Owner Scorecard


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J, Jacobs Solutions

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive

Jacobs delivers innovative solutions to address the world's most complex challenges and create lasting value for clients, communities and society.

Guided by our values and our brand promise — Challenging today.

Our services span advisory and consulting, feasibility and planning, through to design, program delivery and lifecycle management — helping to create a more connected and sustainable world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
J · Jacobs Solutions
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.0B
+4.6% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $13.2B 5-yr avg $11.7B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 24%
Operating margin 4.5% 5-yr avg 6.0%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 4.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.4% to 7.2% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

38% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States62%$7.4B
  • Europe24%$2.9B
  • Middle East and Africa5%$596M
  • Australia and New Zealand5%$573M
  • Canada2%$248M
  • India1%$180M
  • Asia1%$145M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$11.0B$10.0B$15.0B$12.7B$13.6B$14.1B$9.8B$10.9B$11.5B$12.0B$13.2BRevenueRevenue
16%49%44%19%19%22%26%25%25%25%23%Gross marginGross mgn
13%10%12%16%15%17%21%19%19%18%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$339M$244M$387M$405M$536M$688M$540M$676M$692M$864M$598MOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.1%2.4%2.6%3.2%4.0%4.9%5.5%6.2%6.0%7.2%4.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$210M$294M$163M$848M$492M$477M$644M$666M$806M$289M$381MNet incomeNet inc.
26%20%4%10%37%9%13%14%43%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$680M$575M$481M($366M)$807M$726M$475M$975M$1.1B$687M$572MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$82M$76M$118M$90M$91M$101M$102M$103M$99M$82M$85MDepreciationDeprec.
$355M$166M$121M($1.4B)$176M$92M($325M)$131M$75M$254M$41MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$68M$118M$95M$136M$118M$93M$128M$137M$121M$79M$88MCapexCapex
0.6%1.2%0.6%1.1%0.9%0.7%1.3%1.3%1.1%0.7%0.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$612M$457M$386M($502M)$689M$633M$347M$837M$934M$607M$484MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.6%4.6%2.6%−3.9%5.1%4.5%3.5%7.7%8.1%5.0%3.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$612M$457M$386M($502M)$689M$633M$347M$837M$934M$607M$484MFree cash flowFCF
5.6%4.6%2.6%−3.9%5.1%4.5%3.5%7.7%8.1%5.0%3.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$50M$150M$1.5B$575M$862MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$6M$59M$87M$106M$98M$107M$116M$128M$143M$153M$158MDividends paidDiv. paid
$153M$97M$3M$854M$337M$275M$282M$266M$403M$754MBuybacksBuybacks
6%5%3%6%7%6%6%7%11%11%7%ROICROIC
5%7%3%15%8%8%11%10%18%8%12%Return on equityROE
5%5%1%13%7%6%9%8%15%4%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$656M$608M$635M$631M$862M$1.0B$1.1B$771M$1.1B$1.2B$1.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.1B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$3.2B$3.1B$3.4B$2.4B$2.8B$3.0B$3.6BReceivablesReceiv.
$522M$684M$776M$1.1B$1.1B$908M$967M$922M$1.0B$1.3B$1.5BAccounts payablePayables
$1.6B$1.4B$1.7B$1.8B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$2.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.9B$3.0B$4.6B$4.1B$4.5B$4.3B$4.7B$4.7B$4.9B$4.4B$5.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.8B$1.9B$3.1B$3.1B$2.9B$3.2B$3.3B$3.4B$4.1B$3.4B$3.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.4×1.3×1.5×1.3×1.5×1.4×1.2×1.3×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.1B$3.0B$4.8B$5.4B$5.6B$7.2B$7.2B$4.6B$4.8B$4.8B$4.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$7.4B$7.4B$12.6B$11.5B$12.4B$14.6B$14.7B$14.6B$11.8B$11.3B$11.9BTotal assetsAssets
$385M$235M$2.1B$1.2B$1.7B$2.9B$3.4B$2.9B$2.2B$2.2B$4.1BTotal debtDebt
($270M)($373M)$1.5B$570M$815M$1.9B$2.3B$2.1B$1.1B$1.0B$2.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
22.2×20.3×5.0×4.8×8.6×9.5×5.4×4.0×4.1×5.9×4.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.3B$4.4B$5.9B$5.7B$5.8B$5.9B$6.1B$6.5B$4.5B$3.6B$3.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.5%0.7%0.6%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
121M120M138M139M133M131M129M127M126M122M118MShares out (diluted)Shares
$90.25$83.42$108.95$91.50$102.22$107.35$75.58$85.30$91.36$98.66$111.38Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.73$2.44$1.19$6.09$3.71$3.63$4.98$5.23$6.40$2.37$3.23EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.04$3.80$2.81$-3.61$5.19$4.83$2.68$6.58$7.42$4.98$4.09Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.04$3.80$2.81$-3.61$5.19$4.83$2.68$6.58$7.42$4.98$4.09Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.49$0.63$0.76$0.74$0.82$0.90$1.01$1.13$1.26$1.34Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.56$0.98$0.69$0.98$0.89$0.71$0.99$1.08$0.96$0.65$0.75Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$35.11$36.86$42.57$41.05$43.82$45.25$46.82$51.46$36.14$29.86$27.84Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.0%/yr−0.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−0.1%/yr−0.8%/yr
EPS+3.6%/yr−8.5%/yr
Dividends / share+43.6%/yr+11.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.7%/yr−6.1%/yr
Book value / share−1.8%/yr−7.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
122Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
11%low FY2018
Gross margin
25%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$607Mowner earningsvs.$289Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $289M of profit into $607M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$289M
Owner earnings$607M · 5% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$289M$806M$666M$644M$477M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$82M+$99M+$103M+$102M+$101M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$61M+$74M+$74M+$53M+$56M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$254M+$75M+$131M−$325M+$92M
Cash from operations$687M$1.1B$975M$475M$726M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$79M−$121M−$137M−$128M−$93M
Owner earnings$607M$934M$837M$347M$633M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%8%8%4%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $61M), owner earnings is nearer $547M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $864M ÷ interest expense $146M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.0B · 1.2× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $1.2B − debt $2.2B
    What this means

    Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $1.0B owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–11%; 11% latest = NOPAT $495M ÷ invested capital $4.6B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $607M = operating cash $687M − maintenance capex $79M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 5%)
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $61M of SBC) leaves $547M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $687M ÷ net income $289M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $907M ÷ Owner Earnings $607M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $607M of Owner Earnings, $907M (149%) went back to shareholders, $153M dividends, $754M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $61M stock comp, the real buyback was about $693M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.97×
    Maintaining
    Capex $79M ÷ depreciation $82M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs $1.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +164%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.97/share (latest year $2.45), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 6% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 2.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Page 26 We will also need to continue to respond to and anticipate changes resulting from artificial intelligence and other similarly disruptive technologies.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 27, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
  • Receivables$3.6B
  • Other current assets$287M
Current liabilities$3.6B
  • Accounts payable$1.5B
  • Other current liabilities$2.2B
Current ratio1.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+27.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.6B$474M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.7B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$131M
'27$107M
'28$88M
'29$66M
'30$49M
later$87M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$131Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$528Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$473Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$473M
Total fixed claims on the business$2.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.7B, of which the leases are 17%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Sep 26, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$1.1B · 18%
  • Dividends$1.0B · 16%
  • Buybacks$3.4B · 56%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$575M · 9%
  • Returned to owners$4.4B

    89% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.0B as dividends and $3.4B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.7B and cash and short-term investments rose $716M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $3.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−2.6%

    The diluted count fell from 121M to 118M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.26/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 44% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.5B49% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Demetriou$16.3M$39.0M$633M
2022Demetriou$14.6M$16.1M$347M
2023Demetriou$6.4M$16.4M$837M
2023Pragada$10.9M$15.7M$837M
2024Pragada$12.1M$15.6M$934M
2025Pragada$14.0M$14.8M$607M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$61M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Jacobs Solutions is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$385M → $4.1B

    Debt rose from $385M to $4.1B while owner earnings went from about $485M to $793M — about 0.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 27% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $2.1B to $3.6B while revenue grew 20%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FLRFluor Corporation$15.5B3%1.2%8%0%
MTZMasTec$14.3B4.8%8%5%
JJacobs Solutions$12.0B25%4.4%6%5%
KBRKbr, Inc.$7.8B12%6.4%13%4%
PRIMPrimoris Services$7.6B11%4.5%12%2%
GVAGranite Construction$4.4B11%2.2%4%1%
ROADConstruction Partners$2.8B15%7.0%8%5%
STRLSterling Infrastructure$2.5B15%7.6%16%8%
Group median12%4.7%8%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Jacobs Solutions has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Jacobs Solutions earns about $578M on its 4.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $484M on 118M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $2.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($88M) runs well above depreciation ($85M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $493M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Jacobs Solutions (J), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/J, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IXHL its page in the Manual JACK →

Industry order: ← IESC the Construction & Engineering chapter JLHL →