Owner Scorecard


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ROG, Rogers Corporation

Chemicals capital-intensive Cyclical

We design, develop, manufacture and sell high-performance and high-reliability engineered materials and components to meet our customers' demanding challenges.

AES products are sold globally to fabricators, distributors and OEMs.

Critical trade names for our AES products include: curamik , ROLINX , RO4000 Series, RO3000 Series, RT/duroid , CLTE Series , TMM , AD Series , DiClad Series, CuClad Series, Kappa , COOLSPAN , TC Series , IsoClad Series, MAGTREX , IM Series , 2929 Bondply, SpeedWave Prepreg, RO4400 /RO4400T Series and Radix .

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ROG · Rogers Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$811M
−2.3% YoY · 0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $821M 5-yr avg $891M
Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin −4.1% 5-yr avg 6.9%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Advanced Electronics Solutions (55%), EMS (43%) and Other (2%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 35% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −5.6% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Advanced Electronics Solutions at 55%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Advanced Electronics Solutions55%$445M
  • EMS43%$350M
  • Other2%$16M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$656M$821M$879M$898M$803M$933M$971M$908M$830M$811M$821MRevenueRevenue
38%39%35%35%36%37%33%34%33%32%32%Gross marginGross mgn
21%20%19%19%23%21%23%22%23%22%21%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%4%4%4%4%3%4%4%4%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$81M$129M$113M$110M$67M$117M$144M$85M$25M($45M)($34M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.3%15.7%12.8%12.3%8.4%12.6%14.9%9.4%3.0%−5.6%−4.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$48M$80M$88M$47M$50M$108M$117M$57M$26M($62M)($56M)Net incomeNet inc.
41%39%21%14%27%14%17%26%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$117M$139M$67M$161M$165M$124M$130M$131M$127M$101M$95MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$38M$44M$50M$49M$71M$43M$46M$51M$49M$54M$55MDepreciationDeprec.
$20M$3M($82M)$53M$30M($44M)($45M)$9M$37M$98M$87MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$18M$27M$47M$52M$40M$71M$117M$57M$56M$30M$25MCapexCapex
2.8%3.3%5.4%5.7%5.0%7.6%12.0%6.3%6.8%3.7%3.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$99M$112M$20M$110M$125M$53M$13M$74M$71M$71M$70MOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.1%13.6%2.2%12.2%15.5%5.7%1.3%8.2%8.6%8.8%8.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$99M$112M$20M$110M$125M$53M$13M$74M$71M$71M$70MFree cash flowFCF
15.1%13.6%2.2%12.2%15.5%5.7%1.3%8.2%8.6%8.8%8.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$134M$60M$78M$0$0$168M$4M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$8M$0$3M$0$0$0$25M$0$20M$52MBuybacksBuybacks
7%11%10%11%6%9%10%5%2%-4%-3%ROICROIC
8%10%10%5%5%10%10%4%2%-5%-5%Return on equityROE
8%10%10%5%5%10%10%4%2%−5%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$228M$181M$168M$167M$192M$232M$236M$132M$160M$197M$222MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$120M$141M$145M$122M$134M$163M$177M$162M$135M$131M$142MReceivablesReceiv.
$91M$113M$133M$133M$102M$133M$182M$154M$142M$125M$128MInventoryInvent.
$28M$36M$40M$33M$36M$65M$57M$50M$48M$43M$53MAccounts payablePayables
$182M$217M$237M$222M$201M$232M$303M$265M$230M$213M$217MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$458M$455M$486M$464M$474M$584M$660M$527M$494M$500M$511MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$101M$114M$107M$100M$112M$164M$143M$116M$124M$126M$127MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.5×4.0×4.5×4.6×4.3×3.6×4.6×4.5×4.0×4.0×4.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$208M$237M$265M$263M$270M$370M$352M$360M$358M$303M$301MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$240M$131M$228M$123M$25M$190M$215M$30M$0$0Total debtDebt
$12M($50M)$61M($44M)($167M)($42M)($21M)($102M)($160M)($222M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$636M$767M$848M$934M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.7%1.4%1.3%1.4%1.7%1.8%1.2%1.6%1.8%1.3%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
18.2M18.5M18.7M18.7M18.7M18.9M19.0M18.7M18.6M18.2M17.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.02$44.27$47.11$48.00$42.91$49.36$51.12$48.58$44.63$44.55$45.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.65$4.34$4.70$2.53$2.67$5.72$6.14$3.03$1.40$-3.40$-3.12EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.42$6.03$1.06$5.86$6.66$2.82$0.67$3.98$3.82$3.91$3.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.42$6.03$1.06$5.86$6.66$2.82$0.67$3.98$3.82$3.91$3.92Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.00$1.47$2.53$2.76$2.16$3.76$6.15$3.05$3.02$1.65$1.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$34.89$41.33$45.46$49.91$54.57$59.20$61.71$67.33$67.29$65.70$66.63Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.4%/yr+0.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.6%/yr−10.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.8%/yr−5.2%/yr
Book value / share+7.3%/yr+3.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
18Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−4%low FY2025
Gross margin
32%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$71Mowner earningsvs.($62M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $62M loss into $71M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($62M)$26M$57M$117M$108M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$54M+$49M+$51M+$46M+$43M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$15M+$14M+$12M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$98M+$37M+$9M−$45M−$44M
Cash from operations$101M$127M$131M$130M$124M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$30M−$56M−$57M−$117M−$71M
Owner earnings$71M$71M$74M$13M$53M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%9%8%1%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $60M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $197M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $197M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $26M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $223M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 59 + DIO 82 − DPO 28 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -4%–11%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($36M) ÷ invested capital $999M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–16%; latest $71M = operating cash $101M − maintenance capex $30M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $60M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($62M) · cash from operations $101M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $52M ÷ Owner Earnings $71M
    What this means

