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STRD, Strategy Inc
Strategy is the world's first and largest Bitcoin Treasury Company.
Our capital markets strategy generally involves issuing Class A common stock and preferred securities through at-the-market equity offering programs ("ATMs") when we deem advantageous.
We evaluate our bitcoin strategy on an ongoing basis in light of market conditions, our capital structure, our contractual obligations, and our anticipated operating needs for cash resources.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Product support (43%) and Subscription services (37%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 21% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −23%) on a 79% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Product support at 43%.
- Product support43%$204M
- Subscription services37%$176M
- Other services12%$58M
- License8%$40M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $514M | $504M | $498M | $486M | $481M | $511M | $499M | $496M | $463M | $477M | $490M | RevenueRevenue |
| 82% | 81% | 80% | 79% | 81% | 82% | 79% | 78% | 72% | 69% | 68% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 15% | 16% | 17% | 18% | 17% | 19% | 22% | 23% | 30% | 32% | 30% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 14% | 16% | 21% | 22% | 22% | 23% | 26% | 24% | 26% | 20% | 19% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $110M | $73M | $4M | ($1M) | ($14M) | ($785M) | ($1.3B) | ($115M) | ($1.9B) | ($5.4B) | ($14.0B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 21.3% | 14.5% | 0.8% | −0.2% | −2.8% | −153.6% | −255.5% | −23.2% | −399.8% | n/m | n/m | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $92M | $18M | $23M | $34M | ($8M) | ($535M) | ($1.5B) | $429M | ($1.2B) | ($3.8B) | ($12.2B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | — | -10% | 10% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $111M | $78M | $11M | $61M | $54M | $94M | $3M | $13M | ($53M) | ($67M) | ($51M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $20M | $16M | $4M | $9M | $13M | $11M | $11M | $15M | $18M | $26M | $28M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($13M) | $30M | ($30M) | $8M | $37M | $574M | $1.4B | ($501M) | $1.0B | $3.7B | $12.0B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $4M | $7M | $10M | $4M | $3M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $8M | $6M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 0.8% | 1.4% | 2.1% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 1.7% | 1.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $108M | $74M | $4M | $51M | $50M | $91M | $725K | $10M | ($56M) | ($75M) | ($57M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 21.1% | 14.8% | 0.8% | 10.4% | 10.4% | 17.8% | 0.1% | 2.0% | −12.1% | −15.8% | −11.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $108M | $74M | $4M | $51M | $50M | $91M | $725K | $10M | ($56M) | ($75M) | ($57M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 21.1% | 14.8% | 0.8% | 10.4% | 10.4% | 17.8% | 0.1% | 2.0% | −12.1% | −15.8% | −11.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $111M | $73M | $123M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 53% | 20% | 1% | -2% | -1% | -20% | -52% | -2% | -6% | -9% | -26% | ROICROIC |
| 16% | 3% | 4% | 7% | -2% | -55% | — | 20% | -6% | -9% | -33% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | 3% | 4% | 7% | −2% | −55% | — | 20% | −6% | −9% | −33% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $589M | $675M | $576M | $566M | $60M | $63M | $44M | $47M | $38M | $2.3B | $2.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $83M | $165M | $171M | $164M | $197M | $189M | $189M | $184M | $181M | $206M | $122M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $37M | $31M | $34M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $34M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $47M | $135M | $138M | $164M | $197M | $189M | $189M | $184M | $181M | $206M | $89M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $685M | $861M | $778M | $753M | $273M | $268M | $265M | $268M | $252M | $2.6B | $2.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $185M | $271M | $258M | $270M | $286M | $312M | $317M | $323M | $355M | $456M | $395M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.7× | 3.2× | 3.0× | 2.8× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 5.6× | 6.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $768M | $933M | $856M | $917M | $1.5B | $3.6B | $2.4B | $4.8B | $25.8B | $61.6B | $54.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $0 | $486M | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $7.2B | $8.2B | $8.2B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | ($566M) | $427M | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $7.2B | $5.9B | $6.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $566M | $606M | $530M | $509M | $446M | $979M | ($383M) | $2.2B | $18.2B | $44.1B | $36.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.3% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 2.1% | 2.3% | 8.6% | 12.7% | 14.0% | 16.6% | 11.2% | 11.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 11.5M | 11.5M | 11.4M | 10.3M | 9.7M | 10.0M | 113M | 166M | 193M | 278M | 334M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $44.60 | $43.63 | $43.61 | $47.09 | $49.64 | $50.97 | $4.41 | $3.00 | $2.41 | $1.72 | $1.47 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $8.01 | $1.58 | $1.97 | $3.33 | $-0.78 | $-53.44 | $-12.98 | $2.59 | $-6.06 | $-13.86 | $-36.46 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $9.40 | $6.44 | $0.33 | $4.91 | $5.16 | $9.09 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $-0.29 | $-0.27 | $-0.17 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $9.40 | $6.44 | $0.33 | $4.91 | $5.16 | $9.09 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $-0.29 | $-0.27 | $-0.17 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.20 | $0.34 | $0.60 | $0.99 | $0.38 | $0.27 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $49.18 | $52.46 | $46.42 | $49.24 | $46.08 | $97.70 | $-3.38 | $13.07 | $94.68 | $158.91 | $109.76 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×11.3 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −30.4%/yr | −49.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −19.3%/yr | −39.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.9%/yr | +28.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Subscription services+64.5%
