Owner Scorecard


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TGLS, Tecnoglass Inc.

Building Products capital-intensive

Tecnoglass is a leading vertically integrated manufacturer, supplier and installer of high-end aluminum and vinyl windows and architectural glass for the global commercial and residential construction markets.

Tecnoglass supplies over 1,000 customers in North, Central and South America, with the United States accounting for 96% of revenues.

Our expertise extends to the production of top-quality windows, as well as the supply of aluminum, vinyl, and other components.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TGLS · Tecnoglass Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$984M
+10.5% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $784M
Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 21.4% 5-yr avg 27.1%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 28%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 15%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 11% to 32% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 20%, above 15% in 5 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$305M$314M$371M$431M$377M$497M$717M$833M$890M$984M$1.0BRevenueRevenue
37%32%32%32%37%41%49%47%43%43%42%Gross marginGross mgn
9%10%9%8%9%7%8%8%8%9%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$48M$34M$47M$59M$66M$117M$226M$260M$227M$231M$216MOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.7%10.9%12.7%13.6%17.4%23.5%31.6%31.2%25.5%23.5%21.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M$5M$9M$25M$24M$68M$156M$183M$161M$160M$149MNet incomeNet inc.
41%52%40%35%35%29%32%30%28%32%32%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($3M)$14M($5M)$26M$72M$117M$142M$139M$171M$136M$96MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$21M$23M$23M$21M$21M$20M$22M$26M$37M$40MDepreciationDeprec.
($42M)($12M)($37M)($22M)$27M$28M($34M)($66M)($17M)($61M)($94M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M$7M$13M$25M$18M$52M$71M$78M$80M$101M$88MCapexCapex
7.5%2.2%3.5%5.8%4.9%10.4%10.0%9.4%8.9%10.3%8.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($19M)$7M($18M)$712K$53M$96M$122M$117M$144M$99M$55MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−6.1%2.3%−4.9%0.2%14.2%19.4%17.1%14.0%16.2%10.1%5.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($26M)$7M($18M)$712K$53M$66M$71M$61M$91M$34M$7MFree cash flowFCF
−8.5%2.3%−4.9%0.2%14.2%13.2%9.9%7.3%10.2%3.5%0.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$8M$6M$34M$7M$7MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$741K$2M$3M$5M$4M$5M$13M$16M$20M$28M$28MDividends paidDiv. paid
10%6%10%12%23%37%31%27%20%16%ROICROIC
20%5%7%13%11%28%45%33%26%22%20%Return on equityROE
20%2%5%10%10%26%41%30%22%18%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$28M$43M$34M$50M$70M$87M$106M$132M$138M$104M$94MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$92M$110M$93M$111M$89M$111M$158M$166M$203M$239M$264MReceivablesReceiv.
$55M$72M$92M$83M$81M$85M$125M$159M$140M$214M$253MInventoryInvent.
$39M$55M$66M$62M$42M$68M$90M$83M$99M$127M$151MAccounts payablePayables
$108M$127M$119M$131M$128M$127M$193M$243M$244M$326M$367MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$211M$262M$293M$323M$285M$326M$432M$536M$560M$654M$720MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$78M$121M$123M$129M$94M$155M$210M$236M$266M$352M$406MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.2×2.4×2.5×3.0×2.1×2.1×2.3×2.1×1.9×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1M$23M$24M$24M$24M$24M$24M$24M$24M$30M$30MGoodwillGoodwill
$395M$468M$490M$570M$530M$592M$734M$963M$1.0B$1.3B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$200M$224M$242M$260M$224M$199M$169M$170M$109M$172M$268MTotal debtDebt
$171M$182M$208M$210M$154M$112M$64M$38M($28M)$68M$174MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.8×1.7×2.2×2.6×3.2×13.8×33.4×32.7×36.5×38.7×48.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$114M$120M$132M$187M$208M$244M$349M$548M$631M$713M$735MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.1%0.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
33.4M37.4M39.5M44.5M46.4M47.7M47.7M47.5M47.0M46.7M44.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.13$8.41$9.39$9.69$8.12$10.42$15.03$17.54$18.94$21.07$22.64Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.69$0.15$0.23$0.55$0.51$1.43$3.27$3.85$3.43$3.42$3.34EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.56$0.19$-0.46$0.02$1.15$2.02$2.56$2.46$3.07$2.12$1.24Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.78$0.19$-0.46$0.02$1.15$1.38$1.48$1.28$1.94$0.74$0.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02$0.07$0.07$0.12$0.08$0.11$0.27$0.35$0.42$0.60$0.62Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.69$0.19$0.33$0.56$0.39$1.08$1.50$1.64$1.69$2.17$1.97Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.40$3.22$3.35$4.20$4.48$5.12$7.32$11.54$13.43$15.28$16.47Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.7%/yr+21.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.0%/yr
EPS+19.4%/yr+46.0%/yr
Dividends / share+44.3%/yr+49.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.7%/yr+40.6%/yr
Book value / share+18.2%/yr+27.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
47Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
20%low FY2017
Gross margin
43%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.7×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$99Mowner earningsvs.$160Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $99M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $37M it takes just to hold its position. It put $64M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $34M.

