Share count
22Mpeak FY2018
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NRIM, Northrim BanCorp Inc
Banks financial
We offer a wide array of commercial and consumer loan and deposit products, investment products, and electronic banking services over the Internet; Northrim Investment Services Company was formed in November 2002.
Northrim BanCorp Inc is regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (the "FRB").
The Bank has four direct wholly-owned subsidiaries: Residential Mortgage, LLC ("RML") originates 1-4 family residential mortgages, most of which are sold to the secondary market.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$256M
+30.4% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $261M 5-yr avg $175M
Revenue $60M +9.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $14M yr-ago $13M
Net margin 22.9% yr-ago 24.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Community Banking (72%), Home Mortgage Lending (17%) and Specialty Finance (11%).
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 12%, above 12% in 5 of 10 years). It runs at a 58% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Community Banking is 72% of revenue, with Home Mortgage Lending the other meaningful segment at 17%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Community Banking72%$184M
- Home Mortgage Lending17%$43M
- Specialty Finance11%$29M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $100M | $98M | $93M | $102M | $134M | $133M | $134M | $158M | $196M | $256M | $261M | RevenueRevenue |
| $56M | $58M | $61M | $64M | $71M | $81M | $95M | $103M | $113M | $136M | $139M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $43M | $40M | $32M | $37M | $63M | $52M | $34M | $26M | $42M | $77M | $79M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| $2M | $3M | ($500K) | ($1M) | $2M | ($4M) | $2M | $4M | $3M | $4M | $6M | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| $14M | $13M | $20M | $21M | $33M | $38M | $31M | $25M | $37M | $65M | $65M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 30% | 44% | 17% | 21% | 23% | 22% | 20% | 20% | 21% | 24% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 1.9% | Return on assetsROA |
| 8% | 7% | 10% | 10% | 15% | 16% | 14% | 11% | 14% | 20% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 4% | 6% | 6% | 11% | 12% | 9% | 5% | 9% | 15% | 15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 8% | 7% | 11% | 11% | 16% | 17% | 15% | 12% | 17% | 23% | 23% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| 77% | 72% | 75% | 75% | 67% | 67% | 69% | 73% | 68% | 58% | 58% | Efficiency ratioEffic. |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.9B | DepositsDeposits |
| $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $50M | $50M | $50M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $187M | $193M | $206M | $207M | $222M | $238M | $219M | $235M | $267M | $327M | $336M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 27.9M | 27.9M | 27.9M | 27.2M | 25.7M | 25.0M | 23.3M | 22.6M | 22.3M | 22.5M | 22.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.52 | $0.47 | $0.72 | $0.76 | $1.28 | $1.50 | $1.32 | $1.12 | $1.66 | $2.87 | $2.88 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.19 | $0.21 | $0.25 | $0.31 | $0.34 | $0.38 | $0.45 | $0.60 | $0.62 | $0.65 | $0.65 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $6.69 | $6.91 | $7.37 | $7.61 | $8.61 | $9.51 | $9.38 | $10.36 | $11.96 | $14.52 | $14.87 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $6.10 | $6.33 | $6.80 | $7.01 | $7.99 | $8.87 | $8.69 | $9.66 | $9.68 | $12.26 | $12.62 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.7%/yr | +16.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +28.5%/yr | — |
| EPS | +21.0%/yr | +17.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +14.4%/yr | +13.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.4%/yr | +17.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.0%/yr | +11.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Revenue
$256Mlow FY2018
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 20%Very high (≥17%)Net income $65M ÷ equity $327MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $50M − intangibles $950K)Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 58%Efficient (<65%)Noninterest expense $124M ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 66%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 9.9%AdequateEquity $327M ÷ assets $3.3B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 85%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.8B ÷ assets $3.3B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 3%LowProvision for credit losses $4M ÷ net interest income $136M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.0M | $1.2M | $110M |
| 2022 | $872k | $1.0M | $74M |
| 2023 | $1.2M | $1.2M | $35M |
| 2024 | $683k | $1.0M | ($9M) |
| 2024 | $1.1M | $1.3M | ($9M) |
| 2025 | $1.5M | $2.2M | $136M |
| 2025 | $1.5M | $2.2M | $136M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TFSLTFS Financial Corporation | $321M | 5% | 5% | 66% | 1.7% |
| CLBKColumbia Financial Inc. | $259M | 6% | 6% | 66% | 2.4% |
| NRIMNorthrim BanCorp Inc | $256M | 12% | 13% | 71% | 3.7% |
| HTBHomeTrust Bancshares Inc. | $213M | 6% | 7% | 71% | 3.1% |
| CFFNCapitol Federal Financial Inc. | $201M | 6% | 6% | 51% | 2.0% |
| NFBKNorthfield Bancorp, Inc. | $154M | 5% | 5% | 57% | 2.5% |
| KRNYKearny Financial Corp | $154M | 4% | 4% | 69% | 2.2% |
| WSBFWaterstone Financial, Inc. | $142M | 7% | 7% | 76% | 2.5% |
| Group median | — | 6% | 6% | 67% | 2.4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Northrim BanCorp Inc’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered−25%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity13%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $285M on 22M shares, a 13% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Northrim BanCorp Inc (NRIM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NRIM, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← NRGV its page in the Manual NRIX →
Industry order: ← NPB the Banks chapter NTB →