Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← GTM Manual GTX → ← GLIBK Media & Broadcasting IHRT →

GTN, Gray Media Inc.

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Cyclical

Our television stations serve 114 full-power television markets that collectively reach approximately 37% of US television households.

Unless otherwise indicated, all station rank, in-market share and television household data herein are derived from reports prepared by The Nielsen Company US, LLC ("Nielsen") and/or Comscore, Inc.

Our additional media properties include video production companies Raycom Sports, Tupelo Media Group, and PowerNation Studios, and studio production facilities Assembly Atlanta and Third Rail Studios. 3 Our operating revenues are derived primarily from broadcast and digital advertising and from retransmission consent fees.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GTN · Gray Media Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.1B
−15.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $3.2B
Operating margin 12.4% 5-yr avg 18.1%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Core Advertising (47%) and Retransmission Consent (46%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 23% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 12% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Core Advertising at 47%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Core Advertising47%$1.5B
  • Retransmission Consent46%$1.4B
  • Production Companies3%$107M
  • Service, Other2%$65M
  • Political Advertising1%$42M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$812M$883M$1.1B$2.1B$2.4B$2.4B$3.7B$3.3B$3.6B$3.1B$3.1BRevenueRevenue
5%4%4%5%3%7%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$234M$290M$389M$478M$752M$381M$990M$383M$851M$392M$381MOperating incomeOp. inc.
28.8%32.8%35.9%22.5%31.6%15.8%26.9%11.7%23.4%12.7%12.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$62M$262M$211M$179M$410M$90M$455M($76M)$375M($85M)($96M)Net incomeNet inc.
41%27%30%25%46%26%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$210M$180M$323M$385M$652M$300M$829M$648M$751M$289M$158MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$46M$52M$75M$195M$201M$221M$336M$339M$269M$237M$239MDepreciationDeprec.
$97M($143M)$30M($5M)$25M($25M)$16M$365M$85M$115M($8M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$44M$35M$70M$110M$110M$207M$436M$348M$143M$108M$112MCapexCapex
5.4%4.0%6.5%5.2%4.6%8.6%11.9%10.6%3.9%3.5%3.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$166M$145M$253M$275M$542M$93M$493M$300M$608M$181M$46MOwner earningsOwner earn.
20.5%16.4%23.3%13.0%22.8%3.9%13.4%9.1%16.7%5.8%1.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$166M$145M$253M$275M$542M$93M$393M$300M$608M$181M$46MFree cash flowFCF
20.5%16.4%23.3%13.0%22.8%3.9%10.7%9.1%16.7%5.8%1.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$432M$416M$0$2.8B$91M$3.8B$58M$6M$1M$0$67MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$0$0$31M$30M$30M$32M$33M$34MDividends paidDiv. paid
$2M$4M$19M$32M$75M$30M$50M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
7%12%9%7%11%2%9%4%8%4%4%ROICROIC
13%26%18%12%23%5%22%-4%16%-4%-5%Return on equityROE
13%26%12%23%3%20%−5%15%−5%−6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$325M$462M$667M$212M$773M$189M$61M$21M$135M$368M$259MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$147M$171M$184M$411M$425M$624M$650M$342M$337M$205M$178MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$8M$8M$11M$10M$59M$55M$23M$154M$144M$130MAccounts payablePayables
$142M$163M$176M$400M$415M$565M$595M$319M$183M$61M$48MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$505M$667M$873M$672M$1.3B$963M$857M$468M$541M$656M$523MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$119M$131M$150M$246M$255M$384M$409M$395M$527M$516M$437MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.2×5.1×5.8×2.7×5.1×2.5×2.1×1.2×1.0×1.3×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$485M$611M$612M$1.4B$1.5B$2.6B$2.7B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.8B$3.3B$4.2B$7.0B$7.6B$11.1B$11.2B$10.6B$10.5B$10.4B$10.3BTotal assetsAssets
$1.8B$1.8B$2.5B$3.7B$4.0B$6.8B$6.5B$6.2B$5.6B$5.7B$5.7BTotal debtDebt
$1.4B$1.4B$1.9B$3.5B$3.2B$6.6B$6.4B$6.1B$5.5B$5.4B$5.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$493M$994M$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$1.8B$2.1B$2.0B$2.3B$2.2B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%1.0%0.6%0.8%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
72.8M74.0M89.0M100M97.0M95.0M93.0M92.0M96.0M97.0M97.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.17$11.93$12.18$21.22$24.55$25.40$39.53$35.66$37.96$31.91$31.76Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.86$3.54$2.37$1.79$4.23$0.95$4.89$-0.83$3.91$-0.88$-0.99EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.29$1.96$2.84$2.75$5.59$0.98$5.30$3.26$6.33$1.87$0.47Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.29$1.96$2.84$2.75$5.59$0.98$4.23$3.26$6.33$1.87$0.47Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.33$0.32$0.33$0.33$0.34$0.35Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.60$0.47$0.79$1.10$1.13$2.18$4.69$3.78$1.49$1.11$1.15Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.78$13.43$13.34$14.64$18.07$18.49$22.75$21.42$23.78$22.22$21.78Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.4%/yr+5.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.2%/yr−19.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.1%/yr−0.4%/yr
Book value / share+14.1%/yr+4.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
97Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
4%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
29.7×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$181Mowner earningsvs.($85M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $85M loss into $181M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($85M)$375M($76M)$455M$90M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$237M+$269M+$339M+$336M+$221M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$22M+$22M+$20M+$22M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$115M+$85M+$365M+$16M−$25M
Cash from operations$289M$751M$648M$829M$300M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$108M−$143M−$348M−$336M−$207M
Owner earnings$181M$608M$300M$493M$93M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$100M
Free cash flow$181M$608M$300M$393M$93M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%17%9%13%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $22M), owner earnings is nearer $159M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.4B · 13.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $368M − debt $5.7B
    What this means

