr	−4.2%/yr
Book value / share	−13.4%/yr	−44.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

36Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

17%low FY2022

Gross margin

40%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.1×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$274Mowner earningsvs.($167M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $167M loss into $274M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($167M)	($430M)	($5M)	$212M	$118M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$106M	+$108M	+$123M	+$109M	+$110M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$392M	+$451M	+$88M	−$7M	+$65M
Cash from operations	$331M	$129M	$205M	$313M	$293M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$58M	−$78M	−$110M	−$109M	−$104M
Owner earnings	$274M	$51M	$95M	$205M	$190M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$34M	—
Free cash flow	$274M	$51M	$95M	$171M	$190M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	23%	4%	8%	12%	14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $419M ÷ interest expense $78M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 2.9× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $78M − debt $1.3B

What this means
Netting $78M of cash and short-term investments against $1.3B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 2.9× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 95d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 46 + DIO 96 − DPO 48 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 18%

High through the cycle

4-yr median, range 17%–31%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 4%–23%; latest $274M = operating cash $331M − maintenance capex $58M

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $265M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $331M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($167M) · cash from operations $331M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 21%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $56M ÷ Owner Earnings $274M

What this means
Of $274M Owner Earnings, $56M (21%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $56M buybacks. Net of $8M stock comp, the real buyback was about $48M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.54×

Harvesting

Capex $58M ÷ depreciation $106M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.33×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.3B vs $113M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −282%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-5.78/share (latest year $-4.81), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 24% → 35% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 24% early to 35% lately, median 30% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 18.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$582M

Cash & short-term investments$95M
Receivables$148M
Inventory$204M
Other current assets$135M

Current liabilities$409M

Debt due within a year$122M
Accounts payable$85M
Other current liabilities$203M

Current ratio1.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$172Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$122M due · $95M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($133M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$162M$40M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$892M · 36%
Buybacks$551M · 22%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.0B · 41%

Returned to owners$551M
33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $551M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $815M and cash and short-term investments rose $65M.
Average price paid for buybacks$67.75
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $551M, about $67.75 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $53.04 (2025) to $84.49 (2018); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $68.73 ($145M).
Net change in share count−14.8%
The diluted count fell from 42M to 36M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$180M11% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity14%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $892M of capital spent building

$490M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 41% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$4.8M	$3.5M	$190M
2022	$5.4M	$7.3M	$205M
2023	$5.3M	−$1.1M	$95M
2024	$2.0M	$2.0M	$51M
2024	$6.3M	$817k	$51M
2025	$12.8M	$24.5M	$274M
2025	$1.1M	$1.6M	$274M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio127:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ingevity is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$492M → $1.3B
Debt rose from $492M to $1.3B while owner earnings went from about $139M to $140M — about 3.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $604M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$448M · 38% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In 2025, our ten largest customers accounted for approximately 38 percent of the product line's sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SOLSSolstice Advanced Materials Inc.	$3.9B	35%	21.2%	23%	20%
FMCFMC Corp.	$3.5B	40%	14.8%	11%	9%
IOSPInnospec	$1.8B	30%	9.3%	10%	6%
NGVTIngevity	$1.2B	37%	30.5%	22%	14%
WLKPWestlake Chemical Partners LP Common	$1.2B	35%	32.0%	—	32%
CSWCSW Industrials Inc.	$1.1B	45%	16.3%	12%	14%
BCPCBalchem	$1.0B	32%	16.4%	10%	15%
ECVTEcovyst Inc.	$724M	27%	11.8%	4%	12%
Group median	—	35%	16.3%	11%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ingevity has delivered.

Ingevity’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Ingevity earns about $160M on its 13.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($160M) Net of stock comp (−$8M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $246M on 35M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 36M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NGVT against another business →

The owners of NGVT: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ingevity (NGVT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NGVT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NGVC its page in the Manual NHC →

Industry order: ← NEU the Chemicals chapter OEC →