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TWI, Titan International Inc. (DE)

Steel capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Titan, is a global wheel, tire, and undercarriage industrial manufacturer and supplier that services customers across the globe.

As a leading manufacturer in the off-highway industry, Titan produces a broad range of products to meet the specifications of original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") and aftermarket customers in the agricultural, earthmoving/construction, and consumer markets.

Titan manufactures and sells certain tires under the Goodyear Farm Tire, Titan Tire, Carlstar and Voltyre-Prom Tire brands and has complete research and development facilities to validate tire and wheel designs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TWI · Titan International Inc. (DE)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.8B
−0.9% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $1.9B
Gross margin 14% 5-yr avg 15%
Operating margin −0.3% 5-yr avg 5.1%
ROIC −0% 5-yr avg 14%
Owner-earnings margin −2% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 1.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −2.8% and 9.5% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest North America at 53%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • North America53%$976M
  • Europe24%$447M
  • Latin America18%$324M
  • Other Countries4%$82M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.5B$1.6B$1.4B$1.3B$1.8B$2.2B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8BRevenueRevenue
11%12%12%9%10%13%17%17%14%14%14%Gross marginGross mgn
11%10%8%10%10%7%6%7%10%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%0%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($22M)($11M)$42M($28M)($35M)$85M$206M$149M$33M$21M($5M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.8%−0.8%2.6%−2.0%−2.8%4.8%9.5%8.2%1.8%1.1%−0.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($38M)($60M)$16M($48M)($60M)$50M$176M$79M($6M)($63M)($87M)Net incomeNet inc.
30%2%12%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$44M($1M)($36M)$45M$57M$11M$161M$179M$141M$30M$22MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$60M$58M$58M$54M$55M$48M$43M$42M$61M$67M$68MDepreciationDeprec.
$19M($1M)($111M)$38M$61M($90M)($63M)$53M$81M$23M$36MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$42M$33M$39M$36M$22M$39M$47M$61M$66M$55M$53MCapexCapex
3.3%2.2%2.4%2.5%1.7%2.2%2.2%3.3%3.6%3.0%2.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2M($34M)($75M)$9M$36M($28M)$114M$137M$76M($25M)($31M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.1%−2.3%−4.7%0.6%2.8%−1.6%5.2%7.5%4.1%−1.3%−1.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M($34M)($75M)$9M$36M($28M)$114M$119M$76M($25M)($31M)Free cash flowFCF
0.1%−2.3%−4.7%0.6%2.8%−1.6%5.2%6.5%4.1%−1.3%−1.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$144M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1M$1M$1M$1M$603K$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$25M$33MBuybacksBuybacks
-3%-1%5%-3%-5%14%22%17%2%-0%ROICROIC
-13%-19%6%-21%-34%22%46%17%-1%-12%-18%Return on equityROE
−13%−19%5%−21%−34%22%46%−18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$148M$144M$82M$67M$117M$98M$220M$196M$203M$199MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$179M$227M$242M$185M$193M$255M$267M$219M$212M$239M$338MReceivablesReceiv.
$272M$340M$396M$333M$294M$393M$397M$365M$437M$471M$468MInventoryInvent.
$148M$195M$212M$159M$167M$278M$263M$201M$220M$252M$278MAccounts payablePayables
$303M$371M$425M$360M$319M$370M$401M$383M$429M$458M$528MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$729M$783M$779M$651M$659M$813M$910M$877M$912M$986M$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$366M$373M$375M$327M$330M$451M$446M$363M$387M$428M$479MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×2.1×2.1×2.0×2.0×1.8×2.0×2.4×2.4×2.3×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$30M$30M$30MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BTotal assetsAssets
$506M$451M$461M$500M$465M$485M$446M$426M$568M$588M$666MTotal debtDebt
$358M$307M$380M$433M$347M$387M$446M$206M$372M$385M$467MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.7×-0.4×1.5×-0.9×-1.2×2.6×6.9×7.9×0.9×0.5×-0.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$297M$321M$279M$235M$179M$229M$381M$467M$496M$514M$495MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.2%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
53.9M59.3M59.9M60.1M60.8M62.7M63.7M63.0M68.7M63.7M64.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$23.47$24.75$26.75$24.10$20.71$28.40$34.06$28.94$26.88$28.70$28.76Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.70$-1.01$0.27$-0.81$-0.99$0.79$2.77$1.25$-0.08$-1.00$-1.36EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.03$-0.57$-1.25$0.15$0.58$-0.45$1.79$2.17$1.10$-0.39$-0.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.03$-0.57$-1.25$0.15$0.58$-0.45$1.79$1.88$1.10$-0.39$-0.48Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02$0.02$0.02$0.02$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.78$0.55$0.65$0.61$0.36$0.62$0.74$0.97$0.96$0.86$0.82Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.51$5.41$4.66$3.91$2.95$3.66$5.99$7.42$7.22$8.07$7.72Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.3%/yr+6.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.1%/yr+19.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.3%/yr+22.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
64Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
2%low FY2020
Gross margin
14%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.9×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($25M)owner earningsvs.($63M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $63M loss into ($25M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($63M)($6M)$79M$176M$50M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$67M+$61M+$42M+$43M+$48M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$3M+$5M+$5M+$4M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$23M+$81M+$53M−$63M−$90M
Cash from operations$30M$141M$179M$161M$11M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$55M−$66M−$42M−$47M−$39M
Owner earnings($25M)$76M$137M$114M($28M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$18M
Free cash flow($25M)$76M$119M$114M($28M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%4%8%5%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer ($28M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $21M ÷ interest expense $39M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $437M · 21.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $203M − debt $640M
    What this means