    Netting $368M of cash and short-term investments against $5.7B of debt leaves $5.4B owed, about 13.7× a year's operating profit (14.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–12%; 4% latest = NOPAT $310M ÷ invested capital $7.5B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–23%; latest $181M = operating cash $289M − maintenance capex $108M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $22M of SBC) leaves $159M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($85M) · cash from operations $289M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $181M
    What this means

    Of $181M Owner Earnings, $33M (18%) went back to shareholders, $33M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.46×
    Harvesting
    Capex $108M ÷ depreciation $237M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.7B vs $140M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −60%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.74/share (latest year $-0.88), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.22/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 33% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 33% early to 16% lately, median 23% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 11.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$523M
  • Cash & short-term investments$259M
  • Receivables$178M
  • Other current assets$86M
Current liabilities$437M
  • Accounts payable$130M
  • Other current liabilities$307M
Current ratio1.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.59×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$86Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($666M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.8B$67M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$21Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.6B · 35%
  • Dividends$156M · 3%
  • Buybacks$212M · 5%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 57%
  • Returned to owners$368M

    12% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $156M as dividends and $212M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $4.0B and cash and short-term investments fell $66M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $212M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count33.3%

    The diluted count rose from 73M to 97M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.34/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $175M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.8B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$7.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.6B of capital spent building

$16M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Howell$11.5M$12.9M$93M
2022Mr. Howell$7.9M$3.2M$493M
2023Mr. Howell$10.6M$8.1M$300M
2024Mr. Howell$10.9M$6.6M$608M
2025Mr. Howell$11.5M$22.6M$181M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$22M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gray Media Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?10.6% vs 20.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.1% early in the record and 10.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?33.3%

    Diluted shares grew 33.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $212M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.8B → $5.7B

    Debt rose from $1.8B to $5.7B while owner earnings went from about $188M to $363M — about 9.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 16 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FOXFox Corporation$16.3B20.9%13%15%
VSNTVersant Media Group, Inc.$6.7B26.1%13%31%
NXSTNexstar Media Group Inc.$4.9B24.3%9%22%
FWONALiberty Media Corporation$4.5B73%13.6%4%18%
IHRTiHeartMedia Inc.$3.9B2.9%-1%2%
SBGISinclair Inc.$3.2B5.5%11%4%
GTNGray Media Inc.$3.1B25.1%8%15%
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.$2.3B51%15.8%13%12%
Group median18.4%10%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gray Media Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Gray Media Inc. earns about $462M on its 14.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $46M on 97M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $5.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gray Media Inc. (GTN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GTN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GTM its page in the Manual GTX →

Industry order: ← GLIBK the Media & Broadcasting chapter IHRT →