Share count
267Mpeak FY2025
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UNIT, Uniti Group Inc.
The Kinetic business unit is a premier provider of multi-gigabit fiber internet, whole-home Wi-Fi, internet security, and voice services in approximately 1,400 markets across 18 states in the Southwestern, Southeastern, Midwestern and Northeastern U.S.
Uniti Group Inc. serves more than 1.0 million customers, including more than 500,000 residential fiber customers, with a network that includes approximately 1.9 million fiber-equipped households predominately situated in the Midwest and Southeast United States of America ("U.S.").
Segments Kinetic Segment Overview We manage as one business our residential, business and wholesale operations in markets in which we are the incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") due to the similarities with respect to service offerings and marketing strategies.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.2B
+91.5% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $2.9B 3-yr avg $1.5B
Revenue $988M +236.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 11.2% yr-ago 49.6%
Net income ($70M) yr-ago $12M
Net margin −7.1% yr-ago 4.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Fiber Infrastructure (45%), Kinetic (41%) and Uniti Solutions (15%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 33% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from 12% to 50% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 35% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Fiber Infrastructure at 45%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Fiber Infrastructure45%$995M
- Kinetic41%$909M
- Uniti Solutions15%$330M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $2.2B | $2.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 9% | 16% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $378M | $587M | $262M | $227M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 32.9% | 50.3% | 11.7% | 7.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($82M) | $93M | $1.3B | $1.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $353M | $367M | $350M | $603M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $311M | $315M | $667M | $877M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $112M | ($55M) | ($1.6B) | ($1.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $417M | $355M | $788M | $929M | CapexCapex |
| 36.3% | 30.4% | 35.3% | 31.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $43M | $12M | ($438M) | ($326M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.7% | 1.0% | −19.6% | −11.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($64M) | $12M | ($438M) | ($326M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −5.5% | 1.0% | −19.6% | −11.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $230M | $230M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $107M | $109M | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | 18% | 3% | 2% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 343% | 382% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 343% | 382% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $62M | $156M | $54M | $983M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $52M | $359M | $317M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $0 | $44M | $44M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $14M | $172M | $187M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $38M | $232M | $174M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $270M | $831M | $1.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $381M | $1.1B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.7× | 0.7× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $157M | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $5.3B | $12.0B | $13.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $5.8B | $9.5B | $10.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $5.6B | $9.5B | $9.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.8× | 1.1× | 0.4× | 0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($2.5B) | ($2.5B) | $380M | $320M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 143M | 143M | 267M | 252M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.07 | $8.15 | $8.38 | $11.61 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.57 | $0.65 | $4.90 | $4.85 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.30 | $0.08 | $-1.64 | $-1.29 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.45 | $0.08 | $-1.64 | $-1.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.75 | $0.76 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.93 | $2.48 | $2.96 | $3.68 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-17.43 | $-17.14 | $1.43 | $1.27 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.86 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($438M)owner earningsvs.$1.3Bnet incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2023FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $1.3B of profit but ($438M) of owner earnings: $1.7B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.3B | $93M | ($82M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$667M | +$315M | +$311M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$24M | +$14M | +$13M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.6B | −$55M | +$112M |
| Cash from operations | $350M | $367M | $353M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$788M | −$355M | −$311M |
| Owner earnings | ($438M) | $12M | $43M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$107M |
| Free cash flow | ($438M) | $12M | ($64M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -20% | 1% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer ($461M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $262M ÷ interest expense $603M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.5B · 36.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $54M − debt $9.5B
What this means
Netting $54M of cash and short-term investments against $9.5B of debt leaves $9.5B owed, about 36.2× a year's operating profit (36.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $262M ÷ invested capital $9.9B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -20%–4%; latest ($438M) = operating cash $350M − maintenance capex $788MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -20% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves ($461M).
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $350M ÷ net income $1.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.18×MaintainingCapex $788M ÷ depreciation $667M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $9.5B vs ($293M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.81/share (latest year $5.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.57/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Additionally, AI technology continues to develop in a highly competitive and rapidly evolving environment by a wide variety of technology companies, many of which are dedicating substantial resources to research and development initiatives.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.8B
- Cash & short-term investments$983M
- Receivables$317M
- Inventory$44M
- Other current assets$464M
Current liabilities$1.2B
- Debt due within a year$10M
- Accounts payable$187M
- Other current liabilities$976M
Current ratio1.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.50×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.84×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$635Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $983M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+236.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($11.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$11.1B$462M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$170Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$230Mover 3 years buying other businesses, against $1.6B of capital spent building
$204M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 89% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Gunderman | $5.0M | $6.3M | — |
| 2022 | Mr. Gunderman | $5.0M | −$2.8M | — |
| 2023 | Mr. Gunderman | $4.9M | $4.9M | $43M |
| 2024 | Mr. Gunderman | $11.3M | $13.3M | $12M |
| 2025 | Mr. Gunderman | $9.2M | $3.6M | ($438M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Telecom Operators
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LUMNLumen Technologies | $11.3B | 52% | 3.3% | 2% | 10% |
| GTNGray Media Inc. | $3.1B | — | 25.1% | 8% | 15% |
| AMCXAMC Global Media Inc. | $2.3B | 51% | 15.8% | 13% | 12% |
| UNITUniti Group Inc. | $2.2B | — | 32.9% | 3% | 1% |
| CABOCable One | $1.5B | — | 27.3% | 10% | 19% |
| IDTIDT Corporation | $1.2B | 24% | 2.8% | 75% | 2% |
| TDSTelephone and Data Systems | $1.1B | — | 2.2% | 1% | 3% |
| ATNIATN International Inc. | $667M | — | 2.5% | 1% | 3% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.5% | 5% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFUniti Group Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−11%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Uniti Group Inc. (UNIT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UNIT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← UNH its page in the Manual UNM →
Industry order: ← UCL the Telecom Operators chapter UZD →