Owner Scorecard


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PSN, Parsons Corporation

Software asset-light Serial acquirer

Our Federal Solutions business is an advanced technology provider to the U.S. government.

We deliver innovative technology-driven solutions to customers worldwide.

Our Critical Infrastructure business provides integrated design and engineering services for complex physical and digital infrastructure around the globe.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PSN · Parsons Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.4B
−5.7% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.3B 5-yr avg $5.3B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 22%
Operating margin 6.4% 5-yr avg 5.3%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Federal Solutions (51%) and Critical Infrastructure (49%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 44% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 8 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 5.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Federal Solutions at 51%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Federal Solutions51%$3.2B
  • Critical Infrastructure49%$3.1B
By geographyNorth America81%Middle East18%International0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.0B$3.6B$4.0B$3.9B$3.7B$4.2B$5.4B$6.8B$6.4B$6.3BRevenueRevenue
20%21%21%22%23%23%22%21%22%23%Gross marginGross mgn
17%17%20%19%21%19%16%14%16%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$151M$205M$92M$178M$132M$186M$288M$428M$418M$405MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.0%5.8%2.3%4.5%3.6%4.4%5.3%6.3%6.6%6.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$97M$222M$121M$99M$64M$97M$161M$235M$241M$228MNet incomeNet inc.
18%8%30%27%29%26%25%23%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$265M$285M$220M$289M$206M$238M$408M$524M$478M$486MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$35M$70M$126M$128M$144M$121M$120M$99M$116M$125MDepreciationDeprec.
$133M($8M)($34M)$47M($23M)($3M)$92M$133M$78M$90MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$28M$29M$68M$34M$21M$31M$40M$49M$68M$69MCapexCapex
0.9%0.8%1.7%0.9%0.6%0.7%0.7%0.7%1.1%1.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$237M$255M$153M$255M$184M$207M$367M$474M$410M$417MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.9%7.2%3.9%6.5%5.0%4.9%6.7%7.0%6.4%6.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$237M$255M$153M$255M$184M$207M$367M$474M$410M$417MFree cash flowFCF
7.9%7.2%3.9%6.5%5.0%4.9%6.7%7.0%6.4%6.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$26M$481M$495M$303M$198M$379M$222M$429M$145M$447MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$52M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$6M$0$22M$22M$11M$25M$125MBuybacksBuybacks
5%6%5%5%8%10%9%8%ROICROIC
7%5%3%5%7%10%9%9%Return on equityROE
4%5%3%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$446M$280M$183M$484M$343M$263M$273M$454M$466M$284MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$623M$671M$699M$598M$717M$916M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$226M$217M$226M$196M$201M$243M$208M$251M$233MAccounts payablePayables
$397M$455M$473M$402M$516M$673M$893M$874M$864MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$1.6B$1.7B$2.1B$2.5B$2.7B$2.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.9B$1.5B$1.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.3×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.5×1.3×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$497M$737M$1.0B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$1.8B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B$3.5B$3.9B$3.8B$4.2B$4.8B$5.5B$5.8B$6.0BTotal assetsAssets
$429M$249M$590M$592M$744M$746M$1.2B$1.2B$1.5BTotal debtDebt
$149M$67M$106M$249M$481M$473M$794M$771M$1.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
9.5×9.8×3.9×8.5×7.5×8.0×9.2×8.3×8.1×7.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.0B)($968M)$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.4B$2.6B$2.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.5%0.6%0.8%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
83.6M80.0M92.8M101M112M113M115M112M110M108MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.10$44.50$42.64$38.72$32.65$36.97$47.29$60.18$58.02$58.13Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.16$2.78$1.30$0.97$0.57$0.85$1.40$2.10$2.20$2.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.84$3.19$1.65$2.52$1.65$1.82$3.19$4.23$3.74$3.85Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.84$3.19$1.65$2.52$1.65$1.82$3.19$4.23$3.74$3.85Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.56$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.33$0.37$0.73$0.34$0.19$0.27$0.35$0.44$0.62$0.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-12.56$-12.09$17.57$17.92$16.95$18.01$19.87$21.54$24.09$24.44Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.1%/yr+8.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.5%/yr+8.2%/yr
EPS+8.3%/yr+17.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.0%/yr+13.0%/yr
Book value / share+6.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
110Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
9%low FY2021
Gross margin
22%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.9×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$410Mowner earningsvs.$241Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $241M of profit into $410M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$241M
Owner earnings$410M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$241M$235M$161M$97M$64M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$116M+$99M+$120M+$121M+$144M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$43M+$56M+$34M+$23M+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$78M+$133M+$92M−$3M−$23M
Cash from operations$478M$524M$408M$238M$206M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$68M−$49M−$40M−$31M−$21M
Owner earnings$410M$474M$367M$207M$184M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%7%7%5%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $43M), owner earnings is nearer $367M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $418M ÷ interest expense $51M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $771M · 1.8× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $466M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $466M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $771M owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (3.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 64 + DIO 0 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    7-yr median, range 5%–10%; 9% latest = NOPAT $320M ÷ invested capital $3.4B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 4%–8%; latest $410M = operating cash $478M − maintenance capex $68M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $43M of SBC) leaves $367M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $478M ÷ net income $241M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $125M ÷ Owner Earnings $410M
    What this means

    Of $410M Owner Earnings, $125M (30%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $125M buybacks. Net of $43M stock comp, the real buyback was about $82M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.58×
    Harvesting
    Capex $68M ÷ depreciation $116M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.75×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $1.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +45%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.99/share (latest year $2.25), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 6% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 2.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Not named

Despite the structural exposure, the latest 10-K does not name AI as a competitive risk, which is itself worth a question.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$284M
  • Receivables$1.1B
  • Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$1.5B
  • Accounts payable$233M
  • Other current liabilities$1.2B
Current ratio1.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($182M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($664M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$164M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$376Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$368M · 13%
  • Dividends$52M · 2%
  • Buybacks$211M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.3B · 78%
  • Returned to owners$263M

    10% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $52M as dividends and $211M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$57.89

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $205M, about $57.89 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $35.08 (2021) to $87.11 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $68.59 ($125M).

  • Net change in share count29.7%

    The diluted count rose from 84M to 108M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained19%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $202M, so each retained $1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity83%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.7Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $368M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Carey A. Smith$5.3M$4.1M$184M
2021Charles L. Harrington$7.1M$3.8M$184M
2022Carey A. Smith$7.0M$10.6M$207M
2023Carey A. Smith$18.6M$25.5M$367M
2024Carey A. Smith$11.0M$25.8M$474M
2025Carey A. Smith$7.3M−$4.9M$410M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio60:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$43M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Parsons Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?29.7%

    Diluted shares grew 29.7% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $211M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$1.3B · 20% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “One customer set within the federal government exceeded 20% of Parsons' revenue during 2025.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CACICACI International Inc.$8.6B7%8.0%9%6%
SAICScience Applications International Corporation$7.3B11%6.1%11%6%
TTWOTake-Two Interactive$6.7B50%6.3%18%14%
PSNParsons Corporation$6.4B22%5.0%6%7%
SSNCSS&C Technologies$6.3B47%21.8%7%25%
TOSTToast Inc.$6.2B19%-13.4%-38%-1%
OTEXOpen Text Corporation$5.2B69%17.6%6%23%
GDDYGoDaddy Inc.$5.0B9.1%15%21%
Group median22%7.2%8%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Parsons Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Parsons Corporation earns about $414M on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $417M on 107M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net debt $1.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Parsons Corporation (PSN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PSN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PSMT its page in the Manual PSNL →

Industry order: ← PRGS the Software chapter PTC →