“Subscription services revenues increased by $68.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to the same periods in the prior year, primarily due to conversions to cloud-based subscriptions from existing on-premises customers, a net increase in the use of subscription services by existing customers, and sales contracts with new customers. •Product support revenues.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $3.8B loss into ($75M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($3.8B) | ($1.2B) | $429M | ($1.5B) | ($535M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$26M | +$18M | +$15M | +$11M | +$11M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$53M | +$77M | +$70M | +$64M | +$44M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$3.7B | +$1.0B | −$501M | +$1.4B | +$574M |
| Cash from operations | ($67M) | ($53M) | $13M | $3M | $94M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$8M | −$3M | −$3M | −$2M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($75M) | ($56M) | $10M | $725K | $91M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -16% | -12% | 2% | 0% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $53M), owner earnings is nearer ($129M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $2.3B − debt $8.2B
What this means
Netting $2.3B of cash and short-term investments against $8.2B of debt leaves $5.9B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 157 + DIO 0 − DPO 82 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -52%–53%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($4.3B) ÷ invested capital $50.0BIndustry peers: median -67%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -16%–21%; latest ($75M) = operating cash ($67M) − maintenance capex $8MIndustry peers: median 26%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -16% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $53M of SBC) leaves ($129M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($67M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($3.8B) · cash from operations ($67M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.32×HarvestingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $26M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $477M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.62×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $8.2B vs $2.1B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −3550%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.58/share (latest year $-11.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $132.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → −521% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to −521% lately, median −23% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −8%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2025 · −1140.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$2.2B
- Receivables$122M
- Other current assets$62M
- Debt due within a year$31M
- Accounts payable$34M
- Other current liabilities$330M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $304M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$46M · 15%
- Buybacks$307M · 101%
- Returned to owners$307M
119% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $307M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$50M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $50M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $307M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count2799.6%
The diluted count rose from 12M to 334M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Saylor | $2.8M | $2.8M | $91M |
| 2022 | Mr. Le | $20.2M | −$15.8M | $725K |
| 2022 | Mr. Saylor | $671k | $671k | $725K |
| 2023 | Mr. Le | $8.0M | $63.6M | $10M |
| 2024 | Mr. Le | $15.7M | $220.9M | ($56M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Le | $13.8M | −$52.9M | ($75M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$53M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Strategy Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−8.6% vs 12.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.2% early in the record and −8.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?2799.6%
Diluted shares grew 2799.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $307M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 25% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $83M to $122M while revenue grew −5%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 25% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENVAEnova International Inc. | $3.2B | 50% | 21.6% | 10% | 56% |
| CHYMChime Financial Inc. | $2.2B | 88% | -18.4% | -88% | 2% |
| STRDStrategy Inc | $477M | 80% | -13.0% | -2% | 6% |
| WLTHWealthfront Corporation | $365M | 90% | 37.2% | -46% | — |
| LPROOpen Lending Corporation | $93M | 77% | 53.2% | 45% | 50% |
| SBETSharplink Inc. | $28M | 31% | -294.4% | -308% | -117% |
| ZSQRZ Squared Inc. | $1M | 87% | -956.9% | -287% | — |
| Group median | — | 80% | -13.0% | -46% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Strategy Inc has delivered.
Strategy Inc’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Strategy Inc earns about $30M on its 6.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −15.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($57M) on 334M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $6.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← STRC its page in the Manual STRF →
Industry order: ← STRC the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter STRF →