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PBI, Pitney Bowes Inc.
Pitney Bowes Inc. is a technology-driven company that provides digital shipping solutions, mailing innovation, and financial services to clients around the world - including more than 90 percent of the Fortune 500.
Segments SendTech Solutions SendTech Solutions provides clients with physical and digital shipping and mailing technology solutions and other applications to help simplify and save on the sending, tracking and receiving of letters, parcels and flats, as well as supplies and maintenance services for these offerings.
We offer financing alternatives that enable clients to finance equipment.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.2%) on a 40% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States84%$1.6B
- International16%$298M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 49% | 49% | 32% | 40% | 32% | 31% | — | 50% | 52% | — | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 38% | 37% | 38% | 31% | 27% | 25% | 32% | 38% | 35% | 33% | 31% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $202M | $194M | ($394M) | $27M | ($183M) | ($7M) | $189M | ($44M) | ($52M) | $193M | $226M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.8% | 7.0% | −15.0% | 0.8% | −5.2% | −0.2% | 7.6% | −2.1% | −2.6% | 10.2% | 12.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $93M | $244M | $242M | $194M | ($180M) | ($1M) | $37M | ($386M) | ($204M) | $145M | $167M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 54% | 5% | 3% | -7% | — | — | 54% | — | — | 25% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $496M | $454M | $345M | $268M | $302M | $302M | $175M | $80M | $229M | $383M | $444M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $174M | $127M | $148M | $159M | $161M | $163M | $111M | $113M | $114M | $112M | $109M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $214M | $59M | ($67M) | ($109M) | $304M | $119M | $11M | $344M | $302M | $113M | $153M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $159M | $118M | $138M | $137M | $105M | $184M | $83M | $78M | $72M | $66M | $65M | CapexCapex |
| 5.3% | 4.2% | 5.2% | 4.3% | 3.0% | 5.0% | 3.3% | 3.8% | 3.6% | 3.5% | 3.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $337M | $336M | $207M | $131M | $197M | $117M | $92M | $2M | $157M | $317M | $379M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.3% | 12.1% | 7.9% | 4.1% | 5.5% | 3.2% | 3.7% | 0.1% | 7.7% | 16.7% | 20.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $337M | $336M | $207M | $131M | $197M | $117M | $92M | $2M | $157M | $317M | $379M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.3% | 12.1% | 7.9% | 4.1% | 5.5% | 3.2% | 3.7% | 0.1% | 7.7% | 16.7% | 20.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $38M | $483M | $10M | $22M | $7M | $15M | $5M | $0 | $0 | $2M | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $141M | $139M | $140M | $35M | $34M | $35M | $35M | $35M | $36M | $51M | $53M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 4% | 6% | -15% | 1% | -8% | -0% | 6% | -3% | -5% | 16% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| — | 797% | 237% | 67% | -255% | -1% | 61% | — | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| — | 341% | 99% | 55% | −304% | −32% | 4% | — | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $803M | $1.1B | $927M | $1.0B | $940M | $747M | $680M | $622M | $486M | $297M | $314M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $456M | $427M | $372M | $373M | $389M | $335M | $344M | $200M | $160M | $168M | $159M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $93M | $41M | $62M | $68M | $71M | $79M | $84M | $63M | $60M | $66M | $63M | InventoryInvent. |
| $294M | $285M | $281M | $282M | $295M | $311M | $315M | $274M | $240M | $230M | $767M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $255M | $183M | $153M | $160M | $166M | $102M | $112M | ($10M) | ($20M) | $4M | ($546M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.3B | $2.8B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $851M | $734M | $721M | $747M | $743M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $5.8B | $6.6B | $5.9B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $5.0B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $3.4B | $3.2B | $3.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.4B | $3.8B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $4.2B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.3B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $3.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.3× | 1.6× | -3.4× | 0.2× | -1.7× | -0.1× | 2.1× | -0.4× | — | — | 2.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($104M) | $31M | $102M | $289M | $71M | $113M | $61M | ($369M) | ($578M) | ($802M) | ($894M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.5% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $148M | — | — | — | $198M | — | — | $124M | — | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 189M | 187M | 188M | 177M | 172M | 179M | 177M | 176M | 183M | 173M | 148M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.78 | $14.85 | $13.96 | $18.06 | $20.72 | $20.51 | $14.01 | $11.84 | $11.10 | $10.94 | $12.70 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.49 | $1.30 | $1.28 | $1.10 | $-1.05 | $-0.01 | $0.21 | $-2.20 | $-1.12 | $0.84 | $1.13 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.78 | $1.79 | $1.10 | $0.74 | $1.15 | $0.66 | $0.52 | $0.01 | $0.86 | $1.83 | $2.56 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.78 | $1.79 | $1.10 | $0.74 | $1.15 | $0.66 | $0.52 | $0.01 | $0.86 | $1.83 | $2.56 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.74 | $0.74 | $0.75 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.19 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.30 | $0.36 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.84 | $0.63 | $0.73 | $0.77 | $0.61 | $1.03 | $0.47 | $0.44 | $0.40 | $0.38 | $0.44 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.55 | $0.16 | $0.54 | $1.63 | $0.41 | $0.63 | $0.34 | $-2.10 | $-3.17 | $-4.64 | $-6.05 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −4.0%/yr | −12.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +0.3%/yr | +9.8%/yr |
