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NOW, ServiceNow Inc.
ServiceNow sells cloud-based software that runs the routine work inside large organizations — automating the workflows, approvals, and hand-offs that move between departments, with applications layered on a single platform. Customers are public and private institutions that pay a recurring subscription for access rather than buying the software outright. The company writes the code once and rents it to many, which is why most of the sales dollar falls through as gross profit; the platform itself is the product.
We offer an innovative suite of products, including AI-powered applications, and services designed to automate workflows, integrate systems and empower employees, regardless of existing systems, cloud environments or collaboration tools.
With the emergence of artificial intelligence, organizations are under pressure from their stakeholders to accelerate growth and achieve unprecedented productivity improvements.
Read in Notes: The Moat and the Multiple, Jul 16, 2026
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The question that governs this business is whether the platform becomes plumbing — once an enterprise wires its workflows through it, the cost and disruption of ripping it out is the moat to look for, and the test is renewal: do customers stay and spend more. The company's own filing answers the other side plainly, calling the market competitive and fragmented with low barriers to entry, so the bear case is that the work commoditizes and price, not lock-in, decides the contract. Watch too the reinvestment runway, since the value of a software platform rests on how much new work it can absorb without a matching jump in cost. The margins, the returns on capital, and the customer concentration are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 30% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →North America is 63% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- North America63%$8.3B
- EMEA26%$3.4B
- Asia Pacific and other12%$1.5B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $3.5B | $4.5B | $5.9B | $7.2B | $9.0B | $11.0B | $13.3B | $14.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 71% | 74% | 76% | 77% | 78% | 77% | 78% | 79% | 79% | 78% | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 21% | 20% | 20% | 22% | 23% | 24% | 24% | 24% | 23% | 22% | 22% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($382M) | ($64M) | ($42M) | $42M | $199M | $257M | $355M | $762M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −27.5% | −3.4% | −1.6% | 1.2% | 4.4% | 4.4% | 4.9% | 8.5% | 12.4% | 13.7% | 13.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($414M) | ($117M) | ($27M) | $627M | $119M | $230M | $325M | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | 21% | 8% | 19% | — | 18% | 23% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $159M | $643M | $811M | $1.2B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $5.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $83M | $114M | $150M | $252M | $336M | $472M | $433M | $562M | $564M | $738M | $836M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $173M | $252M | $144M | ($305M) | $461M | $358M | $564M | ($499M) | $532M | $1.0B | $812M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $106M | $151M | $224M | $265M | $419M | $392M | $550M | $694M | $852M | $868M | $804M | CapexCapex |
| 7.6% | 7.8% | 8.6% | 7.7% | 9.3% | 6.6% | 7.6% | 7.7% | 7.8% | 6.5% | 5.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $76M | $529M | $661M | $971M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.7B | $4.6B | $4.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.5% | 27.6% | 25.4% | 28.1% | 30.3% | 30.5% | 31.6% | 30.1% | 33.7% | 34.5% | 33.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $54M | $492M | $587M | $971M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $4.6B | $4.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.8% | 25.7% | 22.5% | 28.1% | 30.3% | 30.5% | 30.0% | 30.1% | 31.1% | 34.5% | 33.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $34M | $58M | $37M | $7M | $107M | $785M | $91M | $279M | $113M | $1.1B | $2.4B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $55M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $538M | $696M | $1.8B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -47% | -7% | -3% | 2% | 6% | 7% | 6% | 11% | 13% | 13% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| -77% | -15% | -2% | 29% | 4% | 6% | 6% | 23% | 15% | 13% | 15% | Return on equityROE |
| −77% | −15% | −2% | 29% | 4% | 6% | 6% | 23% | 15% | 13% | 15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.2B | $2.2B | $566M | $776M | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $3.7B | $4.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $323M | $437M | $575M | $835M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $1.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $38M | $32M | $31M | $53M | $34M | $89M | $274M | $126M | $68M | $204M | $427M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $285M | $405M | $544M | $782M | $975M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $1.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.3B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.8B | $4.5B | $5.2B | $6.7B | $7.8B | $9.2B | $10.5B | $8.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.8B | $3.7B | $4.9B | $6.0B | $7.4B | $8.4B | $10.4B | $10.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $83M | $129M | $149M | $157M | $241M | $777M | $824M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $3.6B | $4.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.0B | $3.6B | $3.9B | $6.0B | $8.7B | $10.8B | $13.3B | $17.4B | $20.4B | $26.0B | $24.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $508M | $630M | $662M | $695M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Total debtDebt |
| ($654M) | ($1.5B) | $96M | ($81M) | ($37M) | ($244M) | $16M | ($409M) | ($815M) | ($2.2B) | ($2.6B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -11.5× | -1.2× | -0.8× | 1.3× | 6.0× | 9.2× | 13.1× | — | — | — | 69.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $541M | $779M | $1.1B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $3.7B | $5.0B | $7.6B | $9.6B | $13.0B | $11.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 22.8% | 20.5% | 20.9% | 19.1% | 19.3% | 19.2% | 19.3% | 17.9% | 15.9% | 14.7% | 14.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 823M | 856M | 889M | 986M | 1.01B | 1.02B | 1.02B | 1.03B | 1.04B | 1.05B | 1.04B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.69 | $2.24 | $2.93 | $3.51 | $4.46 | $5.80 | $7.12 | $8.73 | $10.54 | $12.69 | $13.42 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.50 | $-0.14 | $-0.03 | $0.64 | $0.12 | $0.23 | $0.32 | $1.68 | $1.37 | $1.67 | $1.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.09 | $0.62 | $0.74 | $0.98 | $1.35 | $1.77 | $2.25 | $2.63 | $3.55 | $4.37 | $4.46 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.58 | $0.66 | $0.98 | $1.35 | $1.77 | $2.14 | $2.63 | $3.28 | $4.37 | $4.46 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.13 | $0.18 | $0.25 | $0.27 | $0.41 | $0.39 | $0.54 | $0.68 | $0.82 | $0.83 | $0.77 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.66 | $0.91 | $1.25 | $2.16 | $2.80 | $3.64 | $4.94 | $7.42 | $9.22 | $12.39 | $11.28 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +25.1%/yr | +23.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +53.5%/yr | +26.5%/yr |
