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PG, Procter & Gamble Co.

Procter & Gamble makes and sells branded household and personal care products — the everyday goods people use to clean, groom, and care for themselves and their homes. It sells through retailers into many countries around the world, and earns its money on the steady, repeat purchase of those branded staples rather than on any single sale. The economics turn on moving a great many small, familiar items, day after day, at a price above what they cost to make.

Our products are sold in about 180 countries and territories throughout the world.

Copies of these reports are also available, without charge, by contacting EQ Shareowner Services, 1100 Centre Pointe Curve, Suite 101, Mendota, MN 55120-4100.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PG · Procter & Gamble Co.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$84.3B

+0.3% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $86.7B 5-yr avg $81.3B

Gross margin 50% 5-yr avg 50%

Operating margin 23.2% 5-yr avg 22.9%

ROIC 20% 5-yr avg 22%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 18%

Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: The governing question is franchise versus commodity: do P&G's brands command enough trust that shoppers reach for them by name and pay up, or are they interchangeable goods a store brand can undercut? Watch gross margin and pricing through input-cost swings for the answer, since the filing flags both a highly competitive setting and a dependence on key manufacturing and supply arrangements — a real brand passes a cost increase on, a commodity eats it. Watch too the dependence on retail trade customers, who sit between the brand and the shopper and press on price; the moat, if it is there, is the consumer pulling the product off the shelf by name. The bad case is brands that quietly cease to justify their premium against cheaper private label, leaving scale and advertising to defend a position that no longer pays for itself — the margins, returns on capital, and debt in the record below show how that contest stands.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 21%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2014–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2014’14	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$29.4B	$65.1B	$66.8B	$67.7B	$71.0B	$76.1B	$80.2B	$82.0B	$84.0B	$84.3B	$86.7B	RevenueRevenue
—	50%	48%	49%	50%	51%	47%	48%	51%	51%	50%	Gross marginGross mgn
73%	29%	28%	28%	28%	28%	25%	26%	28%	27%	27%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
6%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$13.9B	$13.8B	$13.4B	$5.5B	$15.7B	$18.0B	$17.8B	$18.1B	$18.5B	$20.5B	$20.2B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
47.3%	21.2%	20.0%	8.1%	22.1%	23.6%	22.2%	22.1%	22.1%	24.3%	23.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$11.6B	$15.3B	$9.8B	$3.9B	$13.0B	$14.3B	$14.7B	$14.7B	$14.9B	$16.0B	$16.6B	Net incomeNet inc.
20%	17%	26%	35%	17%	19%	18%	20%	20%	20%	20%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$14.0B	$12.8B	$14.9B	$15.2B	$17.4B	$18.4B	$16.7B	$16.8B	$19.8B	$17.8B	$19.4B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3.1B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$3.0B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.8B	$3.1B	DepreciationDeprec.
($1.2B)	($5.7B)	$1.9B	$8.0B	$805M	$790M	($1.4B)	($1.1B)	$1.5B	($1.5B)	($784M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3.8B	$3.4B	$3.7B	$3.3B	$3.1B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.8B	$4.4B	CapexCapex
13.1%	5.2%	5.6%	4.9%	4.3%	3.7%	3.9%	3.7%	4.0%	4.5%	5.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$10.1B	$9.4B	$12.0B	$11.9B	$14.3B	$15.6B	$13.6B	$13.8B	$16.5B	$15.0B	$16.3B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
34.4%	14.4%	18.0%	17.6%	20.2%	20.5%	16.9%	16.8%	19.7%	17.8%	18.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$10.1B	$9.4B	$11.2B	$11.9B	$14.3B	$15.6B	$13.6B	$13.8B	$16.5B	$14.0B	$15.0B	Free cash flowFCF
34.4%	14.4%	16.7%	17.6%	20.2%	20.5%	16.9%	16.8%	19.7%	16.7%	17.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$24M	$16M	$109M	$3.9B	$58M	$34M	$1.4B	$765M	$21M	$11M	$85M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$6.9B	$7.2B	$7.3B	$7.5B	$7.8B	$8.3B	$8.8B	$9.0B	$9.3B	$9.9B	$10.2B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$6.0B	$5.2B	$7.0B	$5.0B	$7.4B	$11.0B	$10.0B	$7.4B	$5.0B	$6.5B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	16%	14%	5%	23%	23%	22%	22%	21%	22%	20%	ROICROIC
