Owner Scorecard


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TVTX, Travere Therapeutics

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a biopharmaceutical company headquartered in San Diego, California, focused on identifying, developing and delivering life-changing therapies to people living with rare kidney and metabolic diseases.

Sparsentan is also in late-stage development for focal segmental glomerulosclerosis (" FSGS").

Our research and development efforts are at the forefront of our mission to address the unmet needs of patients and we support this innovation by reinvesting revenues from our commercialized products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TVTX · Travere Therapeutics
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$491M
+110.5% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $536M 5-yr avg $222M
Operating margin −10.6% 5-yr avg −172.5%
ROIC −14% 5-yr avg −54%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg −126%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg −126%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is FILSPARI (66%), Tiopronin products (18%) and License (16%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −89% through the cycle on a 97% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 16% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −35%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

FILSPARI is 66% of revenue, with Tiopronin products the other meaningful line at 18%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • FILSPARI66%$322M
  • Tiopronin products18%$88M
  • License16%$80M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$134M$155M$164M$175M$198M$132M$109M$145M$233M$491M$536MRevenueRevenue
97%98%97%97%97%97%96%92%98%99%Gross marginGross mgn
69%65%63%74%68%96%180%183%113%69%67%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
53%50%75%80%66%153%7%169%93%42%40%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($58M)($54M)($80M)($137M)($176M)($199M)($320M)($388M)($324M)($63M)($57M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−43.6%−34.7%−48.7%−78.3%−88.8%−151.3%−292.2%−267.2%−138.9%−12.8%−10.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($48M)($60M)($103M)($146M)($169M)($180M)($278M)($111M)($322M)($26M)($21M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($3M)$7M($25M)($58M)($43M)($15M)($186M)($280M)($237M)$38M$40MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$18M$19M$20M$25M$13M$21M$39M$44M$61M$73MDepreciationDeprec.
($775K)$22M$39M$47M$78M$123M$33M($251M)$4M($42M)($62M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1M$887K$727K$195K$7M$5M$191K$668K$668KCapexCapex
1.1%0.6%0.4%0.1%3.4%3.9%0.2%0.5%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($5M)$7M($26M)($58M)($50M)($20M)($186M)($281M)$39MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.6%4.2%−15.6%−33.3%−25.0%−15.1%−170.4%−193.3%7.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($5M)$7M($26M)($58M)($50M)($20M)($186M)($281M)$39MFree cash flowFCF
−3.6%4.2%−15.6%−33.3%−25.0%−15.1%−170.4%−193.3%7.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$615K$0$0$0$95M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
-15%-18%-15%-30%-41%-43%-71%-59%-82%-15%-14%ROICROIC
-16%-20%-32%-66%-80%-60%-650%-55%-544%-22%-22%Return on equityROE
−16%−20%−32%−66%−80%−60%−650%−55%−544%−22%−22%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$256M$301M$103M$62M$85M$166M$62M$58M$59M$93M$245MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M$14M$13M$18M$16M$16M$17M$21M$27M$80M$87MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$5M$6M$6M$8M$7M$5M$9M$42M$36M$37MInventoryInvent.
$8M$19M$7M$27M$12M$15M$17M$42M$24M$25M$13MAccounts payablePayables
$14M$285K$11M($2M)$11M$8M$4M($11M)$45M$91M$111MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$332M$326M$496M$429M$410M$583M$486M$617M$417M$438M$393MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$83M$86M$105M$95M$93M$124M$142M$178M$201M$160M$125MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.0×3.8×4.7×4.5×4.4×4.7×3.4×3.5×2.1×2.7×3.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$936K$936K$936K$936K$900K$900K$800K$800K$800K$800KGoodwillGoodwill
$525M$520M$709M$605M$607M$777M$673M$789M$594M$605M$555MTotal assetsAssets
$44M$45M$195M$205M$215M$227M$376M$377M$310M$312M$312MTotal debtDebt
($211M)($256M)$92M$142M$131M$61M$314M$319M$252M$219M$67MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-12.3×-12.2×-8.2×-7.3×-9.2×-10.1×-29.1×-34.3×-29.0×-5.8×-5.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$308M$293M$318M$221M$211M$302M$43M$201M$59M$115M$99MShareholders’ equityEquity
21.8%17.3%12.0%12.0%11.9%22.4%34.8%30.5%15.8%9.1%9.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
38.3M38.8M40.4M42.3M47.5M59.8M63.8M74.3M78.9M89.2M91.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.49$4.00$4.06$4.14$4.17$2.20$1.72$1.96$2.96$5.50$5.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.25$-1.54$-2.54$-3.46$-3.56$-3.01$-4.37$-1.50$-4.08$-0.29$-0.23EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.13$0.17$-0.64$-1.38$-1.04$-0.33$-2.92$-3.78$0.42Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.13$0.17$-0.64$-1.38$-1.04$-0.33$-2.92$-3.78$0.42Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.02$0.02$0.00$0.14$0.09$0.00$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.04$7.56$7.87$5.22$4.44$5.05$0.67$2.70$0.75$1.29$1.07Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.2%/yr+5.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−18.4%/yr (7-yr)−12.9%/yr
Book value / share−18.4%/yr−21.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
89Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−15%low FY2024
Gross margin
98%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($281M)owner earningsvs.($111M)net incomelow FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2023 the business reported a $111M loss but ($281M) of owner earnings: $169M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020FY2019
Reported net income($111M)($278M)($180M)($169M)($146M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$39M+$21M+$13M+$25M+$20M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$44M+$38M+$30M+$24M+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$251M+$33M+$123M+$78M+$47M
Cash from operations($280M)($186M)($15M)($43M)($58M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$668K−$191K−$5M−$7M−$195K
Owner earnings($281M)($186M)($20M)($50M)($58M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-193%-170%-15%-25%-33%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $44M), owner earnings is nearer ($325M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($63M) ÷ interest expense $11M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $93M + ST investments $201M − debt $312M
    What this means

