Owner Scorecard


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PFSI, PennyMac Financial Services Inc.

Mortgage & Specialty Finance capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a specialty financial services firm with a comprehensive mortgage platform and integrated business primarily focused on the production and servicing of U.S. residential mortgage loans.

References in this Report to "we," "our," "us," and the "Company" refer to PennyMac Financial Services, Inc.

We are also engaged in the management of investments related to the U.S. mortgage market and providing products and services that leverage innovative technologies to effectively and efficiently support our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PFSI · PennyMac Financial Services Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$20M
−25.2% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $21M 5-yr avg $16M
Operating margin 5879.5% 5-yr avg 8465.5%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin −19116% 5-yr avg 9309%
Free cash flow margin −19116% 5-yr avg 9309%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 6614% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 1493% and 37289% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Stock-based pay runs about 279% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3M$4M$9M$9M$7M$7M$12M$13M$27M$20M$21MRevenueRevenue
$218M$270M$256M$741M$2.5B$1.7B$1.0B$821M$401M$551M$1.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
n/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mOperating marginOp. mgn
$66M$101M$88M$393M$1.6B$1.0B$476M$145M$311M$501M$507MNet incomeNet inc.
41%19%21%26%26%26%29%21%22%9%8%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($938M)($883M)$572M($2.2B)($6.2B)$2.6B$6.0B($1.6B)($4.5B)($1.7B)($4.1B)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$8M$13M$15M$26M$29M$34M$53M$56M$54M$54MDepreciationDeprec.
($1.0B)($1.0B)$447M($2.7B)($7.9B)$1.5B$5.5B($1.8B)($4.9B)($2.2B)($4.6B)Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M$7M$13M$6M$11M$8M$7M$1M$2M$12M$14MCapexCapex
661.8%184.4%145.0%69.0%158.4%107.8%57.8%10.3%6.4%59.3%64.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($944M)($890M)$559M($2.3B)($6.2B)$2.6B$6.0B($1.6B)($4.5B)($1.7B)($4.1B)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mOwner earnings marginOE mgn
($960M)($890M)$559M($2.3B)($6.2B)$2.6B$6.0B($1.6B)($4.5B)($1.7B)($4.1B)Free cash flowFCF
n/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mn/mFree cash flow marginFCF mgn
$10M$10M$31M$53M$55M$41M$52M$63M$63MDividends paidDiv. paid
$9M$5M$1M$337M$958M$406M$71M$5MBuybacksBuybacks
16%7%15%44%21%12%9%4%5%11%ROICROIC
5%21%5%19%49%29%14%4%8%12%12%Return on equityROE
5%19%48%28%12%3%7%10%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$100M$208M$274M$263M$548M$347M$1.3B$949M$659M$712M$654MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$5.3B$6.9B$10.2B$31.6B$18.8B$16.8B$18.8B$26.1B$29.4B$31.9BTotal assetsAssets
$892M$1.4B$1.8B$1.3B$3.1B$3.8B$4.4B$5.3B$6.2B$6.2BTotal debtDebt
$683M$1.1B$1.5B$748M$2.8B$2.4B$3.5B$4.6B$5.5B$5.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.1×1.9×1.8×3.5×9.3×4.5×3.0×1.3×1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B$469M$1.7B$2.1B$3.4B$3.4B$3.5B$3.5B$3.8B$4.3B$4.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
490.6%562.0%272.9%279.0%669.5%516.0%343.4%205.8%77.7%180.2%129.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
76.6M25.0M35.3M80.3M78.7M67.5M56.0M52.7M53.4M53.9M53.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.04$0.15$0.26$0.11$0.09$0.11$0.22$0.25$0.50$0.37$0.40Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.86$4.03$2.48$4.89$20.92$14.87$8.50$2.74$5.84$9.30$9.42EPS (diluted)EPS
$-12.32$-35.61$15.83$-28.02$-78.87$37.87$107.70$-30.03$-84.99$-30.88$-75.64Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-12.53$-35.61$15.83$-28.02$-78.87$37.87$107.70$-30.03$-84.99$-30.88$-75.64Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.28$0.12$0.39$0.78$0.98$0.79$0.98$1.16$1.17Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.29$0.27$0.38$0.08$0.14$0.12$0.13$0.03$0.03$0.22$0.26Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.26$18.78$46.82$25.66$43.05$50.66$62.04$67.10$71.78$79.97$80.32Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/3.07 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.41 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.27 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+27.1%/yr+34.3%/yr
EPS+30.2%/yr−15.0%/yr
Dividends / share+22.2%/yr (7-yr)+24.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.8%/yr+10.3%/yr
Book value / share+17.8%/yr+13.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
54Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
5%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($1.7B)owner earningsvs.$501Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $501M of profit but ($1.7B) of owner earnings: $2.2B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$501M$311M$145M$476M$1.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$54M+$56M+$53M+$34M+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$36M+$21M+$28M+$43M+$38M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$2.2B−$4.9B−$1.8B+$5.5B+$1.5B
Cash from operations($1.7B)($4.5B)($1.6B)$6.0B$2.6B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$12M−$2M−$1M−$7M−$8M
Owner earnings($1.7B)($4.5B)($1.6B)$6.0B$2.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-8275%-16879%-11815%48629%34883%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $36M), owner earnings is nearer ($1.7B).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $1.2B ÷ interest expense $638M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.5B · 4.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $302M + ST investments $410M − debt $6.2B
    What this means

    Netting $712M of cash and short-term investments against $6.2B of debt leaves $5.5B owed, about 4.6× a year's operating profit (5.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 4%–44%; 11% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $10.2B
    Industry peers: median -32%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -92172%–48629%; latest ($1.7B) = operating cash ($1.7B) − maintenance capex $12M
    Industry peers: median -55%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8275% of revenue this year, a -16879% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $36M of SBC) leaves ($1.7B).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ($1.7B) ÷ net income $501M

    In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 10% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.22×
    Harvesting
    Capex $12M ÷ depreciation $54M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $20M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +276%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.14/share (latest year $9.65), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $82.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5566% → 3454% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5566% early to 3454% lately, median 6614% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2024 · 1492.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Adverse consequences of these risks related to artificial intelligence could undermine the decisions, predictions or analyses such technologies produce and subject us to competitive harm, legal liability, heightened regulatory scrutiny and brand or reputational harm.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Spector$13.6M$17.3M$2.6B
2022Mr. Spector$9.7M$6.5M$6.0B
2023Mr. Spector$7.3M$14.5M($1.6B)
2024Mr. Spector$10.6M$9.6M($4.5B)
2025Mr. Spector$12.7M$17.7M($1.7B)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership15.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio147:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$36M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 180% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HIVEHIVE Digital Technologies Ltd.$298M1.8%0%-42%
CRCLCircle Internet Group Inc.$110M1102.0%-4%699%
DGXXDigi Power X Inc.$34M-95%
ORBSEightco Holdings Inc.$33M9%-20.7%-39%-33%
SLNHPSoluna Holdings, Inc.$30M23%-113.3%-33%-55%
PFSIPennyMac Financial Services Inc.$20M6967.8%12%-14347%
BMNPBitmine Immersion Technologies, Inc.$6M-224.0%-32%-139%
AVXAvax One Technology Ltd.$2M96%-37998.5%-55%-670%
Group median-20.7%-32%-75%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

PennyMac Financial Services Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered31%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−19116%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PennyMac Financial Services Inc. (PFSI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PFSI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PFS its page in the Manual PG →

Industry order: ← ONIT the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter RKT →