Owner Scorecard


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PGEN, Precigen Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a commercial-stage biopharmaceutical company specializing in the advancement of innovative precision medicines to improve the lives of patients.

Precision medicine is the practice of therapeutic product development that takes into account specific genetic variations within populations impacted by a disease to design targeted therapies to improve outcomes for a disease or patient population.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PGEN · Precigen Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$10M
+146.7% YoY · −21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $56M
Cash burn · annual $115M
Runway 6 mo
Gross margin −10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 105% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −533%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −63 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −72%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$191M$219M$151M$91M$32M$14M$27M$6M$4M$10M$32MRevenueRevenue
80%85%−10%Gross marginGross mgn
75%67%91%649%n/m724%249%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
59%65%268%781%n/m427%116%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($125M)($138M)($506M)($323M)($171M)($92M)$28M($100M)($135M)($111M)($94M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−65.6%−62.8%−334.4%−356.3%−533.3%−647.1%104.5%n/mn/mn/m−297.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($187M)($117M)($509M)($322M)($171M)($92M)$28M($96M)($126M)($251M)($204M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($49M)($104M)($124M)($136M)($77M)($56M)($65M)($67M)($68M)($88M)($115M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$25M$31M$33M$25M$18M$14M$11M$7M$5M$3M$4MDepreciationDeprec.
$71M($59M)$316M$143M$58M$9M($114M)$12M$44M$149M$74MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$32M$47M$42M$38M$8M$7M$5M$2M$9M$2M$2MCapexCapex
16.6%21.3%27.5%41.8%23.5%50.8%18.3%24.7%218.7%20.6%5.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($81M)($150M)($166M)($174M)($85M)($63M)($70M)($68M)($77M)($90M)($117M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−42.2%−68.5%−109.7%−191.6%−264.3%−441.7%−260.0%n/mn/m−927.6%−370.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($81M)($150M)($166M)($174M)($85M)($63M)($70M)($68M)($77M)($90M)($117M)Free cash flowFCF
−42.2%−68.5%−109.7%−191.6%−264.3%−441.7%−260.0%n/mn/m−927.6%−370.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$920K$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
-20%-23%-84%-114%-72%-29%17%-71%-1186%-104%-50%ROICROIC
-33%-22%-140%-449%-254%-86%22%-81%-328%-1199%-1010%Return on equityROE
−33%−22%−140%−449%−254%−86%22%−81%−328%n/mn/mRetained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$243M$74M$216M$75M$100M$109M$56M$63M$98M$98M$56MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$22M$20M$21M$21M$16M$1M$978K$902K$926K$4M$26MReceivablesReceiv.
$8M$9M$12M$6M$5M$3M$4M$2M$4M$12M$3MAccounts payablePayables
$13M$11M$9M$15M$12M($2M)($3M)($824K)($3M)($8M)$24MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$315M$154M$285M$235M$149M$157M$118M$69M$102M$115M$102MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$95M$80M$62M$123M$42M$35M$79M$23M$22M$37M$21MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×1.9×4.6×1.9×3.5×4.5×1.5×3.0×4.8×3.1×4.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$157M$94M$94M$54M$54M$38M$37M$27M$19M$15M$15MGoodwillGoodwill
$949M$847M$716M$456M$315M$360M$216M$151M$145M$156M$139MTotal assetsAssets
$8M$8M$212M$218M$172M$180M$43M$0$93M$137MTotal debtDebt
($235M)($66M)($5M)$143M$72M$71M($13M)($98M)($5M)$80MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-145.4×-225.7×-59.3×-213.2×-22504.8×-28.6×-13.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$560M$534M$363M$72M$67M$107M$126M$118M$39M$21M$20MShareholders’ equityEquity
22.1%18.9%24.0%20.9%57.4%97.5%37.9%158.8%241.3%112.2%35.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$14M$88M$10M$482K$10M$7M$4M$4MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
118M120M130M154M167M198M200M245M268M313M354MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.62$1.83$1.17$0.59$0.19$0.07$0.13$0.03$0.01$0.03$0.09Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.58$-0.98$-3.93$-2.09$-1.02$-0.47$0.14$-0.39$-0.47$-0.80$-0.58EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.68$-1.25$-1.28$-1.13$-0.51$-0.32$-0.35$-0.28$-0.29$-0.29$-0.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.68$-1.25$-1.28$-1.13$-0.51$-0.32$-0.35$-0.28$-0.29$-0.29$-0.33Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.27$0.39$0.32$0.25$0.05$0.04$0.02$0.01$0.03$0.01$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.75$4.45$2.80$0.47$0.40$0.54$0.63$0.48$0.14$0.07$0.06Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−35.6%/yr−30.5%/yr
Capital spending / share−34.0%/yr−32.4%/yr
Book value / share−37.7%/yr−30.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
313Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−104%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($90M)owner earningsvs.($251M)net incomelow FY2019

