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NIQ, NIQ Global Intelligence plc
Leveraging our strong NIQ brand, long-term client relationships, global scale, proprietary technology and extensive data and insights, we are positioned as a global leader in measuring, analyzing and predicting consumer behavior in the FMCG vertical, T&D and other verticals in which we operate.
We are a leading global consumer intelligence company positioned at the nexus of brands, retailers and consumers.
We manage a comprehensive and integrated ecosystem The NIQ Ecosystem which combines proprietary data, best-in-class technology, human intelligence and highly sophisticated software applications and analytics solutions (the "Ecosystem" or "The NIQ Ecosystem").
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is EMEA (44%), Americas (39%) and APAC (17%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −2.5% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest EMEA at 44%.
- EMEA44%$1.9B
- Americas39%$1.6B
- APAC17%$702M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $3.3B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 43% | 40% | 38% | 38% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($109M) | ($100M) | $85M | $60M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −3.3% | −2.5% | 2.0% | 1.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($577M) | ($798M) | ($353M) | ($324M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($12M) | $74M | $299M | $389M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $461M | $597M | $633M | $638M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $100M | $271M | ($42M) | $3M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $24M | $35M | $35M | $35M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($36M) | $39M | $264M | $354M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −1.1% | 1.0% | 6.3% | 8.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($36M) | $39M | $264M | $354M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.1% | 1.0% | 6.3% | 8.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $1.4B | $0 | $27M | $27M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| -9% | -2% | 2% | 1% | ROICROIC |
| -47% | -1337% | -36% | -35% | Return on equityROE |
| −47% | n/m | −36% | −35% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $283M | $266M | $519M | $362M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $645M | $696M | $809M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $217M | $224M | $225M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $428M | $471M | $584M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $6.4B | $6.8B | $6.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $4.1B | $3.7B | $3.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $3.9B | $3.1B | $3.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.2B | $60M | $988M | $916M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.1% | 1.5% | 1.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 245M | 245M | 267M | 295M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $13.64 | $16.21 | $15.73 | $14.59 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.36 | $-3.26 | $-1.32 | $-1.10 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.15 | $0.16 | $0.99 | $1.20 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.15 | $0.16 | $0.99 | $1.20 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.10 | $0.14 | $0.13 | $0.12 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $4.97 | $0.24 | $3.70 | $3.10 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Americas+5.3%
“Americas revenue increased by $82.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 driven by higher incremental Intelligence revenue of $66.7 million, representing an increase of 5.5% due to strong renewals, expansion in core services, cross-selling new capabilities and penetrating adjacent and high-growth markets, and by higher incremental Activation revenue of $15.3 million, representing an increase of 4.5% driven by higher project demand and volumes.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Activation+2.1%
“Activation revenue increased by $15.3 million driven by higher project demand and volumes.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $353M loss into $264M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($353M) | ($798M) | ($577M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$633M | +$597M | +$461M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$61M | +$5M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$42M | +$271M | +$100M |
| Cash from operations | $299M | $74M | ($12M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$35M | −$35M | −$24M |
| Owner earnings | $264M | $39M | ($36M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 1% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $61M), owner earnings is nearer $203M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.1B · 36.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $519M − debt $3.7B
What this means
Netting $519M of cash and short-term investments against $3.7B of debt leaves $3.1B owed, about 36.7× a year's operating profit (42.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -9%–2%; 2% latest = NOPAT $67M ÷ invested capital $4.1BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -1%–6%; latest $264M = operating cash $299M − maintenance capex $35MIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $61M of SBC) leaves $203M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($353M) · cash from operations $299M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.05×HarvestingCapex $35M ÷ depreciation $633M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.7B vs $47M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.95/share (latest year $-1.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We believe the Gastrograph Acquisition further strengthens our AI capabilities and competitive differentiation to provide consumer packaged goods companies with The Full View TM .”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$362M
- Receivables$809M
- Other current assets$362M
- Debt due within a year$90M
- Accounts payable$225M
- Other current liabilities$1.1B
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership3.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio100:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$61M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 72% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SNAPSnap Inc. | $5.9B | 55% | -32.4% | -24% | -4% |
| APPAppLovin | $5.5B | 70% | 19.6% | 10% | 17% |
| ZMZoom | $4.9B | 76% | 11.6% | 8% | 33% |
| PINSPinterest Inc. | $4.2B | 76% | -4.1% | -5% | 16% |
| NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc | $4.2B | — | -2.5% | -2% | 1% |
| MTCHMatch Group Inc. | $3.5B | 73% | 26.1% | 17% | 27% |
| SABRSabre | $2.8B | 57% | 9.0% | 8% | -0% |
| RXTRackspace Technology Inc. | $2.7B | 29% | -6.7% | -10% | 6% |
| Group median | — | — | 3.2% | 3% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what NIQ Global Intelligence plc has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $354M on 295M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-11; net debt $3.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NIC its page in the Manual NJR →
Industry order: ← NICE the Software chapter NOW →