    Netting $294M of cash and short-term investments against $312M of debt leaves $17M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 60 + DIO 1276 − DPO 876 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -82%–-15%; -15% latest = NOPAT ($50M) ÷ invested capital $334M
    Industry peers: median -25%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $37M = operating cash $38M − maintenance capex $668K (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median -25%)
    Industry peers: median -38%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -25% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves ($8M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($26M) · cash from operations $38M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $37M
    What this means

    Of $37M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.01×
    Harvesting
    Capex $668K ÷ depreciation $61M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $491M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.74×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $312M vs $278M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.64/share (latest year $-0.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −42% → −140% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    The recent-years average (−140%) sits below the early years (−42%), but the latest year (−13%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −89% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2022 · −292.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we are unable to use AI/ML and/or automated decision-making technologies in the future, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$393M
  • Cash & short-term investments$245M
  • Receivables$87M
  • Inventory$37M
  • Other current assets$24M
Current liabilities$125M
  • Accounts payable$13M
  • Other current liabilities$113M
Current ratio3.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.95×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$267Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+55.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 3.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($12M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($64M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$62M$16M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$115M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity1%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$96Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $16M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021(1)$5.7M$6.6M($20M)
2022(1)$5.8M$687k($186M)
2023(1)$7.6M$885k($281M)
2024(1)$5.2M$10.9M
2025(1)$8.5M$24.5M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio23:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$45M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Travere Therapeutics is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−24.5% vs −5.0%

    The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −5.0%) and the loss has widened to −24.5% across the last three years, with the latest year at −15.1%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$44M → $312M

    Debt rose from $44M to $312M while owner earnings went from about ($8M) to ($162M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 23% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $21M to $124M while revenue grew 301%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CPRXCatalyst Pharmaceuticals Inc.$589M86%35.9%48%37%
MIRMMirum Pharmaceuticals Inc.$521M-58.6%-61%-38%
BBIOBridgeBio Pharma Inc.$502M96%-659.6%-627%
TVTXTravere Therapeutics$491M97%-83.6%-35%-20%
NATRNature's Sunshine Products Inc.$480M73%4.3%12%4%
ZLABZai Lab Limited$457M65%-338.0%-103%-281%
INVAInnoviva Inc.$411M85.6%44%63%
ARDXArdelyx Inc.$407M87%-138.7%-82%-232%
Group median86%-71.1%-35%-29%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Travere Therapeutics has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $39M on 93M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $67M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Travere Therapeutics (TVTX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TVTX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TTWO its page in the Manual TW →

Industry order: ← TRLV the Pharmaceuticals chapter UPB →