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MRVL, Marvell Technology Inc.
Marvell Technology, Inc. is a leading supplier of data infrastructure semiconductor solutions, spanning the data center core to network edge.
We are a fabless supplier of high-performance semiconductor products with core strengths in developing and scaling complex System-on-a-Chip architectures, integrating analog, mixed-signal and digital signal processing functionality.
Leveraging leading intellectual property and deep system-level expertise, as well as highly innovative security firmware, our solutions are empowering the data economy and enabling the data center and communications and other end markets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Data center (74%) and Communications and other (26%).
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 16% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.7%) on a 50% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Data center is 74% of revenue, with Communications and other the other meaningful line at 26%.
- Data center74%$6.1B
- Communications and other26%$2.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $2.7B | $3.0B | $4.5B | $5.9B | $5.5B | $5.8B | $8.2B | $8.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | 50% | 46% | 50% | 42% | 41% | 51% | 51% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | 21% | 14% | 15% | 14% | 9% | 10% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 40% | 36% | 32% | 30% | 34% | 34% | 25% | 25% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($243M) | ($258M) | ($348M) | $238M | ($568M) | ($720M) | $1.3B | $1.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −9.0% | −8.7% | −7.8% | 4.0% | −10.3% | −12.5% | 16.1% | 16.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $1.6B | ($277M) | ($421M) | ($164M) | ($933M) | ($885M) | $2.7B | $2.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $360M | $817M | $819M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $157M | $198M | $266M | $305M | $148M | $177M | $222M | $222M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($1.6B) | $655M | $514M | $595M | $1.5B | $1.8B | ($1.7B) | ($1.3B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $82M | $107M | $169M | $206M | $336M | $285M | $354M | $391M | CapexCapex |
| 3.0% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 3.5% | 6.1% | 4.9% | 4.3% | 4.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $278M | $711M | $650M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 10.3% | 23.9% | 14.6% | 18.3% | 22.2% | 26.1% | 18.7% | 21.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $278M | $711M | $650M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 10.3% | 23.9% | 14.6% | 18.3% | 18.8% | 24.2% | 17.0% | 19.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $1.1B | $0 | $3.6B | $112M | $0 | $10M | $0 | $1.3B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $160M | $161M | $191M | $204M | $207M | $208M | $205M | $207M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $364M | $25M | $0 | $115M | $150M | $725M | $2.0B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -3% | -2% | -1% | 1% | -3% | -3% | 7% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 18% | -3% | -3% | -1% | -6% | -7% | 19% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | −5% | −4% | −2% | −8% | −8% | 17% | 13% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $648M | $748M | $614M | $911M | $951M | $948M | $2.6B | $3.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $537M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $2.2B | $1.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $268M | $720M | $1.1B | $864M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $252M | $462M | $466M | $411M | $622M | $1.1B | $710M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $552M | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $2.5B | $2.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.6B | $2.5B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $6.5B | $7.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.1B | $1.4B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $3.2B | $2.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.5× | 1.8× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.5× | 2.0× | 3.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $5.3B | $11.5B | $11.6B | $11.6B | $11.6B | $11.1B | $13.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $10.8B | $22.1B | $22.5B | $21.2B | $20.2B | $22.3B | $26.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.1B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $5.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $444M | $3.9B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $1.3B | $1.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.8× | -3.7× | -2.5× | 1.4× | -2.7× | -3.8× | 6.5× | 6.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8.7B | $8.4B | $15.7B | $15.6B | $14.8B | $13.4B | $14.3B | $18.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 9.0% | 8.1% | 10.3% | 9.3% | 11.1% | 10.4% | 7.2% | 7.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 676M | 669M | 797M | 851M | 861M | 866M | 870M | 893M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.99 | $4.44 | $5.60 | $6.95 | $6.39 | $6.66 | $9.42 | $9.76 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.34 | $-0.41 | $-0.53 | $-0.19 | $-1.08 | $-1.02 | $3.07 | $2.83 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.41 | $1.06 | $0.82 | $1.27 | $1.42 | $1.74 | $1.76 | $2.05 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.41 | $1.06 | $0.82 | $1.27 | $1.20 | $1.61 | $1.61 | $1.86 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.23 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.12 | $0.16 | $0.21 | $0.24 | $0.39 | $0.33 | $0.41 | $0.44 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $12.84 | $12.61 | $19.70 | $18.37 | $17.22 | $15.51 | $16.45 | $20.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.4%/yr | +16.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +27.4%/yr | +10.6%/yr |