17%	27%	18%	8%	28%	31%	31%	31%	29%	31%	30%	Return on equityROE
7%	15%	5%	−8%	11%	13%	13%	12%	11%	12%	12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$8.5B	$5.6B	$2.6B	$4.2B	$16.2B	$10.3B	$7.2B	$8.2B	$9.5B	$9.6B	$12.3B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$6.4B	$4.6B	$4.7B	$5.0B	$4.2B	$4.7B	$5.1B	$5.5B	$6.1B	$6.2B	$6.3B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$6.8B	$4.6B	$4.7B	$5.0B	$5.5B	$6.0B	$6.9B	$7.1B	$7.0B	$7.6B	$7.9B	InventoryInvent.
$8.5B	$9.6B	$10.3B	$11.3B	$12.1B	$13.7B	$14.9B	$14.6B	$15.4B	$15.2B	$15.0B	Accounts payablePayables
$4.7B	($414M)	($920M)	($1.3B)	($2.4B)	($3.0B)	($2.8B)	($2.1B)	($2.2B)	($1.5B)	($855M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$31.6B	$26.5B	$23.3B	$22.5B	$28.0B	$23.1B	$21.7B	$22.6B	$24.7B	$25.4B	$28.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$33.7B	$30.2B	$28.2B	$30.0B	$33.0B	$33.1B	$33.1B	$35.8B	$33.6B	$36.1B	$38.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	0.9×	0.8×	0.7×	0.8×	0.7×	0.7×	0.6×	0.7×	0.7×	0.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$50.7B	$44.7B	$45.2B	$40.3B	$39.9B	$40.9B	$39.7B	$40.7B	$40.3B	$41.6B	$41.4B	GoodwillGoodwill
$144.3B	$120.4B	$118.3B	$115.1B	$120.7B	$119.3B	$117.2B	$120.8B	$122.4B	$125.2B	$128.4B	Total assetsAssets
$24.1B	$19.7B	$22.6B	$23.8B	$26.0B	$26.7B	$26.5B	$28.3B	$29.1B	$30.4B	$37.0B	Total debtDebt
$15.6B	$14.1B	$20.1B	$19.5B	$9.9B	$16.4B	$19.3B	$20.1B	$19.6B	$20.8B	$24.7B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
19.6×	29.6×	26.4×	10.8×	33.8×	35.8×	40.6×	24.0×	20.0×	22.5×	23.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$70.0B	$55.8B	$52.9B	$47.6B	$46.9B	$46.7B	$46.9B	$47.1B	$50.6B	$52.3B	$54.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	0.5%	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
2.90B	2.74B	2.66B	2.54B	2.63B	2.60B	2.54B	2.48B	2.47B	2.45B	2.43B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$10.12	$23.74	$25.16	$26.65	$27.02	$29.26	$31.58	$33.02	$34.00	$34.34	$35.75	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.01	$5.59	$3.67	$1.53	$4.96	$5.50	$5.81	$5.90	$6.02	$6.51	$6.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.48	$3.42	$4.53	$4.68	$5.46	$5.99	$5.34	$5.55	$6.68	$6.10	$6.74	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.48	$3.42	$4.20	$4.68	$5.46	$5.99	$5.34	$5.55	$6.68	$5.72	$6.20	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.38	$2.64	$2.75	$2.95	$2.97	$3.18	$3.45	$3.62	$3.77	$4.02	$4.19	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.32	$1.23	$1.40	$1.32	$1.17	$1.07	$1.24	$1.23	$1.34	$1.54	$1.81	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$24.09	$20.35	$19.91	$18.74	$17.85	$17.94	$18.45	$18.95	$20.45	$21.30	$22.56	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	11-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.7%/yr	+4.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.2%/yr	+2.2%/yr
EPS	+4.5%/yr	+5.6%/yr
Dividends / share	+4.9%/yr	+6.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+1.4%/yr	+5.6%/yr
Book value / share	−1.1%/yr	+3.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+0.3%
“Net Sales Net sales increased $245 million to $84.3 billion in fiscal 2025 as an increase in net sales driven by pricing of 1% was mostly offset by unfavorable foreign exchange of 1%.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Net income+7.4%
“Net Earnings Earnings before income taxes increased $1.4 billion, or 7%, to $20.2 billion as the increase in operating income, the components of which are discussed above, were partially offset by the non-cash charge for accumulated foreign currency translation losses due to the substantial liquidation of operations in Argentina.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2014–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

2.5Bpeak FY2014

ROIC

22%low FY2019

Gross margin

51%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$15.0Bowner earningsvs.$16.0Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2014FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $15.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put $926M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $14.0B.

