Owner Scorecard


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NPO, EnPro Industries

Industrial Machinery consumer brand Serial acquirer

Enpro Inc. is a leading-edge industrial technology company focused on critical applications across a diverse group of growing end markets including semiconductor, industrial process, commercial vehicle, sustainable power generation, aerospace, food and biopharmaceuticals, photonics and life sciences.

Enpro is a leader in applied engineering and designs, develops, manufactures, and markets proprietary, value-added products and solutions that generally have a specified position on a critical application, contributing key functionality with the purpose of safeguarding a variety of critical environments.

As of December 31, 2025, our continuing operations had 15 primary manufacturing and service facility locations (approximately 50,000 square feet or larger) located in 8 countries, including the United States.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
NPO · EnPro Industries
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+9.0% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Gross margin 43% 5-yr avg 41%
Operating margin 13.9% 5-yr avg 9.9%
Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Sealing Technologies (64%) and Advanced Surface Technologies (36%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 5.6% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.2% to 14% — on a steadier 39% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Sealing Technologies is 64% of revenue, with Advanced Surface Technologies the other meaningful segment at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Sealing Technologies64%$732M
  • Advanced Surface Technologies36%$411M
By geographyUnited States57%Asia Pacific22%Europe14%Rest of World8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.2B$800M$840M$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
33%45%44%33%36%39%39%40%42%43%43%Gross marginGross mgn
25%23%20%26%29%31%26%27%28%28%28%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%1%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($3M)$70M$86M$57M$29M$65M$72M$77M$142M$162M$163MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−0.2%5.4%5.6%4.7%3.6%7.8%6.6%7.3%13.6%14.1%13.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($40M)$540M$20M$38M$178M$178M$205M$22M$73M$41M$43MNet incomeNet inc.
5%50%-1%5%11%58%23%30%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$65M$35M$213M$131M$42M$124M$106M$208M$163M$201M$220MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$57M$59M$66M$68M$57M$64M$103M$95M$100M$103M$105MDepreciationDeprec.
$42M($573M)$121M$18M($198M)($123M)($209M)$82M($22M)$44M$57MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$36M$30M$36M$22M$13M$15M$29M$34M$29M$42M$46MCapexCapex
3.0%2.3%2.4%1.8%1.7%1.8%2.7%3.2%2.8%3.7%3.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$29M$5M$177M$109M$29M$109M$77M$175M$134M$159M$174MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.4%0.4%11.5%9.1%3.6%13.0%7.0%16.5%12.8%13.9%14.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$29M$5M$177M$109M$29M$109M$77M$175M$134M$159M$174MFree cash flowFCF
2.4%0.4%11.5%9.1%3.6%13.0%7.0%16.5%12.8%13.9%14.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$29M$45M$0$311M$238M$857M$0$0$209M$274M$274MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$18M$19M$20M$21M$22M$22M$23M$24M$25M$26M$27MDividends paidDiv. paid
$30M$12M$50M$15M$5M$0BuybacksBuybacks
-0%5%4%4%2%3%3%2%6%ROICROIC
-11%60%2%4%16%14%15%2%5%3%3%Return on equityROE
−16%58%−0%2%14%12%13%−0%3%1%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$112M$189M$130M$121M$230M$338M$334M$370M$236M$115M$80MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$175M$204M$174M$157M$139M$136M$152M$143M$139M$154M$159MInventoryInvent.
$103M$131M$96M$83M$70M$72M$73M$69M$66M$72M$80MAccounts payablePayables
$73M$73M$78M$74M$69M$64M$79M$74M$73M$82M$79MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$525M$820M$732M$750M$579M$805M$684M$650M$512M$438M$433MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$303M$268M$292M$314M$202M$386M$212M$196M$198M$189M$197MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×3.1×2.5×2.4×2.9×2.1×3.2×3.3×2.6×2.3×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$202M$324M$322M$485M$605M$948M$864M$808M$896M$1.1B$1.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.9B$1.7B$2.0B$2.1B$3.0B$2.6B$2.5B$2.5B$2.7B$2.6BTotal assetsAssets
$425M$619M$465M$629M$491M$977M$791M$647M$640M$655M$605MTotal debtDebt
$314M$429M$335M$508M$262M$639M$456M$277M$404M$541M$525MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.0×1.4×3.0×2.9×1.8×4.0×2.0×1.7×3.5×4.8×4.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$359M$903M$858M$897M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.7%0.4%0.6%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.9%1.1%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$10M$65M$61MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
21.6M21.8M20.9M20.8M20.5M20.8M20.9M21.0M21.1M21.2M21.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$54.99$60.07$73.30$57.97$39.02$40.40$52.59$50.44$49.70$53.93$55.08Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.86$24.76$0.94$1.84$8.66$8.55$9.81$1.06$3.45$1.91$2.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.33$0.22$8.45$5.25$1.40$5.25$3.67$8.31$6.34$7.51$8.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.33$0.22$8.45$5.25$1.40$5.25$3.67$8.31$6.34$7.51$8.15Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.84$0.87$0.97$1.00$1.06$1.08$1.12$1.16$1.20$1.24$1.24Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.66$1.39$1.73$1.04$0.65$0.72$1.41$1.61$1.38$1.98$2.17Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.60$41.41$41.04$43.11$52.75$61.07$66.75$67.13$67.71$72.83$73.37Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.2%/yr+6.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+21.2%/yr+39.9%/yr
EPS−26.1%/yr
Dividends / share+4.4%/yr+3.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.0%/yr+24.8%/yr
Book value / share+17.9%/yr+6.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
21Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
6%low FY2016
Gross margin
43%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.4×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$159Mowner earningsvs.$41Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $41M of profit into $159M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$41M
Owner earnings$159M · 14% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$41M$73M$22M$205M$178M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$103M+$100M+$95M+$103M+$64M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$12M+$10M+$7M+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$44M−$22M+$82M−$209M−$123M
Cash from operations$201M$163M$208M$106M$124M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$42M−$29M−$34M−$29M−$15M
Owner earnings$159M$134M$175M$77M$109M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%13%16%7%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $146M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $162M ÷ interest expense $34M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $541M · 3.3× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $115M − debt $655M
    What this means