| EPS | — | +70.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +23.0%/yr | +14.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +38.6%/yr | +34.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.7B of profit into $4.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $325M | $230M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$738M | +$564M | +$562M | +$433M | +$472M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$2.0B | +$1.7B | +$1.6B | +$1.4B | +$1.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.0B | +$532M | −$499M | +$564M | +$358M |
| Cash from operations | $5.4B | $4.3B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$868M | −$564M | −$694M | −$433M | −$392M |
| Owner earnings | $4.6B | $3.7B | $2.7B | $2.3B | $1.8B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$288M | — | −$117M | — |
| Free cash flow | $4.6B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $1.8B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 34% | 34% | 30% | 32% | 31% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2.0B), owner earnings is nearer $2.6B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 67.6×ComfortableOperating income $1.8B ÷ interest expense $27M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $3.7B + ST investments $1.1B − debt $1.5B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $3.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $391M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $3.7B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 72 + DIO 0 − DPO 25 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -47%–13%; 13% latest = NOPAT $1.4B ÷ invested capital $10.7BIndustry peers: median 19%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 5%–34%; latest $4.6B = operating cash $5.4B − maintenance capex $868MIndustry peers: median 29%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2.0B of SBC) leaves $2.6B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $5.4B ÷ net income $1.7B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $1.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.6B
What this means
Of $4.6B Owner Earnings, $1.8B (40%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.8B buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($2.0B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.18×MaintainingCapex $868M ÷ depreciation $738M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $13.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.00×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs $28M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.59/share (latest year $1.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.57/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −11% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 12% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +34%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 34% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −27.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Cloud-based and AI native vendors may build more business applications or AI powered automation solutions that compete with our products and services.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$3.7B
- Receivables$1.7B
- Other current assets$3.0B
- Accounts payable$427M
- Other current liabilities$9.6B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.4B, of which the leases are 38%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $22.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$4.5B · 20%
- Buybacks$3.1B · 14%
- Retained (debt / cash)$15.0B · 66%
- Returned to owners$3.1B
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.1B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$163.51
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 19M shares were bought for $3.1B, about $163.51 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $119.56 (2023) to $178.64 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($1.8B).
- Net change in share count26.4%
The diluted count rose from 823M to 1040M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained129%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.2B, so each retained $1 added about 1.29 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. McDermott | $165.8M | $136.2M | $1.8B |
| 2022 | Mr. McDermott | $38.5M | −$76.3M | $2.3B |
| 2023 | Mr. McDermott | $37.6M | $184.8M | $2.7B |
| 2024 | Mr. McDermott | $37.6M | $202.0M | $3.7B |
| 2025 | Mr. McDermott | $51.6M | −$83.3M | $4.6B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio251:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$2.0B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue, equal to 107% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why ServiceNow Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?26.4%
Diluted shares grew 26.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $3.1B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$1.5B · 11% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“We had one customer, a U.S. federal channel partner and systems integrator, that represented 11 % and 12 % of our accounts receivable balance as of December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively, and 11 % of our total revenues for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XYZBlock Inc. | $24.2B | 34% | -0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| ADBEAdobe Inc. | $23.8B | 87% | 32.2% | 33% | 39% |
| INTUIntuit Inc. | $18.8B | 99% | 26.0% | 35% | 32% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| SHOPShopify Inc. | $11.6B | 49% | -1.3% | -0% | 15% |
| EAElectronic Arts | $7.5B | 75% | 20.1% | 19% | 29% |
| ADSKAutodesk Inc. | $7.2B | 90% | 15.3% | 33% | 29% |
| SNPSSynopsys Inc. | $7.1B | 78% | 16.2% | 15% | 21% |
| Group median | — | 78% | 15.7% | 17% | 29% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ServiceNow Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, ServiceNow Inc. earns about $4.0B on its 30.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $4.6B on 1031M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $2.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Notes
- Jul 16, 2026 The Moat and the Multiple
Manual order: ← NOVTU its page in the Manual NP →
Industry order: ← NIQ the Software chapter NTCT →