Owner Scorecard


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OTEX, Open Text Corporation

Software asset-light

And Strategy About OpenText OpenText is an Information Management company that provides software and services that empower digital businesses of all sizes to become more intelligent, connected, secure and responsible.

OpenText's Information Management solutions manage the creation, capture, use, analysis and lifecycle of structured and unstructured data.

Our Information Management solutions are designed to help organizations extract value and insights from their information, secure that information and meet the growing list of privacy and compliance requirements.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
OTEX · Open Text Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.2B
−10.4% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.2B 5-yr avg $4.5B
Gross margin 73% 5-yr avg 71%
Operating margin 18.1% 5-yr avg 16.9%
ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Customer support (45%) and Cloud services and subscriptions (36%), with 2 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 69% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Customer support at 45%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Customer support45%$2.3B
  • Cloud services and subscriptions36%$1.9B
  • License12%$626M
  • Professional service and other7%$352M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.8B$2.3B$2.8B$2.9B$3.1B$3.4B$3.5B$4.5B$5.8B$5.2B$5.2BRevenueRevenue
69%67%66%68%68%69%70%71%73%72%73%Gross marginGross mgn
8%7%7%7%8%8%9%9%10%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%12%11%11%12%12%13%15%15%15%13%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$369M$355M$507M$567M$504M$741M$645M$516M$887M$893M$944MOperating incomeOp. inc.
20.2%15.5%18.0%19.8%16.2%21.9%18.5%11.5%15.4%17.3%18.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$284M$1.0B$242M$286M$234M$311M$397M$150M$465M$436M$516MNet incomeNet inc.
2%37%35%32%52%23%32%36%10%17%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$526M$440M$708M$876M$955M$876M$982M$779M$968M$831M$979MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$242M$346M$457M$471M$490MDepreciationDeprec.
($27M)($962M)($19M)$93M$691M$513M$515M$499M$363M$290M($107M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$70M$80M$105M$64M$73M$64M$93M$124M$159M$143M$170MCapexCapex
3.8%3.5%3.7%2.2%2.3%1.9%2.7%2.8%2.8%2.8%3.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$456M$361M$603M$812M$882M$812M$889M$655M$808M$687M$810MOwner earningsOwner earn.
25.0%15.7%21.4%28.3%28.4%24.0%25.4%14.6%14.0%13.3%15.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$456M$361M$603M$812M$882M$812M$889M$655M$808M$687M$810MFree cash flowFCF
25.0%15.7%21.4%28.3%28.4%24.0%25.4%14.6%14.0%13.3%15.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$1.3B$0$0$5.7B$9M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$99M$121M$146M$169M$189M$211M$238M$260M$267M$272M$269MDividends paidDiv. paid
$11M$8M$0$27M$0$119M$177M$0$150M$413MBuybacksBuybacks
10%5%5%6%5%6%8%3%6%9%9%ROICROIC
14%29%7%7%6%8%10%4%11%11%13%Return on equityROE
9%26%3%3%1%2%4%−3%5%4%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.3B$443M$683M$941M$1.7B$1.6B$1.7B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$286M$446M$488M$464M$466M$439M$427M$683M$626M$660M$621MReceivablesReceiv.
$36M$44M$42M$46M$41M$58M$114M$163M$151M$136M$124MAccounts payablePayables
$250M$402M$446M$417M$425M$381M$313M$520M$475M$523M$499MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.0B$1.3B$1.6B$2.4B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$2.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$671M$1.1B$995M$1.0B$1.9B$1.4B$1.5B$3.2B$2.8B$2.7B$2.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×0.9×1.3×1.5×1.3×1.6×1.6×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.3B$3.4B$3.6B$3.8B$4.7B$4.7B$5.2B$8.7B$7.5B$7.5B$7.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$5.2B$7.5B$7.8B$7.9B$10.2B$9.6B$10.2B$17.1B$14.2B$13.8B$13.3BTotal assetsAssets
$3.0B$3.4B$3.5B$3.4B$4.7B$3.6B$4.2B$8.9B$6.4B$6.4B$6.2BTotal debtDebt
$1.7B$3.0B$2.8B$2.5B$3.0B$2.0B$2.5B$7.7B$5.1B$5.2B$5.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$2.0B$3.5B$3.7B$3.9B$4.0B$4.1B$4.0B$4.0B$4.2B$3.9B$4.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%1.3%1.0%0.9%0.9%1.5%2.0%2.9%2.4%2.0%1.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
244M256M267M270M272M273M272M270M273M264M252MShares out (diluted)Shares
$7.47$8.96$10.52$10.63$11.44$12.38$12.85$16.58$21.17$19.60$20.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.17$4.01$0.91$1.06$0.86$1.14$1.46$0.56$1.71$1.65$2.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.87$1.41$2.25$3.01$3.24$2.97$3.27$2.42$2.97$2.61$3.22Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.87$1.41$2.25$3.01$3.24$2.97$3.27$2.42$2.97$2.61$3.22Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.41$0.47$0.54$0.63$0.69$0.77$0.87$0.96$0.98$1.03$1.07Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.29$0.31$0.39$0.24$0.27$0.23$0.34$0.46$0.58$0.54$0.67Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.11$13.81$13.89$14.39$14.74$14.98$14.83$14.87$15.40$14.90$15.75Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.3%/yr+11.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.8%/yr−4.3%/yr
EPS+4.0%/yr+13.9%/yr
Dividends / share+10.9%/yr+8.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.4%/yr+15.2%/yr
Book value / share+7.0%/yr+0.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
264Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
9%low FY2023
Gross margin
72%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.6×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$687Mowner earningsvs.$436Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $436M of profit into $687M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$436M
Owner earnings$687M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$436M$465M$150M$397M$311M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$105M+$140M+$130M+$70M+$52M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$290M+$363M+$499M+$515M+$513M
Cash from operations$831M$968M$779M$982M$876M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$143M−$159M−$124M−$93M−$64M
Owner earnings$687M$808M$655M$889M$812M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%14%15%25%24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $105M), owner earnings is nearer $583M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.2B · 5.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $1.2B − debt $6.4B
    What this means

    Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $6.4B of debt leaves $5.2B owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (7.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 47 + DIO 0 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–10%; 9% latest = NOPAT $807M ÷ invested capital $9.2B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 13%–28%; latest $687M = operating cash $831M − maintenance capex $143M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $105M of SBC) leaves $583M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $831M ÷ net income $436M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $685M ÷ Owner Earnings $687M
    What this means

    Of $687M Owner Earnings, $685M (100%) went back to shareholders, $272M dividends, $413M buybacks. Net of $105M stock comp, the real buyback was about $308M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.30×
    Harvesting
    Capex $143M ÷ depreciation $471M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $6.4B vs ($546M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −32%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.44/share (latest year $1.80), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (15%) sits below the early years (18%), but the latest year (17%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 17% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 11.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.9%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We could lose market share if our current or prospective competitors: (i) develop technologies that are perceived to be substantially equivalent or superior to our technologies; (ii) introduce new competitive products or services; (iii) add new functionality to existing products and services, including through new and …”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.3B
  • Receivables$621M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$507M
Current liabilities$2.5B
  • Debt due within a year$36M
  • Accounts payable$124M
  • Other current liabilities$2.4B
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.94×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.49×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($151M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$36M due · $1.3B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($4.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.8BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.4B$204M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.7Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$975M · 12%
  • Dividends$2.0B · 25%
  • Buybacks$905M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$4.1B · 52%
  • Returned to owners$2.9B

    41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.0B as dividends and $905M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.2B and cash and short-term investments fell $41M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$52.95

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 17M shares were bought for $886M, about $52.95 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $29.57 (2024) to $89.46 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($413M).

  • Net change in share count3.1%

    The diluted count rose from 244M to 252M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.03/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained26%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($957M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $244M, so each retained $1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$9.5B69% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$7.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $975M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$105M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Open Text Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?14.0% vs 20.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.7% early in the record and 14.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.1%

    Diluted shares grew 3.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $905M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.0B → $6.2B

    Debt rose from $3.0B to $6.2B while owner earnings went from about $473M to $717M — about 6.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CACICACI International Inc.$8.6B7%8.0%9%6%
SAICScience Applications International Corporation$7.3B11%6.1%11%6%
PSNParsons Corporation$6.4B22%5.0%6%7%
CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc.$5.3B99%24.1%28%28%
TEAMAtlassian$5.2B83%-2.5%27%
OTEXOpen Text Corporation$5.2B69%17.6%6%23%
TWLOTwilio Inc.$5.1B52%-19.4%-7%-1%
GDDYGoDaddy Inc.$5.0B9.1%15%21%
Group median52%7.0%9%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Open Text Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Open Text Corporation earns about $1.2B on its 22.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $810M on 243M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $5.0B. The if-converted diluted count is 252M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($170M) runs well above depreciation ($490M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $836M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Open Text Corporation (OTEX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OTEX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OSW its page in the Manual OTIS →

Industry order: ← OSPN the Software chapter PATH →