    Netting $115M of cash and short-term investments against $655M of debt leaves $541M owed, about 3.3× a year's operating profit (4.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -0%–6%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–16%; latest $159M = operating cash $201M − maintenance capex $42M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $146M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $201M ÷ net income $41M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $26M ÷ Owner Earnings $159M
    What this means

    Of $159M Owner Earnings, $26M (16%) went back to shareholders, $26M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.41×
    Harvesting
    Capex $42M ÷ depreciation $103M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.32×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $655M vs $249M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −74%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.14/share (latest year $1.92), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $73.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 12% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +27%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −0.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“AI technology is complex and rapidly evolving and may subject us to significant competitive, legal, regulatory, operational and other risks.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$433M
  • Cash & short-term investments$80M
  • Inventory$159M
  • Other current assets$195M
Current liabilities$197M
  • Debt due within a year$200K
  • Accounts payable$80M
  • Other current liabilities$116M
Current ratio2.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.41×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$237Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$200K due · $80M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$320Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($640M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$671M$66M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$200K
'27$200K
'28$200K
'29$100K
later$450M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2029, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$200Kthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$400Kthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$200Kin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$451Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$80M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$159M
Together, against $200K due next year1196.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $239M against the $200K due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1196 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$287M · 22%
  • Dividends$222M · 17%
  • Buybacks$112M · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$668M · 52%
  • Returned to owners$334M

    33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $222M as dividends and $112M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$62.33

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $112M, about $62.33 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $50.67 (2016) to $75.00 (2019); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $71.43 ($50M).

  • Net change in share count−1.4%

    The diluted count fell from 22M to 21M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.24/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($920M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $86M, so each retained $1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$1.1B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity69%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $287M of capital spent building

$136M written down across 3 years (2017, 2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Vaillancourt$9.3M$1.1M$109M
2021Mr. Vaillancourt$3.3M$4.6M$109M
2022Mr. Vaillancourt$5.9M$5.9M$77M
2023Mr. Vaillancourt$6.2M$10.5M$175M
2024Mr. Vaillancourt$6.7M$8.3M$134M
2025Mr. Vaillancourt$7.5M$10.9M$159M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio128:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EnPro Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $222M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Machinery

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ENTGEntegris Inc.$3.2B45%15.8%11%14%
WMSAdvanced Drainage Systems$3.1B24%16.1%16%13%
AWIArmstrong World Industries Inc$1.6B37%25.7%23%11%
AZEKThe Azek Company Inc.$1.4B32%8.7%5%4%
NPOEnPro Industries$1.1B40%6.1%3%10%
MYEMyers Industries Inc.$826M32%6.9%16%7%
SWIMLatham Group Inc.$546M31%4.3%4%8%
KRTKarat Packaging Inc.$468M34%8.9%24%7%
Group median33%8.8%14%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EnPro Industries has delivered.

EnPro Industries’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, EnPro Industries earns about $118M on its 10.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $174M on 21M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $525M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EnPro Industries (NPO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NPO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NPKI its page in the Manual NRC →

Industry order: ← NDSN the Industrial Machinery chapter NVT →