Owner Scorecard


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PBI, Pitney Bowes Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies consumer brand Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Pitney Bowes Inc. is a technology-driven company that provides digital shipping solutions, mailing innovation, and financial services to clients around the world - including more than 90 percent of the Fortune 500.

Segments SendTech Solutions SendTech Solutions provides clients with physical and digital shipping and mailing technology solutions and other applications to help simplify and save on the sending, tracking and receiving of letters, parcels and flats, as well as supplies and maintenance services for these offerings.

We offer financing alternatives that enable clients to finance equipment.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K/A
PBI · Pitney Bowes Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
−6.6% YoY · −12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $2.4B
Gross margin 49% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 12.1% 5-yr avg 2.6%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.2%) on a 40% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States84%$1.6B
  • International16%$298M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.0B$2.8B$2.6B$3.2B$3.6B$3.7B$2.5B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.9BRevenueRevenue
49%49%32%40%32%31%50%52%49%Gross marginGross mgn
38%37%38%31%27%25%32%38%35%33%31%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%2%2%2%1%1%1%1%2%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$202M$194M($394M)$27M($183M)($7M)$189M($44M)($52M)$193M$226MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.8%7.0%−15.0%0.8%−5.2%−0.2%7.6%−2.1%−2.6%10.2%12.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$93M$244M$242M$194M($180M)($1M)$37M($386M)($204M)$145M$167MNet incomeNet inc.
54%5%3%-7%54%25%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$496M$454M$345M$268M$302M$302M$175M$80M$229M$383M$444MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$174M$127M$148M$159M$161M$163M$111M$113M$114M$112M$109MDepreciationDeprec.
$214M$59M($67M)($109M)$304M$119M$11M$344M$302M$113M$153MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$159M$118M$138M$137M$105M$184M$83M$78M$72M$66M$65MCapexCapex
5.3%4.2%5.2%4.3%3.0%5.0%3.3%3.8%3.6%3.5%3.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$337M$336M$207M$131M$197M$117M$92M$2M$157M$317M$379MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.3%12.1%7.9%4.1%5.5%3.2%3.7%0.1%7.7%16.7%20.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$337M$336M$207M$131M$197M$117M$92M$2M$157M$317M$379MFree cash flowFCF
11.3%12.1%7.9%4.1%5.5%3.2%3.7%0.1%7.7%16.7%20.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$38M$483M$10M$22M$7M$15M$5M$0$0$2M$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$141M$139M$140M$35M$34M$35M$35M$35M$36M$51M$53MDividends paidDiv. paid
4%6%-15%1%-8%-0%6%-3%-5%16%5%ROICROIC
797%237%67%-255%-1%61%Return on equityROE
341%99%55%−304%−32%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$803M$1.1B$927M$1.0B$940M$747M$680M$622M$486M$297M$314MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$456M$427M$372M$373M$389M$335M$344M$200M$160M$168M$159MReceivablesReceiv.
$93M$41M$62M$68M$71M$79M$84M$63M$60M$66M$63MInventoryInvent.
$294M$285M$281M$282M$295M$311M$315M$274M$240M$230M$767MAccounts payablePayables
$255M$183M$153M$160M$166M$102M$112M($10M)($20M)$4M($546M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.3B$2.8B$2.7B$2.2B$2.1B$1.9B$1.8B$2.1B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.3B$2.1B$1.9B$1.6B$1.9B$1.7B$1.7B$1.9B$1.7B$1.5B$1.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.4×1.4×1.4×1.1×1.1×1.0×1.1×0.8×0.7×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$851M$734M$721M$747M$743MGoodwillGoodwill
$5.8B$6.6B$5.9B$5.5B$5.2B$5.0B$4.7B$4.3B$3.4B$3.2B$3.1BTotal assetsAssets
$3.4B$3.8B$3.3B$2.7B$2.6B$2.3B$2.2B$2.1B$1.9B$2.0B$4.2BTotal debtDebt
$2.6B$2.8B$2.3B$1.7B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.7B$3.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.3×1.6×-3.4×0.2×-1.7×-0.1×2.1×-0.4×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($104M)$31M$102M$289M$71M$113M$61M($369M)($578M)($802M)($894M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.9%0.8%0.7%0.5%0.6%0.7%0.4%0.8%0.7%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$148M$198M$124MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
189M187M188M177M172M179M177M176M183M173M148MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.78$14.85$13.96$18.06$20.72$20.51$14.01$11.84$11.10$10.94$12.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.49$1.30$1.28$1.10$-1.05$-0.01$0.21$-2.20$-1.12$0.84$1.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.78$1.79$1.10$0.74$1.15$0.66$0.52$0.01$0.86$1.83$2.56Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.78$1.79$1.10$0.74$1.15$0.66$0.52$0.01$0.86$1.83$2.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.74$0.74$0.75$0.20$0.20$0.19$0.20$0.20$0.20$0.30$0.36Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.84$0.63$0.73$0.77$0.61$1.03$0.47$0.44$0.40$0.38$0.44Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.55$0.16$0.54$1.63$0.41$0.63$0.34$-2.10$-3.17$-4.64$-6.05Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−4.0%/yr−12.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.3%/yr+9.8%/yr
EPS+6.1%/yr
Dividends / share−9.8%/yr+8.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.4%/yr−9.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
173Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
16%low FY2018
Gross margin
52%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.4×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$317Mowner earningsvs.$145Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $145M of profit into $317M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$145M
Owner earnings$317M · 17% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$145M($204M)($386M)$37M($1M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$112M+$114M+$113M+$111M+$163M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$17M+$9M+$16M+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$113M+$302M+$344M+$11M+$119M
Cash from operations$383M$229M$80M$175M$302M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$66M−$72M−$78M−$83M−$184M
Owner earnings$317M$157M$2M$92M$117M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%8%0%4%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $303M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K/A · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $193M ÷ interest expense $100M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.9B · 20.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $285M + ST investments $12M − debt $4.2B
    What this means