    Netting $203M of cash and short-term investments against $640M of debt leaves $437M owed, about 21.0× a year's operating profit (30.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 48 + DIO 109 − DPO 58 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -5%–22%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–8%; latest ($25M) = operating cash $30M − maintenance capex $55M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves ($28M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($63M) · cash from operations $30M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.81×
    Maintaining
    Capex $55M ÷ depreciation $67M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.30×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $640M vs $558M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.05/share (latest year $-0.99), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 0% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 0% early to 4% lately, median 1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −2.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$199M
  • Receivables$338M
  • Inventory$468M
  • Other current assets$45M
Current liabilities$479M
  • Debt due within a year$52M
  • Accounts payable$278M
  • Other current liabilities$149M
Current ratio2.19×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$572Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$52M due · $199M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$455Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($162M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$789M$123M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$23Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $631M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$438M · 69%
  • Dividends$5M · 1%
  • Buybacks$58M · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$130M · 21%
  • Returned to owners$63M

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $5M as dividends and $58M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $160M and cash and short-term investments rose $52M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$8.61

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $58M, about $8.61 each.

  • Net change in share count18.8%

    The diluted count rose from 54M to 64M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Reitz$4.5M$5.2M($28M)
2022Mr. Reitz$3.3M$5.1M$114M
2023Mr. Reitz$3.2M$3.1M$137M
2024Mr. Reitz$2.7M−$502k$76M
2025Mr. Reitz$2.4M$2.6M($25M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio69:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$3M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Titan International Inc. (DE) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?18.8%

    Diluted shares grew 18.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $58M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$506M → $666M

    Debt rose from $506M to $666M while owner earnings went from about ($36M) to $63M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$608M · 33% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “CUSTOMERS Titan's 10 largest customers accounted for 33% of net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025, and 35% of net sales for the year ended December 31, 2024.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Steel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WSWorthington Steel Inc.$3.1B11%5.2%12%3%
CRSCarpenter Technology$2.9B17%6.0%5%5%
NXQuanex Building Products Corporation$1.8B23%4.2%6%5%
SXCSunCoke Energy Inc.$1.8B7.8%8%6%
TWITitan International Inc. (DE)$1.8B13%1.5%2%0%
MTUSMetallus Inc.$1.2B8%0.3%0%3%
WORWorthington$1.2B17%2.4%4%8%
ROCKGibraltar Industries Inc.$1.1B25%9.6%12%11%
Group median17%4.7%6%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Titan International Inc. (DE) has delivered.

Titan International Inc. (DE)’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Titan International Inc. (DE) earns about $7M on its 0.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($31M) on 64M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $467M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Titan International Inc. (DE) (TWI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TWI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TWFG its page in the Manual TWIN →

Industry order: ← TS the Steel chapter TX →