| EPS | +6.1%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | −9.8%/yr | +8.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −8.4%/yr | −9.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $145M of profit into $317M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $145M | ($204M) | ($386M) | $37M | ($1M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$112M | +$114M | +$113M | +$111M | +$163M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$14M | +$17M | +$9M | +$16M | +$21M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$113M | +$302M | +$344M | +$11M | +$119M |
| Cash from operations | $383M | $229M | $80M | $175M | $302M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$66M | −$72M | −$78M | −$83M | −$184M |
| Owner earnings | $317M | $157M | $2M | $92M | $117M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 17% | 8% | 0% | 4% | 3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $303M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $193M ÷ interest expense $100M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.9B · 20.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $285M + ST investments $12M − debt $4.2B
What this means
Netting $297M of cash and short-term investments against $4.2B of debt leaves $3.9B owed, about 20.3× a year's operating profit (21.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 32 + DIO 25 − DPO 87 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -15%–16%; 5% latest = NOPAT $145M ÷ invested capital $3.1BIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–17%; latest $317M = operating cash $383M − maintenance capex $66MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $303M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $383M ÷ net income $145M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $151M ÷ Owner Earnings $317M
What this means
Of $317M Owner Earnings, $151M (48%) went back to shareholders, $51M dividends, $100M buybacks. Net of $14M stock comp, the real buyback was about $86M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.59×HarvestingCapex $66M ÷ depreciation $112M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.71×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.2B vs ($447M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −177%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.09/share (latest year $1.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-5.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −0% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −0% early to 2% lately, median −0% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · −15.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$314M
- Receivables$159M
- Inventory$63M
- Other current assets$594M
- Debt due within a year$364M
- Accounts payable$767M
- Other current liabilities$688M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $631M against the $2.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 31% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $3.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.1B · 38%
- Dividends$682M · 22%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 40%
- Returned to owners$682M
36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $682M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $878M and cash and short-term investments fell $489M.
- Net change in share count−21.8%
The diluted count fell from 189M to 148M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.30/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$470M written down across 3 years (2016, 2020, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 81% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $4.9M | $6.9M | $117M |
| 2022 | $7.0M | $777k | $92M |
| 2023 | $2.7M | $2.8M | $2M |
| 2023 | $7.3M | $4.7M | $2M |
| 2024 | $10.5M | $8.6M | $157M |
| 2024 | $6.3M | $5.1M | $157M |
| 2025 | $3.6M | $2.9M | $317M |
| 2025 | $1.1M | $5.9M | $317M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership6.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$14M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Pitney Bowes Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.4B → $4.2B
Debt rose from $3.4B to $4.2B while owner earnings went from about $293M to $159M — about 11 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 27 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $668M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DBDDiebold Nixdorf Incorporated | $3.8B | 24% | -0.6% | -4% | 7% |
| PEverpure Inc. | $3.7B | 69% | -8.1% | -12% | 12% |
| FFIVF5 Inc. | $3.1B | 81% | 23.1% | 26% | 27% |
| VYXNCR Voyix Corporation | $2.7B | 25% | 2.0% | 1% | 10% |
| PBIPitney Bowes Inc. | $1.9B | 44% | 0.3% | 0% | 7% |
| CRSRCorsair Gaming Inc. | $1.5B | 25% | 1.4% | 1% | 2% |
| OMCLOmnicell | $1.2B | 46% | 2.3% | 2% | 11% |
| EXTRExtreme Networks Inc. | $1.1B | 56% | -0.2% | -0% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 0.9% | 1% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Pitney Bowes Inc. has delivered.
Pitney Bowes Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Pitney Bowes Inc. earns about $126M on its 6.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $379M on 135M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $3.9B. The if-converted diluted count is 148M, 9% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PBH its page in the Manual PBYI →
Industry order: ← PAYS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter PDD →