Owner Scorecard


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NXPI, NXP Semiconductors N.V.

Semiconductors asset-light Cyclical

NXP Semiconductors N.V. is a global semiconductor company and a long-standing supplier in the industry, with over 70 years of innovation and operating history.

Our product solutions are used in a wide range of end market applications including: automotive, industrial & Internet of Things (IoT), mobile, and communication infrastructure.

We engage with leading global companies and sell products in all major geographic regions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
NXPI · NXP Semiconductors N.V.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.3B
−2.7% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $12.6B 5-yr avg $12.5B
Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 56%
Operating margin 30.4% 5-yr avg 26.3%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 17%
Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 20%
Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 25% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 4.9% to 29% — on a steadier 55% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 5 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

74% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States26%$3.2B
  • Germany19%$2.4B
  • China17%$2.0B
  • Japan9%$1.1B
  • Other countries8%$1.0B
  • South Korea7%$889M
  • Other14%$1.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$9.3B$9.4B$8.9B$8.6B$11.1B$13.2B$13.3B$12.6B$12.3B$12.6BRevenueRevenue
50%52%52%49%55%57%57%56%55%55%Gross marginGross mgn
12%11%10%10%9%8%9%9%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
17%18%19%20%17%16%18%19%19%19%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$2.1B$2.7B$641M$418M$2.6B$3.8B$3.7B$3.4B$3.0B$3.8BOperating incomeOp. inc.
22.7%28.8%7.2%4.9%23.3%28.8%27.6%27.1%24.8%30.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.2B$2.2B$243M$52M$1.9B$2.8B$2.8B$2.5B$2.0B$2.7BNet incomeNet inc.
7%8%13%16%16%18%21%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.4B$4.4B$2.4B$2.5B$3.1B$3.9B$3.5B$2.8B$2.8B$3.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.2B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$925M$832M$802MDepreciationDeprec.
($2.2B)($140M)($263M)$58M($409M)($506M)($801M)($1.1B)($495M)($851M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$552M$611M$526M$392M$767M$1.1B$827M$727M$397M$337MCapexCapex
6.0%6.5%5.9%4.6%6.9%8.0%6.2%5.8%3.2%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.9B$3.8B$1.8B$2.1B$2.3B$2.8B$2.7B$2.1B$2.4B$2.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
20.5%39.9%20.8%24.3%20.9%21.4%20.2%16.3%19.7%21.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.9B$3.8B$1.8B$2.1B$2.3B$2.8B$2.7B$2.1B$2.4B$2.7BFree cash flowFCF
20.5%39.9%20.8%24.3%20.9%21.4%20.2%16.3%19.7%21.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$18M$1.7B$34M$23M$27M$0$0$1.2B$1.2BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$74M$319M$420M$562M$815M$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
$286M$5.0B$1.4B$627M$4.0B$1.4B$1.1B$1.4B$899MBuybacksBuybacks
17%4%16%21%19%17%13%16%ROICROIC
16%21%3%1%29%37%32%27%20%24%Return on equityROE
16%20%−1%−4%20%26%21%16%10%15%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.5B$2.8B$1.0B$2.3B$2.8B$3.8B$3.9B$3.3B$3.3B$3.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$792M$667M$765M$923M$960M$894M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.3B$1.2B$1.0B$1.2B$1.8B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$2.5BInventoryInvent.
$999M$944M$991M$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.0B$997M$904MAccounts payablePayables
$1.1B$915M$804M$860M$1.6B$1.9B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$5.2B$3.3B$4.3B$5.2B$6.9B$7.9B$7.3B$7.9B$8.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.4B$1.8B$2.0B$2.5B$3.3B$4.1B$3.1B$3.9B$3.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.8×2.1×2.1×2.1×1.9×2.4×2.0×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$8.9B$8.9B$9.9B$10.0B$10.0B$9.9B$10.0B$9.9B$10.3B$10.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$21.5B$20.0B$19.8B$20.9B$23.2B$24.4B$24.4B$26.6B$27.1BTotal assetsAssets
$7.4B$7.4B$7.7B$10.7B$11.3B$11.2B$10.9B$12.2B$12.2BTotal debtDebt
$4.6B$6.4B$5.4B$7.8B$7.4B$7.3B$7.6B$9.0B$8.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.8×9.9×1.7×1.2×7.0×8.9×8.4×8.6×6.5×8.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13.7B$10.5B$9.4B$8.9B$6.5B$7.4B$8.6B$9.2B$10.1B$10.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.0%3.3%3.9%4.5%3.2%2.8%3.1%3.7%3.8%3.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
346M329M286M284M276M264M261M258M254M254MShares out (diluted)Shares
$26.77$28.63$31.05$30.34$40.13$50.01$50.79$48.92$48.24$49.76Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.41$6.72$0.85$0.18$6.79$10.55$10.70$9.73$7.95$10.46EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.48$11.44$6.46$7.36$8.38$10.73$10.28$7.97$9.53$10.69Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.48$11.44$6.46$7.36$8.38$10.73$10.28$7.97$9.53$10.69Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.23$1.12$1.48$2.04$3.09$3.85$4.03$4.03$4.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.60$1.86$1.84$1.38$2.78$4.03$3.16$2.82$1.56$1.33Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$39.66$31.97$33.02$31.51$23.68$28.21$33.07$35.61$39.54$43.10Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.6%/yr+9.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.2%/yr+5.3%/yr
EPS+2.7%/yr+112.5%/yr
Dividends / share+22.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−0.3%/yr+2.5%/yr
Book value / share−0.0%/yr+4.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
254Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
13%low FY2019
Gross margin
55%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.7×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.4Bowner earningsvs.$2.0Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2.0B of profit into $2.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2.0B
Owner earnings$2.4B · 20% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$2.0B$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$1.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$832M+$925M+$1.1B+$1.3B+$1.3B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$462M+$461M+$411M+$364M+$353M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$495M−$1.1B−$801M−$506M−$409M
Cash from operations$2.8B$2.8B$3.5B$3.9B$3.1B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$397M−$727M−$827M−$1.1B−$767M
Owner earnings$2.4B$2.1B$2.7B$2.8B$2.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue20%16%20%21%21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $462M), owner earnings is nearer $2.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $3.0B ÷ interest expense $466M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.0B · 2.9× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $3.3B − debt $12.2B
    What this means

