Owner Scorecard


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SWIM, Latham Group Inc.

Containers & Packaging consumer brand Distress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

We are the largest designer, manufacturer, and marketer of in-ground residential swimming pools in North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

With an operating history that spans over 70 years, we offer the industry's broadest portfolio of pools and related products, including in-ground swimming pools, pool covers, and pool liners.

In an industry that has traditionally marketed on a business-to-business basis (pool manufacturer to dealer), we pioneered the first "direct-to-homeowner" digital and social marketing strategy that has transformed the homeowner's purchase journey.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SWIM · Latham Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$546M
+7.4% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $552M 5-yr avg $589M
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 5.2% 5-yr avg 2.1%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is In-ground Swimming Pools (48%), Covers (29%) and Liners (23%).
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 51% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 4.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −5.7% to 10% — on a steadier 31% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest In-ground Swimming Pools at 48%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • In-ground Swimming Pools48%$262M
  • Covers29%$161M
  • Liners23%$123M
By geographyUnited States85%Canada9%Australia4%New Zealand1%Other1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$318M$403M$630M$696M$566M$509M$546M$552MRevenueRevenue
31%35%32%31%27%30%33%34%Gross marginGross mgn
18%21%35%21%19%21%22%23%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$25M$40M($36M)$30M$16M$18M$31M$29MOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.9%9.9%−5.7%4.3%2.8%3.6%5.6%5.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$7M$16M($62M)($6M)($2M)($18M)$11M$9MNet incomeNet inc.
30%18%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$36M$63M$34M$32M$116M$61M$63M$63MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$22M$25M$32M$38M$41M$44M$51M$52MDepreciationDeprec.
$6M$20M($65M)($51M)$59M$27M($8M)($6M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$8M$16M$25M$40M$33M$20M$25M$32MCapexCapex
2.6%4.0%4.0%5.7%5.9%4.0%4.7%5.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$27M$47M$9M($7M)$83M$41M$38M$30MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.6%11.6%1.4%−1.1%14.7%8.1%7.0%5.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$27M$47M$9M($7M)$83M$41M$38M$30MFree cash flowFCF
8.6%11.6%1.4%−1.1%14.7%8.1%7.0%5.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$20M$75M$91M$5M$0$65M$5M$14MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$200K$582K$282M$281M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
18%12%-5%2%4%3%ROICROIC
4%6%-18%-1%-1%-5%3%2%Return on equityROE
4%6%−18%−1%−1%−5%3%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$57M$59M$44M$33M$103M$56M$71M$27MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$33M$61M$49M$30M$32M$40M$89MReceivablesReceiv.
$65M$110M$165M$97M$77M$75M$88MInventoryInvent.
$27M$38M$25M$13M$19M$30MAccounts payablePayables
$71M$132M$189M$128M$96M$96M$147MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$167M$229M$255M$239M$178M$219M$230MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$94M$115M$87M$86M$71M$79M$122MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×2.0×2.9×2.8×2.5×2.8×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$102M$116M$129M$131M$131M$153M$155M$161MGoodwillGoodwill
$647M$794M$870M$835M$794M$823M$856MTotal assetsAssets
$13M$280M$313M$301M$282M$280M$280MTotal debtDebt
($46M)$236M$280M$198M$225M$209M$253MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.1×2.2×-1.5×1.9×0.5×0.7×1.2×1.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$194M$282M$354M$383M$399M$387M$406M$397MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.5%20.4%7.3%3.3%1.5%1.7%1.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
95.4M103M111M113M113M115M120M117MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.33$3.93$5.70$6.14$5.02$4.41$4.56$4.72Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.08$0.16$-0.56$-0.05$-0.02$-0.15$0.09$0.07EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.29$0.46$0.08$-0.07$0.74$0.36$0.32$0.26Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.29$0.46$0.08$-0.07$0.74$0.36$0.32$0.26Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.09$0.16$0.23$0.35$0.29$0.17$0.21$0.28Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.03$2.74$3.20$3.38$3.54$3.35$3.39$3.39Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.3%/yr+3.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+1.6%/yr−7.0%/yr
EPS+2.9%/yr−9.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.3%/yr+6.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.9%/yr+4.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
120Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
4%low FY2021
Gross margin
33%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.5×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$38Mowner earningsvs.$11Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $11M of profit into $38M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$11M
Owner earnings$38M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$11M($18M)($2M)($6M)($62M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$51M+$44M+$41M+$38M+$32M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$9M+$7M+$19M+$51M+$129M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$8M+$27M+$59M−$51M−$65M
Cash from operations$63M$61M$116M$32M$34M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$25M−$20M−$33M−$40M−$25M
Owner earnings$38M$41M$83M($7M)$9M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%8%15%-1%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $29M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $31M ÷ interest expense $26M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $209M · 6.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $71M − debt $280M
    What this means

    Netting $71M of cash and short-term investments against $280M of debt leaves $209M owed, about 6.8× a year's operating profit (9.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 27 + DIO 75 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -5%–18%; 4% latest = NOPAT $25M ÷ invested capital $615M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -1%–15%; latest $38M = operating cash $63M − maintenance capex $25M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $29M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $63M ÷ net income $11M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $38M
    What this means

    Of $38M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.49×
    Harvesting
    Capex $25M ÷ depreciation $51M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $546M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.77×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $280M vs $140M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.03/share (latest year $0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 4% lately, median 4%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −5.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“For example, we believe our introduction of Latham Measure, which employs AI technology, has the potential disrupt competition in the market for safety covers and liners.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$230M
  • Cash & short-term investments$27M
  • Receivables$89M
  • Inventory$88M
  • Other current assets$26M
Current liabilities$122M
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$30M
  • Other current liabilities$89M
Current ratio1.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.16×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$108Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $27M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.2× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($30M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($230M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$311M$30M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $406M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$168M · 41%
  • Buybacks$563M · 139%
  • Returned to owners$563M

    236% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $563M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$325M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $325M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $563M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count22.5%

    The diluted count rose from 95M to 117M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$423M51% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity38%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$260Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $168M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership3.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 30% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ATRAptarGroup Inc.$3.8B12.3%10%8%
ENTGEntegris Inc.$3.2B45%15.8%11%14%
AWIArmstrong World Industries Inc$1.6B37%25.7%23%11%
AZEKThe Azek Company Inc.$1.4B32%8.7%5%4%
NPOEnPro Industries$1.1B40%6.1%3%10%
MYEMyers Industries Inc.$826M32%6.9%16%7%
SWIMLatham Group Inc.$546M31%4.3%4%8%
KRTKarat Packaging Inc.$468M34%8.9%24%7%
Group median34%8.8%11%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Latham Group Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Latham Group Inc. earns about $44M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+177%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $30M on 117M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $253M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($32M) runs well above depreciation ($52M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $37M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Latham Group Inc. (SWIM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SWIM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SWBI its page in the Manual SWK →

Industry order: ← SW the Containers & Packaging chapter