Share count
374Mpeak FY2025
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TPG, TPG Inc.
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
We offer a broad range of investment strategies across the alternative asset management landscape, primarily in private equity, credit and real estate, and have constructed a high-quality base of assets under management within attractive sub-segments of these asset classes.
Our investment and operations professionals are organized into industry sector teams, which share investment themes across platforms to drive firmwide pattern recognition.
Through multiple decades of experience, we have developed an ecosystem of insight, engagement and collaboration across our platforms and products, which currently include more than 400 active portfolio companies, approximately 300 real estate properties and over 6,400 credit positions, across more than 33 countries.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.4B
+16.1% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Net margin 6.3% 5-yr avg 4.3%
Revenue $500M −51.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income ($123M) yr-ago $88M
Net margin −24.7% yr-ago 8.5%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Management fees (75%) and Expense reimbursements and other (12%), with 3 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating margin has been modest for a fee business (median 6%). It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 3%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Management fees is 75% of revenue, with Expense reimbursements and other the other meaningful line at 12%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Management fees75%$1.8B
- Expense reimbursements and other12%$288M
- Transaction fees10%$231M
- Incentive fees2%$49M
- Monitoring fees1%$29M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $883M | $978M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 1.1% | 0.9% | 10.0% | 9.1% | 3.6% | 10.4% | 8.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| 0.0% | 0.0% | 7.4% | 5.2% | 1.1% | 7.6% | 6.3% | Net marginNet mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $92M | $80M | $23M | $185M | $158M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 26% | 43% | — | 27% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| — | — | 3% | 2% | 1% | 4% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 3% | 2% | 1% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| — | $9.0B | $7.9B | $9.4B | $10.5B | $13.5B | $13.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $858M | $973M | $1.1B | $665M | $808M | $826M | $851M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $3.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| — | 0K | 309M | 318M | 365M | 374M | 384M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | $4.04 | $4.83 | $5.72 | $6.48 | $6.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | $0.30 | $0.25 | $0.06 | $0.49 | $0.41 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $9.99 | $10.57 | $9.85 | $11.06 | $9.71 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +17.1%/yr (3-yr) | +17.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | +18.1%/yr (3-yr) | +18.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +3.4%/yr (3-yr) | +3.4%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$2.4Blow FY2020
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Operating margin 10.4%Modest fee marginOperating income $252M ÷ revenue $2.4BIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.
- Net margin 7.6%SolidNet income $185M ÷ revenue $2.4B
What this means
What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.
- Below the cost of equityNet income $185M ÷ equity $4.1BIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“See "—Artificial intelligence and other machine learning techniques could increase competitive, operational, legal and regulatory risks to our businesses in ways that we cannot predict."”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$6Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$898Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$605Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$1.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$605M
Total fixed claims on the business$2.3B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.3B, of which the leases are 26%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Winkelried | $34.1M | $35.1M | $92M |
| 2023 | Mr. Winkelried | $198.7M | $298.2M | $80M |
| 2024 | Mr. Winkelried | $32.8M | $244.2M | $23M |
| 2025 | Mr. Winkelried | $29.9M | $47.6M | $185M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Op. margin | Net margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LAZLazard | $3.2B | 18.5% | 11.6% | 44% |
| JHGJanus Henderson Group plc | $3.1B | 25.0% | 18.8% | 10% |
| OWLBlue Owl Capital | $2.9B | 14.3% | 2.7% | 4% |
| HLIHoulihan Lokey | $2.6B | 20.5% | 16.1% | 18% |
| MORNMorningstar Inc. | $2.4B | 17.4% | 15.2% | 17% |
| TPGTPG Inc. | $2.4B | 6.4% | 3.2% | 3% |
| AMGAffiliated Managers Group Inc. | $2.1B | 42.8% | 24.3% | 17% |
| STEPStepStone Group | $2.0B | 25.0% | 4.0% | 18% |
| Group median | — | 19.5% | 13.4% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFTPG Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered24%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TPG Inc. (TPG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TPG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TPC its page in the Manual TPGXL →
Industry order: ← TOP the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter TPGXL →