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TRLV, Trulieve Cannabis Corp.
Trulieve Cannabis Corp. operates in highly regulated markets that require expertise in cultivation, manufacturing, and retail.
The Company's Subordinate Voting Shares (as hereinafter defined) are listed for trading on the Canadian Securities Exchange ("CSE") under the symbol "TRUL" and are also traded in the United States on the OTCQX Best Market ("OTCQX") under the symbol "TCNNF".
Headquartered in Tallahassee, Florida, we are the largest cannabis retailer in the United States with market leading retail operations in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 48% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 60% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 45% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 2 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $253M | $522M | $932M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 76% | 74% | 61% | 57% | 52% | 60% | 60% | 60% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 6% | 7% | 11% | 14% | 34% | 43% | 38% | 37% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $113M | $218M | $204M | $50M | ($222M) | $98M | $143M | $146M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 44.8% | 41.9% | 21.9% | 4.1% | −19.6% | 8.2% | 12.1% | 12.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $53M | $63M | $17M | ($253M) | ($527M) | ($155M) | ($116M) | ($81M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $19M | $100M | $13M | $23M | $202M | $271M | $273M | $277M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $5M | $13M | $46M | $116M | $110M | $113M | $118M | $118M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($39M) | $21M | ($60M) | $141M | $608M | $294M | $251M | $220M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $72M | $100M | $276M | $165M | $40M | $123M | $44M | $37M | CapexCapex |
| 28.4% | 19.2% | 29.6% | 13.5% | 3.6% | 10.3% | 3.7% | 3.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $14M | $87M | ($33M) | ($93M) | $162M | $149M | $229M | $241M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.5% | 16.7% | −3.5% | −7.7% | 14.3% | 12.5% | 19.4% | 20.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($53M) | ($298K) | ($263M) | ($142M) | $162M | $149M | $229M | $241M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −20.9% | −0.1% | −28.2% | −11.6% | 14.3% | 12.5% | 19.4% | 20.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $20M | $28M | $0 | $28M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| 141% | 36% | 4% | — | -11% | 4% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 40% | 14% | 1% | -13% | -37% | -12% | -10% | -7% | Return on equityROE |
| 40% | 14% | 1% | −13% | −37% | −12% | −10% | −7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $92M | $147M | $227M | $207M | $201M | $299M | $256M | $353M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $308K | $9M | $7M | $7M | $8M | $10M | $14M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $98M | $212M | $277M | $213M | $231M | $242M | $242M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $9M | $15M | $16M | $28M | $20M | $27M | $79M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $89M | $206M | $267M | $192M | $219M | $226M | $177M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $261M | $524M | $594M | $477M | $605M | $563M | $653M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $76M | $169M | $210M | $115M | $138M | $127M | $124M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 3.4× | 3.1× | 2.8× | 4.2× | 4.4× | 4.4× | 5.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $7M | $67M | $765M | $791M | $484M | $484M | $484M | $484M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $810M | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $6M | $463M | $542M | $363M | $365M | $137M | $198M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($141M) | $236M | $334M | $162M | $66M | ($119M) | ($155M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 12.5× | 10.8× | 7.0× | 0.7× | -2.7× | 1.6× | 2.3× | 2.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $133M | $448M | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | 0.5% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 0.9% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 1.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 115M | 118M | 147M | 188M | 189M | 190M | 191M | 198M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.19 | $4.41 | $6.35 | $6.48 | $5.98 | $6.24 | $6.17 | $5.92 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.46 | $0.53 | $0.12 | $-1.34 | $-2.79 | $-0.82 | $-0.61 | $-0.41 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.12 | $0.74 | $-0.22 | $-0.50 | $0.86 | $0.78 | $1.19 | $1.22 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.46 | $-0.00 | $-1.79 | $-0.75 | $0.86 | $0.78 | $1.19 | $1.22 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.62 | $0.84 | $1.88 | $0.88 | $0.21 | $0.65 | $0.23 | $0.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.15 | $3.79 | $14.63 | $10.25 | $7.45 | $6.57 | $5.97 | $5.81 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +18.8%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +46.4%/yr | +10.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −15.2%/yr | −22.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +31.6%/yr | +9.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $116M loss into $229M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($116M) | ($155M) | ($527M) | ($253M) | $17M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$118M | +$113M | +$110M | +$116M | +$46M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$20M | +$20M | +$11M | +$18M | +$9M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$251M | +$294M | +$608M | +$141M | −$60M |
| Cash from operations | $273M | $271M | $202M | $23M | $13M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$44M | −$123M | −$40M | −$116M | −$46M |
| Owner earnings | $229M | $149M | $162M | ($93M) | ($33M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$48M | −$230M |
| Free cash flow | $229M | $149M | $162M | ($142M) | ($263M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 13% | 14% | -8% | -4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $208M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $143M ÷ interest expense $63M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- Net cashCash $256M − debt $137M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $119M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 3 + DIO 188 − DPO 21 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -11%–141%; 7% latest = NOPAT $72M ÷ invested capital $1.0BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -8%–19%; latest $229M = operating cash $273M − maintenance capex $44MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $208M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($116M) · cash from operations $273M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.38×HarvestingCapex $44M ÷ depreciation $118M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.43×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $137M vs $436M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −698%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.38/share (latest year $-0.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 36% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 36% early to 0% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +25%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 25% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −19.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +8.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$353M
- Receivables$14M
- Inventory$242M
- Other current assets$44M
- Debt due within a year$2M
- Accounts payable$79M
- Other current liabilities$43M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $901M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$819M · 91%
- Retained (debt / cash)$81M · 9%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $261M.
- Net change in share count71.5%
The diluted count rose from 115M to 198M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$308M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership3.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Trulieve Cannabis Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?71.5%
Diluted shares grew 71.5% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 7 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 7 years, $327M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pharmaceuticals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PAHCPhibro Animal Health Corporation | $1.3B | 32% | 8.8% | 16% | 3% |
| INDVIndivior Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $1.2B | 82% | -2.9% | — | -2% |
| TECHBio-Techne | $1.2B | 67% | 21.4% | 9% | 22% |
| TRLVTrulieve Cannabis Corp. | $1.2B | 60% | 12.1% | 6% | 13% |
| NVAXNovavax Inc. | $1.1B | 65% | -117.4% | -128% | -50% |
| PBHPrestige Consumer Healthcare | $1.1B | 56% | 29.0% | 8% | 21% |
| USNAUSANA Health Sciences | $925M | 82% | 12.7% | 57% | 10% |
| TLRYTilray Brands Inc. Common Stock | $821M | 24% | -66.6% | -32% | -32% |
| Group median | — | 63% | 10.5% | 8% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Trulieve Cannabis Corp. has delivered.
Trulieve Cannabis Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Trulieve Cannabis Corp. earns about $148M on its 12.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $241M on 192M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $155M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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