Owner Scorecard


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STRL, Sterling Infrastructure

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive CyclicalSerial acquirer

Infrastructure Solutions provides advanced, large-scale site development services and mission-critical electrical services for data centers, semiconductor fabrication, manufacturing, distribution centers, warehousing, power generation and more.

Transportation Solutions includes infrastructure and rehabilitation projects for highways, roads, bridges, airports, ports, rail and storm drainage systems.

Building Solutions includes residential and commercial concrete foundations for single-family and multi-family homes, parking structures, elevated slabs, other concrete work, plumbing services, and surveys for new single-family residential builds.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
STRL · Sterling Infrastructure
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.5B
+17.7% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.9B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 18%
Operating margin 16.9% 5-yr avg 11.2%
ROIC 38% 5-yr avg 26%
Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 15%
Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 43% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 14% and operating margin about 7.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −0.7% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$690M$958M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.8B$2.0B$2.1B$2.5B$2.9BRevenueRevenue
6%9%11%10%15%14%16%17%20%23%23%Gross marginGross mgn
5%5%5%4%5%5%5%5%6%6%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($5M)$26M$43M$38M$93M$107M$160M$206M$265M$406M$488MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−0.7%2.7%4.1%3.4%7.5%7.6%9.0%10.4%12.5%16.3%16.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($9M)$12M$25M$40M$42M$63M$106M$139M$257M$290M$347MNet incomeNet inc.
1%6%31%28%28%26%25%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$44M$25M$39M$42M$123M$159M$219M$479M$497M$440M$521MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$17M$17M$21M$33M$34M$52M$57M$68M$77M$83MDepreciationDeprec.
$36M($7M)($6M)($22M)$36M$50M$48M$268M$152M$49M$66MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$11M$9M$13M$15M$33M$47M$61M$64M$81M$77M$79MCapexCapex
1.6%1.0%1.3%1.4%2.7%3.3%3.4%3.3%3.8%3.1%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$33M$15M$26M$27M$90M$125M$158M$414M$416M$363M$442MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.8%1.6%2.5%2.4%7.3%8.8%8.9%21.0%19.7%14.6%15.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$33M$15M$26M$27M$90M$112M$158M$414M$416M$363M$442MFree cash flowFCF
4.8%1.6%2.5%2.4%7.3%7.9%8.9%21.0%19.7%14.6%15.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$55M$0$396M$0$181M$18M$51M$11M$482M$444MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$5M$3M$0$0$0$0$71M$74MBuybacksBuybacks
-5%17%25%6%11%10%16%31%43%30%38%ROICROIC
-9%8%15%18%16%17%22%22%32%26%29%Return on equityROE
−9%8%15%18%16%17%22%22%32%26%29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$43M$84M$94M$46M$48M$61M$182M$472M$664M$391M$512MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M$5M$3M$2MInventoryInvent.
$67M$97M$99M$138M$95M$113M$122M$146M$130M$227M$234MAccounts payablePayables
($63M)($93M)($96M)$106M$20MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$176M$279M$303M$330M$362M$435M$597M$848M$1.0B$1.0B$1.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$147M$182M$179M$266M$322M$352M$447M$678M$742M$1.0B$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.5×1.7×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.3×1.3×1.4×1.0×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$55M$85M$85M$192M$192M$258M$263M$281M$265M$585M$585MGoodwillGoodwill
$302M$463M$483M$935M$953M$1.2B$1.4B$1.8B$2.0B$2.6B$2.8BTotal assetsAssets
$5M$99M$89M$433M$369M$452M$431M$342M$316M$291M$287MTotal debtDebt
($37M)$15M($5M)$387M$321M$391M$250M($130M)($348M)($100M)($224M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$107M$141M$164M$220M$267M$359M$475M$619M$808M$1.1B$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.9%0.8%0.7%0.7%0.9%1.0%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
23.1M26.7M27.2M27.1M28.2M29.1M30.6M31.2M31.1M30.9M31.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$29.82$35.86$38.16$41.53$43.51$48.60$57.89$63.20$67.93$80.46$92.94Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.40$0.43$0.93$1.47$1.50$2.15$3.48$4.44$8.27$9.38$11.17EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.44$0.57$0.97$0.98$3.19$4.29$5.18$13.27$13.36$11.72$14.23Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.44$0.57$0.97$0.98$3.19$3.86$5.18$13.27$13.36$11.72$14.23Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.47$0.35$0.48$0.57$1.17$1.60$1.99$2.06$2.60$2.50$2.55Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.64$5.29$6.05$8.11$9.48$12.33$15.53$19.83$25.94$35.82$38.33Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.7%/yr+13.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+26.2%/yr+29.7%/yr
EPS+44.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+20.4%/yr+16.5%/yr
Book value / share+25.5%/yr+30.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+53.4%
    “Operating income—Operating income was $346.0 million, or 23.6% of revenue, for 2025, an increase of $142.7 million compared to $203.4 million, or 22.0% of revenue, in the prior year. The increase in operating income is partly attributable to a $19.4 million (inclusive of $3.0 million of intangible amortization) contribution from the electrical and mechanical business acquired late in the third quarter 2025, and the remaining increases in operating income and margin were driven by a project mix shift toward large mission-critical projec…”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
31Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
30%low FY2016
Gross margin
23%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$363Mowner earningsvs.$290Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $290M of profit into $363M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$290M
Owner earnings$363M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$290M$257M$139M$106M$63M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$77M+$68M+$57M+$52M+$34M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$19M+$15M+$13M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$49M+$152M+$268M+$48M+$50M
Cash from operations$440M$497M$479M$219M$159M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$77M−$81M−$64M−$61M−$34M
Owner earnings$363M$416M$414M$158M$125M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$12M
Free cash flow$363M$416M$414M$158M$112M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%20%21%9%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $338M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $391M − debt $291M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $100M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 37 + DIO 1 − DPO 43 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–43%; 30% latest = NOPAT $303M ÷ invested capital $1.0B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 30% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–21%; latest $363M = operating cash $440M − maintenance capex $77M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $338M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $440M ÷ net income $290M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $74M ÷ Owner Earnings $363M
    What this means