    Of $71M Owner Earnings, $52M (74%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $52M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $42M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.55×
    Harvesting
    Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $54M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $811M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.97×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $374M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −90%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.39/share (latest year $-3.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $66.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 14% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 2% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −15%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −5.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we are unable to use generative AI due to these additional costs, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$511M
  • Cash & short-term investments$196M
  • Receivables$142M
  • Inventory$128M
  • Other current assets$46M
Current liabilities$127M
  • Accounts payable$53M
  • Other current liabilities$75M
Current ratio4.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.02×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.54×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$384Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.3× → 4.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$796Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$22M$22M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$516M · 41%
  • Buybacks$108M · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$639M · 51%
  • Returned to owners$108M

    14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $108M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $240M and cash and short-term investments fell $32M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$70.99

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $52M, about $70.99 each.

  • Net change in share count−1.8%

    The diluted count fell from 18M to 18M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($451M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $5M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$403M28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity25%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$444Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $516M of capital spent building

$67M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 15% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.8M$18.1M$53M
2022$4.5M−$8.7M$13M
2023$7.0M$5.9M$74M
2024$6.9M$1.5M$71M
2025$7.4M−$751k$71M
2025$2.5M$2.9M$71M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Rogers Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.5% vs 10.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.3% early in the record and 8.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $219M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AVNTAvient$3.3B27%6.5%7%5%
HXLHexcel$1.9B24%11.6%11%9%
ASIXAdvanSix Inc. Common Stock$1.5B11%4.6%7%2%
CSWCSW Industrials Inc.$1.1B45%16.3%12%14%
BCPCBalchem$1.0B32%16.4%10%15%
ALTOAlto Ingredients Inc.$918M1%-1.8%-7%0%
ROGRogers Corporation$811M35%12.3%8%9%
ECVTEcovyst Inc.$724M27%11.8%4%12%
Group median27%11.7%8%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Rogers Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Rogers Corporation earns about $70M on its 8.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $70M on 18M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $222M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Rogers Corporation (ROG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ROG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ROCK its page in the Manual ROIV →

Industry order: ← REX the Chemicals chapter RPM →