    Netting $297M of cash and short-term investments against $4.2B of debt leaves $3.9B owed, about 20.3× a year's operating profit (21.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 32 + DIO 25 − DPO 87 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -15%–16%; 5% latest = NOPAT $145M ÷ invested capital $3.1B
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–17%; latest $317M = operating cash $383M − maintenance capex $66M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $303M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $383M ÷ net income $145M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $151M ÷ Owner Earnings $317M
    What this means

    Of $317M Owner Earnings, $151M (48%) went back to shareholders, $51M dividends, $100M buybacks. Net of $14M stock comp, the real buyback was about $86M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.59×
    Harvesting
    Capex $66M ÷ depreciation $112M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.71×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.2B vs ($447M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −177%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.09/share (latest year $1.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-5.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −0% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −0% early to 2% lately, median −0% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · −15.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$314M
  • Receivables$159M
  • Inventory$63M
  • Other current assets$594M
Current liabilities$1.8B
  • Debt due within a year$364M
  • Accounts payable$767M
  • Other current liabilities$688M
Current ratio0.62×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.59×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($689M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$364M due · $314M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.7B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.3B$130M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$157Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$2.0B
'27$17M
'28$368M
'29$134M
'30$332M
later$236M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$2.0Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.0Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.0Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$314M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$317M
Together, against $2.0B due next year0.31×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $631M against the $2.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 31% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.1B · 38%
  • Dividends$682M · 22%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 40%
  • Returned to owners$682M

    36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $682M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $878M and cash and short-term investments fell $489M.

  • Net change in share count−21.8%

    The diluted count fell from 189M to 148M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.30/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$761M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$582Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$470M written down across 3 years (2016, 2020, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 81% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$4.9M$6.9M$117M
2022$7.0M$777k$92M
2023$2.7M$2.8M$2M
2023$7.3M$4.7M$2M
2024$10.5M$8.6M$157M
2024$6.3M$5.1M$157M
2025$3.6M$2.9M$317M
2025$1.1M$5.9M$317M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Pitney Bowes Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.4B → $4.2B

    Debt rose from $3.4B to $4.2B while owner earnings went from about $293M to $159M — about 11 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 27 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $668M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DBDDiebold Nixdorf Incorporated$3.8B24%-0.6%-4%7%
PEverpure Inc.$3.7B69%-8.1%-12%12%
FFIVF5 Inc.$3.1B81%23.1%26%27%
VYXNCR Voyix Corporation$2.7B25%2.0%1%10%
PBIPitney Bowes Inc.$1.9B44%0.3%0%7%
CRSRCorsair Gaming Inc.$1.5B25%1.4%1%2%
OMCLOmnicell$1.2B46%2.3%2%11%
EXTRExtreme Networks Inc.$1.1B56%-0.2%-0%8%
Group median45%0.9%1%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Pitney Bowes Inc. has delivered.

Pitney Bowes Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Pitney Bowes Inc. earns about $126M on its 6.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $379M on 135M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $3.9B. The if-converted diluted count is 148M, 9% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Pitney Bowes Inc. (PBI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PBI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PBH its page in the Manual PBYI →

Industry order: ← PAYS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter PDD →