Reported net income$160M
Owner earnings$99M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$160M$161M$183M$156M$68M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$37M+$26M+$22M+$20M+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$61M−$17M−$66M−$34M+$28M
Cash from operations$136M$171M$139M$142M$117M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$37M−$26M−$22M−$20M−$21M
Owner earnings$99M$144M$117M$122M$96M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$64M−$53M−$56M−$52M−$31M
Free cash flow$34M$91M$61M$71M$66M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%16%14%17%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $37M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $64M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $231M ÷ interest expense $6M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $110M · 0.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $101M + ST investments $3M − debt $214M
    What this means

    Netting $104M of cash and short-term investments against $214M of debt leaves $110M owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (0.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 89 + DIO 139 − DPO 83 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 6%–37%; 19% latest = NOPAT $156M ÷ invested capital $826M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -6%–19%; latest $99M = operating cash $136M − maintenance capex $37M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. It chose to put $64M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $34M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $284K of SBC) leaves $99M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $136M ÷ net income $160M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $51M ÷ Owner Earnings $99M
    What this means

    Of $99M Owner Earnings, $51M (52%) went back to shareholders, $28M dividends, $23M buybacks. Net of $284K stock comp, the real buyback was about $23M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.75×
    Expanding
    Capex $101M ÷ depreciation $37M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $984M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $214M vs $302M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +1238%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.78/share (latest year $3.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.07/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 13% early to 27% lately, median 17% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 41%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2017 · 10.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$720M
  • Cash & short-term investments$94M
  • Receivables$264M
  • Inventory$253M
  • Other current assets$108M
Current liabilities$406M
  • Debt due within a year$6M
  • Accounts payable$151M
  • Other current liabilities$250M
Current ratio1.77×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.15×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$314Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $94M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$692Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$95MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$200Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$163Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $808M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$468M · 58%
  • Dividends$97M · 12%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$242M · 30%
  • Returned to owners$97M

    16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $97M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count33.6%

    The diluted count rose from 33M to 45M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.60/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 44% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained18%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($716M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $130M, so each retained $1 added about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Jose M. Daes$2.8M$2.8M$122M
2023Jose M. Daes$4.0M$4.0M$117M
2024Jose M. Daes$4.4M$4.4M$144M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$284K

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tecnoglass Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?33.6%

    Diluted shares grew 33.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CRHCRH Public Limited Company$37.4B34%12.0%12%9%
AMRZAmrize Ltd$11.8B26%16.2%12%
OCOwens Corning Inc Common Stock New$10.1B25%12.4%8%11%
OIO-I Glass Inc.$6.4B18%5.5%6%3%
JHXJames Hardie Industries plc.$4.8B39%16.9%16%15%
EXPEagle Materials$2.3B28.6%18%20%
APOGApogee Enterprises Inc.$1.4B23%7.5%11%6%
TGLSTecnoglass Inc.$984M39%20.5%20%12%
Group median26%14.3%12%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tecnoglass Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Tecnoglass Inc. earns about $119M on its 12.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+91%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $7M on 44M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $174M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($88M) runs well above depreciation ($40M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $59M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tecnoglass Inc. (TGLS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TGLS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TFX its page in the Manual TGT →

Industry order: ← SWK the Building Products chapter TREX →