Reported net income$16.0B

Owner earnings$15.0B · 18% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$16.0B	$14.9B	$14.7B	$14.7B	$14.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.8B	+$2.9B	+$2.7B	+$2.8B	+$2.7B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$476M	+$562M	+$545M	+$528M	+$540M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$1.5B	+$1.5B	−$1.1B	−$1.4B	+$790M
Cash from operations	$17.8B	$19.8B	$16.8B	$16.7B	$18.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2.8B	−$3.3B	−$3.1B	−$3.2B	−$2.8B
Owner earnings	$15.0B	$16.5B	$13.8B	$13.6B	$15.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$926M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$14.0B	$16.5B	$13.8B	$13.6B	$15.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	18%	20%	17%	17%	20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $926M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $476M), owner earnings is nearer $14.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 22.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $20.5B ÷ interest expense $907M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $20.8B · 1.0× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $9.6B − debt $30.4B

What this means
Netting $9.6B of cash and short-term investments against $30.4B of debt leaves $20.8B owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -41d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 27 + DIO 67 − DPO 135 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 21%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 5%–23%; 22% latest = NOPAT $16.3B ÷ invested capital $73.1B

Industry peers: median 19%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 18%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 14%–34%; latest $15.0B = operating cash $17.8B − maintenance capex $2.8B

Industry peers: median 23%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $476M of SBC) leaves $14.5B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.12×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $17.8B ÷ net income $16.0B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 109%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $16.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $15.0B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $15.0B of Owner Earnings, $16.4B (109%) went back to shareholders, $9.9B dividends, $6.5B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $476M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6.0B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.33×

Expanding

Capex $3.8B ÷ depreciation $2.8B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $84.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.70×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $30.4B vs ($10.7B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +24%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.51/share (latest year $6.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2014–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 29% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 29% early to 23% lately, median 22% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 8.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Failure to continually innovate, improve and respond to competitive moves, changing consumer habits and platform evolution, including the timely, responsible and effective adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, could compromise our competitive position and adversely impact our financial cond…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$28.0B

Cash & short-term investments$12.3B
Receivables$6.3B
Inventory$7.9B
Other current assets$1.5B

Current liabilities$38.2B

Debt due within a year$13.2B
Accounts payable$15.0B
Other current liabilities$10.0B

Current ratio0.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.53×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($10.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$13.2B due · $12.3B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($8.2B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($45.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$38.0B$956M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$5.4B

'27$4.6B

'28$2.1B

'29$2.0B

'30$4.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$5.4Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$10.0Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$5.4Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$18.1Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $30.4B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$12.3B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$15.0B

Together, against $5.4B due next year5.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $27.3B against the $5.4B due in the twelve months after the Jun 30, 2025 schedule: 5.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jun 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2014–2025

Over the record, the business generated $163.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$33.5B · 20%
Dividends$82.0B · 50%
Buybacks$70.5B · 43%

Returned to owners$152.5B
115% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $82.0B as dividends and $70.5B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$22.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $22.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $24.1B to $37.0B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $70.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−16.5%
The diluted count fell from 2905M to 2426M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$4.02/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$63.6B51% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity80%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$6.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $33.5B of capital spent building

$6.8B written down across 1 year (2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Taylor	$23.9M	$38.2M	$15.6B
2022	Mr. Moeller	$17.7M	$30.3M	$13.6B
2022	Mr. Taylor	$18.6M	$34.3M	$13.6B
2023	Mr. Moeller	$21.7M	$26.7M	$13.8B
2024	Mr. Moeller	$23.0M	$38.0M	$16.5B
2025	Mr. Moeller	$21.9M	$15.4M	$15.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio276:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$476M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Procter & Gamble Co. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2014–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.1% vs 22.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 22.3% early in the record and 18.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Household Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
JNJJohnson & Johnson	$94.2B	67%	23.8%	22%	23%
PGProcter & Gamble Co.	$84.3B	50%	22.1%	21%	18%
LLYEli Lilly and Company	$65.2B	78%	24.0%	27%	20%
MRKMerck & Company Inc. Common Stock (new)	$65.0B	70%	25.9%	19%	21%
PFEPfizer Inc.	$62.6B	75%	26.1%	11%	28%
ABBVAbbVie Inc.	$61.2B	70%	28.0%	21%	38%
BMYBristol-Myers Squibb Company	$48.2B	72%	18.9%	12%	28%
ECLEcolab Inc.	$16.1B	42%	14.1%	10%	12%
Group median	—	70%	23.9%	20%	22%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Procter & Gamble Co. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Procter & Gamble Co. earns about $15.1B on its 17.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($15.1B) Net of stock comp (−$506M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($16.6B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’14→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $15.0B on 2329M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $24.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 2426M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.4B) runs well above depreciation ($3.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $16.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PG against another business →

The owners of PG: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Procter & Gamble Co. (PG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PFSI its page in the Manual PGC →

Industry order: ← KMB the Household Products chapter REYN →