    Netting $3.3B of cash and short-term investments against $12.2B of debt leaves $9.0B owed, about 2.9× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 31 + DIO 169 − DPO 66 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median, range 4%–21%; 13% latest = NOPAT $2.4B ÷ invested capital $19.0B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 16%–40%; latest $2.4B = operating cash $2.8B − maintenance capex $397M
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $462M of SBC) leaves $2.0B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.8B ÷ net income $2.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.4B
    What this means

    Of $2.4B Owner Earnings, $1.9B (79%) went back to shareholders, $1.0B dividends, $899M buybacks. Net of $462M stock comp, the real buyback was about $437M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.48×
    Harvesting
    Capex $397M ÷ depreciation $832M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.05×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $12.2B vs $4.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +57%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.68/share (latest year $8.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 20% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 20% early to 26% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 4.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$3.7B
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Inventory$2.5B
  • Other current assets$735M
Current liabilities$3.6B
  • Debt due within a year$750M
  • Accounts payable$904M
  • Other current liabilities$2.0B
Current ratio2.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$750M due · $3.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.2× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($858M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$12.0B$274M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.3B
'27$1.0B
'28$1.0B
'29$1.0B
'30$1.7B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$1.3Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.7Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$5.9Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $12.2B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 29, 2026$3.7B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$2.4B
Together, against $1.3B due next year4.9×

Cash on hand as of Mar 29, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.1B against the $1.3B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.9 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $27.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$5.9B · 21%
  • Dividends$5.3B · 19%
  • Buybacks$16.1B · 58%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$509M · 2%
  • Returned to owners$21.4B

    98% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $5.3B as dividends and $16.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$132.09

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 122M shares were bought for $16.1B, about $132.09 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $90.95 (2019) to $239.75 (2024); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $92.06 ($5.0B).

  • Net change in share count−26.7%

    The diluted count fell from 346M to 254M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$4.03/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$11.8B45% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3.0Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $5.9B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Kurt Sievers$20.9M$43.7M$2.3B
2022Kurt Sievers$20.8M$4.7M$2.8B
2023Kurt Sievers$21.1M$47.3M$2.7B
2024Kurt Sievers$20.7M$4.6M$2.1B
2025Kurt Sievers$3.3M−$8.6M$2.4B
2025Rafael Sotomayor$14.7M$12.2M$2.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio268:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$462M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 15% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why NXP Semiconductors N.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.8% vs 27.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 27.1% early in the record and 18.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMATApplied Materials Inc.$28.4B46%27.9%36%22%
CLSCelestica Inc.$12.4B10%5.2%19%3%
NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V.$12.3B55%24.8%17%21%
ADIAnalog Devices Inc.$11.0B63%27.0%8%35%
VRTVertiv Holdings LLC$10.2B33%5.0%11%3%
MRVLMarvell Technology Inc.$8.2B50%-8.7%-2%19%
ONON Semiconductor Corporation$6.0B37%13.4%14%15%
MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated$4.7B61%15.9%7%31%
Group median48%14.6%13%20%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what NXP Semiconductors N.V. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, NXP Semiconductors N.V. earns about $2.6B on its 20.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.7B on 252M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $8.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NXPI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NXPI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NXDR its page in the Manual NXRT →

Industry order: ← NVTS the Semiconductors chapter NXT →