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $251M loss into ($90M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($251M)($126M)($96M)$28M($92M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3M+$5M+$7M+$11M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$9M+$10M+$10M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$149M+$44M+$12M−$114M+$9M
Cash from operations($88M)($68M)($67M)($65M)($56M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2M−$9M−$2M−$5M−$7M
Owner earnings($90M)($77M)($68M)($70M)($63M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-928%-1956%-1100%-260%-442%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer ($101M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($111M) ÷ interest expense $4M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $30M + ST investments $68M − debt $136M
    What this means

    Netting $98M of cash and short-term investments against $136M of debt leaves $39M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -1186%–17%; -69% latest = NOPAT ($87M) ÷ invested capital $127M
    Industry peers: median -48%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -69% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1956%–-42%; latest ($90M) = operating cash ($88M) − maintenance capex $2M
    Industry peers: median -530%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -928% of revenue this year, a -264% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves ($101M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($251M) · cash from operations ($88M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.62×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $3M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $10M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.09×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $136M vs $78M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.44/share (latest year $-0.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −154% → −2061% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −154% early to −2061% lately, median −533% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2024 · −3440.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$102M
  • Cash & short-term investments$56M
  • Receivables$26M
  • Other current assets$19M
Current liabilities$21M
  • Debt due within a year$43M
  • Accounts payable$3M
Current ratio4.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio2.67×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$81Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$43M due · $56M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1633.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 4.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($17M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$141M$5M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$410Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$18M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity73%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $190M of capital spent building

$134M written down across 7 years (2017, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Helen Sabzevari$2.5M−$16.1M($63M)
2022Helen Sabzevari$3.5M−$1.1M($70M)
2023Helen Sabzevari$3.7M$3.7M($68M)
2024Helen Sabzevari$5.4M$4.6M($77M)
2025Helen Sabzevari$5.4M$18.6M($90M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership41.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio34:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 112% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Precigen Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$8M → $137M

    Debt rose from $8M to $137M while owner earnings went from about ($132M) to ($78M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?11% → 84% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $22M to $26M while revenue grew −83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (11% of revenue then, 84% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $334M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CBIOCrescent Biopharma Inc.$11M-957.2%-530%
XOMAXOMA Royalty Corporation$10M-177.6%-16%-250%
JANXJanux Therapeutics Inc.$10M-905.4%-14%-508%
ZBIOZenas BioPharma Inc.$10M-3277.8%-144%-1724%
PGENPrecigen Inc.$10M-444.8%-72%-262%
PRTAProthena Corporation plc$10M-1390.3%-1090%
BIOABioAge Labs Inc.$9M-1031.5%-85%-910%
COGTCogent Biosciences Inc.$8M-341.4%-48%-320%
Group median-931.3%-60%-519%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Precigen Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−28%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−370%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Precigen Inc. (PGEN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PGEN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PGC its page in the Manual PGNY →

Industry order: ← PFE the Pharmaceuticals chapter PHAR →