Owner Scorecard


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SBGI, Sinclair Inc.

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a diversified media company with national reach and a strong focus on providing high-quality content on our local television stations and digital platform.

The content, distributed through our broadcast platform and third-party platforms, consists of programming provided by third-party networks and syndicators, local news, sports, other original programming produced by us and our owned networks, and professional sports.

We have interests in, own, manage and/or operate technical and software services companies, research and development for the advancement of broadcast technology, and other media and non-media related businesses and assets, including real estate, venture capital, private equity, and direct investments.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SBGI · Sinclair Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
−10.7% YoY · −15% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $4.0B
Operating margin 5.8% 5-yr avg 22.7%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 5.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 101% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2021–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$6.1B$3.9B$3.1B$3.5B$3.2B$3.2BRevenueRevenue
15%21%24%22%25%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$95M$4.0B($331M)$551M$173M$186MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.5%101.3%−10.6%15.5%5.5%5.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($414M)$2.7B($291M)$310M($112M)$64MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$327M$799M$235M$98M$189M$227MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$591M$321M$271M$250M$249M$252MDepreciationDeprec.
$90M($2.2B)$210M($513M)$1M($139M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$80M$105M$92M$84M$74M$73MCapexCapex
1.3%2.7%2.9%2.4%2.3%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$247M$694M$143M$14M$115M$154MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.0%17.7%4.6%0.4%3.6%4.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$247M$694M$143M$14M$115M$154MFree cash flowFCF
4.0%17.7%4.6%0.4%3.6%4.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$10M$0$0$29M$19MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$60M$70M$65M$66M$69M$70MDividends paidDiv. paid
$61M$120M$153M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
71%-7%11%ROICROIC
355%-102%53%-25%14%Return on equityROE
345%−125%42%−41%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$819M$884M$662M$697M$866M$844MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$612M$616M$637M$687M$631MReceivablesReceiv.
$397M$913M$416M$496M$475MAccounts payablePayables
$215M($297M)$221M$191M$156MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.5B$1.5B$1.7B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$608M$1.1B$605M$703M$672MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×1.3×2.5×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$6.7B$6.1B$5.9B$5.9B$5.8BTotal assetsAssets
$4.3B$4.2B$4.2B$4.4B$4.4BTotal debtDebt
$3.4B$3.6B$3.5B$3.6B$3.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.2×13.4×-1.1×1.8×0.4×0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.7B)$748M$285M$583M$443M$467MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.3%1.4%1.4%1.6%1.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
75.0M70.7M65.1M66.1M69.1M70.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$81.73$55.59$48.12$53.68$45.85$45.18Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-5.52$37.53$-4.47$4.69$-1.62$0.90EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.29$9.82$2.20$0.21$1.66$2.17Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.29$9.82$2.20$0.21$1.66$2.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.80$0.99$1.00$1.00$1.00$0.99Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.07$1.49$1.41$1.27$1.07$1.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-22.73$10.59$4.38$8.82$6.41$6.59Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
4-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−13.5%/yr−13.5%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share−15.7%/yr−15.7%/yr (4-yr)
Dividends / share+5.7%/yr+5.7%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+0.1%/yr+0.1%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2021–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
69Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
11%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
31.1×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$115Mowner earningsvs.($112M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2021FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $112M loss into $115M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($112M)$310M($291M)$2.7B($414M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$249M+$250M+$271M+$321M+$591M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$51M+$51M+$45M+$50M+$60M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1M−$513M+$210M−$2.2B+$90M
Cash from operations$189M$98M$235M$799M$327M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$74M−$84M−$92M−$105M−$80M
Owner earnings$115M$14M$143M$694M$247M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%0%5%18%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $51M), owner earnings is nearer $64M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $173M ÷ interest expense $395M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.6B · 20.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $866M − debt $4.4B
    What this means

    Netting $866M of cash and short-term investments against $4.4B of debt leaves $3.6B owed, about 20.6× a year's operating profit (25.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    3-yr median, range -7%–71%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range 0%–18%; latest $115M = operating cash $189M − maintenance capex $74M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $51M of SBC) leaves $64M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($112M) · cash from operations $189M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $69M ÷ Owner Earnings $115M
    What this means

    Of $115M Owner Earnings, $69M (60%) went back to shareholders, $69M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.30×
    Harvesting
    Capex $74M ÷ depreciation $249M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.4B vs $997M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (5-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (5)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.44/share (latest year $-1.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2021–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 5
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 51% → 10% (2-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 51% early to 10% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −39%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 39% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −10.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$844M
  • Receivables$631M
  • Other current assets$153M
Current liabilities$672M
  • Debt due within a year$23M
  • Accounts payable$475M
  • Other current liabilities$174M
Current ratio2.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.42×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$956Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$23M due · $844M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.5B$138M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$87Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$17M
'27$18M
'28$392M
'29$692M
'30$1.2B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$17Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$35Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.2Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$2.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $4.4B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$844M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$115M
Together, against $17M due next year56.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $959M against the $17M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 56 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2021–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$435M · 26%
  • Dividends$330M · 20%
  • Buybacks$334M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$549M · 33%
  • Returned to owners$664M

    55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $330M as dividends and $334M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$17.39

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $153M, about $17.39 each.

  • Net change in share count−5.6%

    The diluted count fell from 75M to 71M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−18%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $271M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.6B44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$39Mover 5 years buying other businesses, against $435M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021(a)$15.5M$13.9M$247M
2022(a)$9.6M$7.3M$694M
2023(a)$7.2M$7.6M$143M
2024(a)$10.5M$11.3M$14M
2025(a)$10.8M$12.0M$115M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$51M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 29% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sinclair Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.0% vs 10.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.8% early in the record and 2.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.77×

    Across the record the business reported $2.1B of net income but generated $1.6B of operating cash, a 0.77-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FOXFox Corporation$16.3B20.9%13%15%
VSNTVersant Media Group, Inc.$6.7B26.1%13%31%
NXSTNexstar Media Group Inc.$4.9B24.3%9%22%
FWONALiberty Media Corporation$4.5B73%13.6%4%18%
IHRTiHeartMedia Inc.$3.9B2.9%-1%2%
SBGISinclair Inc.$3.2B5.5%11%4%
GTNGray Media Inc.$3.1B25.1%8%15%
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.$2.3B51%15.8%13%12%
Group median18.4%10%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sinclair Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Sinclair Inc. earns about $128M on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−39%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $154M on 71M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $3.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sinclair Inc. (SBGI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SBGI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SBET its page in the Manual SBH →

Industry order: ← ROKU the Media & Broadcasting chapter SIRI →