| EPS | +4.6%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | −0.0%/yr | −0.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +22.4%/yr | +20.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.2%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned $1.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $222M it takes just to hold its position. It put $132M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.4B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.7B | ($885M) | ($933M) | ($164M) | ($421M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$222M | +$177M | +$148M | +$305M | +$266M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$591M | +$597M | +$610M | +$552M | +$461M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.7B | +$1.8B | +$1.5B | +$595M | +$514M |
| Cash from operations | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $819M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$222M | −$177M | −$148M | −$206M | −$169M |
| Owner earnings | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $650M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$132M | −$108M | −$188M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $650M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 26% | 22% | 18% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $222M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $132M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $591M), owner earnings is nearer $938M.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $1.3B ÷ interest expense $203M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 1.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $2.6B − debt $4.6B
What this means
Netting $2.6B of cash and short-term investments against $4.6B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (3.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 97 + DIO 126 − DPO 98 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -3%–7%; 7% latest = NOPAT $1.2B ÷ invested capital $16.2BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 10%–26%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $222MIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $591M of SBC) leaves $938M.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $2.7B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $2.2B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.5B of Owner Earnings, $2.2B (147%) went back to shareholders, $205M dividends, $2.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $591M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.4B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.60×ExpandingCapex $354M ÷ depreciation $222M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.01×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $4.6B vs $3.2B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (7)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −4%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.32/share (latest year $3.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.36/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −9% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −9% early to −2% lately, median −9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −12.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +4.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“AI systems may make unforeseen or unintended discoveries that may disrupt our customers' existing products, services, or business strategy and potentially render some of our customers current offerings and products obsolete which may have a material adverse effect on our revenue and profitability.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$3.8B
- Receivables$1.9B
- Inventory$1.4B
- Other current assets$348M
- Accounts payable$710M
- Other current liabilities$1.6B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2026
Over the record, the business generated $8.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.5B · 19%
- Dividends$1.3B · 17%
- Buybacks$3.4B · 42%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 22%
- Returned to owners$4.8B
68% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $3.4B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $3.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$60.86
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 56M shares were bought for $3.4B, about $60.86 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.38 (2021) to $80.56 (2025); its heaviest year, 2026, paid $76.70 ($2.0B).
- Net change in share count32.1%
The diluted count rose from 676M to 893M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.24/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 0% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Murphy | $15.5M | $57.3M | $650M |
| 2023 | Mr. Murphy | $22.4M | −$7.8M | $1.1B |
| 2024 | Mr. Murphy | $45.2M | $119.7M | $1.2B |
| 2025 | Mr. Murphy | $32.2M | $144.4M | $1.5B |
| 2026 | Mr. Murphy | $25.1M | −$69.7M | $1.5B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio158:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$591M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 45% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Marvell Technology Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2026.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?32.1%
Diluted shares grew 32.1% over 2020–2026, even as the company spent $3.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 17% | 21% |
| ADIAnalog Devices Inc. | $11.0B | 63% | 27.0% | 8% | 35% |
| MRVLMarvell Technology Inc. | $8.2B | 50% | -8.7% | -2% | 19% |
| SANMSanmina Corporation | $8.1B | 8% | 3.6% | 12% | 3% |
| ONON Semiconductor Corporation | $6.0B | 37% | 13.4% | 14% | 15% |
| QQnity Electronics Inc. | $4.8B | 46% | 20.1% | 7% | 20% |
| MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated | $4.7B | 61% | 15.9% | 7% | 31% |
| SWKSSkyworks Solutions Inc. | $4.1B | 47% | 27.8% | 23% | 28% |
| Group median | — | 49% | 18.0% | 10% | 20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marvell Technology Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Marvell Technology Inc. earns about $1.5B on its 18.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $1.7B on 875M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-21; net debt $1.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($391M) runs well above depreciation ($222M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MRVI its page in the Manual MS →
Industry order: ← MRAM the Semiconductors chapter MTSI →