    Of $363M Owner Earnings, $74M (20%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $74M buybacks. Net of $24M stock comp, the real buyback was about $50M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.00×
    Maintaining
    Capex $77M ÷ depreciation $77M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.01×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $291M vs $12M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +2390%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.45/share (latest year $9.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 13% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 38%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +36%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 36% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −0.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Risks include flawed algorithms, biased data, intense competition, and the inability to commercialize AI offerings effectively.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$512M
  • Receivables$252M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$428M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Debt due within a year$15M
  • Accounts payable$234M
  • Other current liabilities$834M
Current ratio1.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$111Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$15M due · $512M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+91.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$57Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($394M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$342M$55M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$696Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$412M · 20%
  • Buybacks$153M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.5B · 73%
  • Returned to owners$153M

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $153M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $282M and cash and short-term investments rose $469M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$167.23

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $5M, about $167.23 each.

  • Net change in share count34.1%

    The diluted count rose from 23M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained46%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($812M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $373M, so each retained $1 added about 0.46 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B43% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity53%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $412M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Cutillo$4.8M$11.0M$125M
2022Mr. Cutillo$5.2M$11.9M$158M
2023Mr. Cutillo$6.1M$17.8M$414M
2024Mr. Cutillo$16.9M$32.2M$416M
2025Mr. Cutillo$8.4M$35.3M$363M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio100:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sterling Infrastructure is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?34.1%

    Diluted shares grew 34.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $153M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
JJacobs Solutions$12.0B25%4.4%6%5%
KBRKbr, Inc.$7.8B12%6.4%13%4%
GVAGranite Construction$4.4B11%2.2%4%1%
MYRGMYR Group$3.7B11%3.5%12%3%
ROADConstruction Partners$2.8B15%7.0%8%5%
STRLSterling Infrastructure$2.5B15%7.6%16%8%
ORNOrion Group Holdings Inc. Common$852M9%0.3%-4%1%
CDNLCardinal Infrastructure Group Inc.$456M11.4%14%7%
Group median12%5.4%10%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sterling Infrastructure has delivered.

Sterling Infrastructure’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Sterling Infrastructure earns about $201M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $442M on 31M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $224M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sterling Infrastructure (STRL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/STRL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← STRK its page in the Manual STRO →

Industry order: ← STN the Construction & Engineering chapter TPC →